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Abstract 
 
 
Complexities of the post-New Public Management (NPM) era have resulted in a new 
governance regime that hinges on ‘collaboration’, a network-based model that links various 
stakeholders (state and non-state actors) to promote sustainable governance. This study sets 
out to examine the theory and practice of collaborative natural resource governance (CNRG) 
with a special focus on the triggers of collaboration and institutional evolution using the 
experience of Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana. The study’s first two objectives 
are conceptual in nature to advance knowledge in the field of CNRG which culminated in 
publishing two peer-reviewed articles (Chapters Five and Six). The first article “Rising to 
the challenge: A framework for optimising value in collaborative natural resource 
governance” provides pointers to enhance the process of natural resource collaboration 
(Chapter Five). A second article “Institutional assessment in natural resource governance” 
conceptualises the interplay of formal and informal institutions in natural resource 
governance (Chapter Six). Empirically, the study adapts the philosophy of transdisciplinary 
research approach (published as peer-reviewed article in Chapter Four), interspersed with 
ethnography, to advance three key objectives. The first empirical objective was to identify 
the trajectory of institutional evolution as well as the triggers. Results and conclusions are 
published as a third article “Complex Crisis’ and the rise of Collaborative Natural Resource 
Governance: Institutional Trajectory of a Wildlife Governance Experience in Ghana” in 
Environment, Development and Sustainability Journal (Chapter Seven). A second empirical 
objective was to examine the interplay of formal and informal institutions in the governance 
of wildlife in the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS). This is to be published as a 
fourth article “Two sides of the same coin: Synergy between formal and informal institutions 
in natural resource governance” (Chapter Eight). A final phase of the study discussed a 
“bottom-up” approach to natural resource governance collaboration to foster sustainable 
governance of resources. This was also published as “Comparative Conservation Studies: A 
“Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance” (Chapter Nine). A general 
conclusion derived from the study is that the ability of a natural resource governance system 
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to adjust or readjust its institutional underpinnings and governance regime in the face of 
threat, of whatever form or intensity, contributes immensely to the viability of the particular 
ecosystem. Institutions must necessarily evolve to adapt when there is sufficient evidence 
that the existing regime has become weakened in the face of the changing internal and 
external conditions of social-ecological systems. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die kompleksiteit van die post-Nuwe Openbare Bestuur (NPM)-era het gelei tot ’n nuwe 
regeer- en bestuurstelsels met betrekking tot ‘samewerking,’ ’n netwerkgebaseerde model 
wat verskeie belanghebbendes (staats- en nie-staatsdeelhouers) verbind om volhoubare 
beheer en bestuur te bevorder.  Hierdie studie ondersoek die teorie en praktyk van 
samewerkende of kollaboratiewe natuurlike hulpbronbestuur (CNRG) met ’n spesiale fokus 
op die snellers wat samewerking en institusionele evolusie van stapel laat loop deur die 
ondervinding wat by die Boabeng-Fiema aapvlugsoord in Ghana opgedoen is.  Die studie se 
eerste twee doelwitte is van nature konseptueel om kennis op die gebied van CNRG te 
bevorder.  Dit het aanleiding gegee tot die publikasie van twee portuur-beoordeelde artikels 
(hoofstukke 5 en 6).  Die eerste artikel, “Rising to the challenge: A framework for optimising 
value in collaborative natural resource governance,” bied aanduidings vir die bevordering 
van die proses van natuurlike hulpbron-samewerking (hoofstuk 5).  ’n Tweede artikel, 
“Institutional assessment in natural resource governance,” konseptualiseer die 
wisselwerking tussen formele en informele instellings in natuurlike hulpbronbestuur 
(hoofstuk 6).  Empiries-gesproke pas dié studie die filosofie van die transdissiplinêre 
benadering toe (as portuur-beoordeelde publikasie in hoofstuk 4 gepubliseer), afgewissel 
met etnografie om sodoende drie belangrike doelwitte te bevorder.  Die eerste empiriese 
doelwit was om die trajek van institusionele evolusie te identifiseer, sowel as die snellers 
wat dit aan die gang sit.  Resultate en bevindinge is in ’n derde artikel, “Complex Crisis’ and 
the rise of Collaborative Natural Resource Governance: Institutional Trajectory of a Wildlife 
Governance Experience in Ghana” in Environment, Development and Sustainability Journal 
(hoofstuk 7) gepubliseer.  ’n Tweede empiriese doelwit was om die wisselwerking tussen 
formele en informele instellings in die bestuur van wild in die Boabeng-Fiema 
Bobbejaantoevlugsoord (BFMS) te ondersoek.  Dié sal as ’n vierde artikel, “Two sides of 
the same coin: Synergy between formal and informal institutions in natural resource 
governance“(hoofstuk 8) gepubliseer word.  ’n Slotfase van die studie het ’n “onder-na-bo” 
benadering tot natuurlike hulpbronbestuur bespreek met die oog op die bevordering van 
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volhoubare hulpbronbestuur.  Dié is ook gepubliseer as “Comparative Conservation Studies: 
A “Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance” (hoofstuk 9).  ’n Algemene 
afleiding wat uit die studie gemaak is, is dat die vermoë van ’n natuurlike 
hulpbronbestuurstelsel om sy institusionele onderstutte en regeerstelsel in die aangesig van 
’n bedreiging, in watter vorm of intensiteit ookal, aan te pas, of her aan te pas, oneindig veel 
bydra tot die lewensvatbaarheid van die spesifieke ekostelsel.  Dit is nodig dat instellings 
moet ontwikkel om aan te pas waar daar voldoende bewys is dat die bestuur- en regeerstelsel 
in die lig van veranderde interne en eksterne toestande van sosiaal-eklogiese stelsels verswak 
het. 
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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The study sets out to examine the theory and practice of institutional assessment in 
collaborative natural resource governance. The empirical work was carried out in the 
Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana, West Africa. The first chapter of the study 
provides a general introduction presenting a background to the study, and a brief literature 
review which sets the stage for the problem statement. The chapter highlights the 
complexities inherent in wildlife governance and justifies the need for a transdisciplinary 
research approach. It also presents five key study objectives underpinning the study as well 
as the corresponding research questions to achieve the objectives. The significance of the 
study is discussed and a chapter outline is provided. 
 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
Protecting the environment and its resources has been a key goal championed by the global 
community which featured in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and ‘MDGs 
beyond 2015’ as well as various international conventions. In order to make way for effective 
biological conservation and ecosystem stability, many countries have designated ‘protected 
areas and species’. The ‘2014 United Nations List of Protected Areas’ lists about 209,000 
protected areas. On the African continent in particular, protected areas account for about 
14% of terrestrial areas and 2.4% of marine areas, which form 15% of the world’s protected 
areas (Deguignet et al., 2014).  
 
Setting aside protected areas is mostly based on sustainability issues, but modern scholarship 
on sustainable development suggests that the philosophical underpinning of development 
should view each of the three values (economic, social and environmental) as 
complementary and not substitutory (Tafon & Saunders, 2015). However, the people’s quest 
to meet their primary survival needs tends to put unregulated and enormous pressure on the 
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environment (Triplet, 2009). This suggests that the mere fact of designating an area as a 
‘protected area’ does not necessarily mean the particular area is effectively protected and 
that most of these protected areas in fact appear to be ineffective (Triplet, 2009). To address 
this poorly regulated trend, scholars have argued for an integrated approach which calls for 
co-management of these protected areas by linking various actors from national, local, 
private sector and civil society (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004; Wyborn & Bixler, 2013). 
This makes the role of institutional arrangements – not just professing them but actual 
enforcement – very distinctive in conservation and management efforts. Especially in the 
African context, state agencies and formal legislation on natural resources proliferate, but 
enforcement and compliance appear problematic: “at the institutional and legal level, most 
African countries have a satisfactory framework for protected areas; however, despite an 
abundance of laws and institutions, the framework is often ineffective and less strictly 
enforced for management of protected areas, and especially when there are economic 
interests” (Iritie, 2015:202). According to Rockstrom et al. (2009), humanity has already 
crossed the planet’s boundaries for sustainable development for at least three indicators: 
climate change, the nitrogen cycle and biodiversity loss. What appears more problematic is 
that these three processes are mostly interlinked and tend to influence one another. 
 
Whilst previous thinking on natural resource management (before the late 1980s) tended to 
focus a great deal on the role of national governments and appeared to view communities as 
detrimental to management and conservation, there has been a paradigm shift that views 
communities as strategic partners in natural resource conservation and management 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Agrawal and Gibson (1999:630), referencing the work of 
Chitere (1994) and Etzioni (1996), observe a “break from previous work on development 
which considered communities to hinder progressive social change, current writing 
champions the role of community in bringing about decentralisation, meaningful 
participation, cultural autonomy, and conservation”. This concept is fundamentally 
attributed to the acknowledgement of a key narrative forcefully brought home by Ostrom 
(1990) to the effect that  local communities, when granted sufficient property rights over 
local resources, can self-organise and develop local-level institutions to regulate sustainable 
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use of natural resources. In a related argument, Ojha (2014) maintains that though CBNRM 
is viewed as ‘community-based’, it should be linked up with other actors in order to 
strengthen capacities. It is evident from the foregoing that neither the central government 
nor the local people can act effectively with a stand alone approach, but such action in fact 
calls for co-management and joint solutions. 
 
In the view of Salamon (2002), this is perhaps the driving force for solving public problems 
in contemporary times and in the future. Salamon’s emphasis has been on a collaborative 
approach to solving public problems. Instead of relying exclusively on government to solve 
public problems, numerous other actors have to be mobilised as well, sometimes on their 
own initiative, but often in complex partnerships with the state. The ever evolving concept 
of co-management of natural resources has consequently become a logical approach to 
solving resource management problems by means of partnership (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). 
They explain that the difficulty for indigenous communities to effectively manage on their 
own because natural resources entail complexities operating in a heterogeneous society. On 
the other hand, there is also a plethora of data or evidence which indicates that centralised 
management of local resources is problematic (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).  
 
Ecologists use the concept of social scale to refer to the different dimensions of institutional 
size, various actors and their representation, as well as power arrangements, whose 
dimensions range from individuals to networks of organisations involving, inter alia, the 
rules, laws, policies and norms that govern the extent of resource-related rights and 
management responsibilities (Gibson et al., 2000; Cumming et al., 2006). This suggests that 
the management approaches of protected areas differ across scales that influence (and are 
influenced by) governance, affecting outputs and outcomes of the socioecological systems 
(Ostrom, 2009; Maciejewski et al., 2015). Scholars point out that institutional designs that 
influence the contemporary management of natural resources have their roots in the past 
(Brechin et al., 2003; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2013; Ojha, 2014). This calls for a more 
historically-oriented institutional approach in assessing the forces that have shaped the social 
scale or institutional arrangement that underpins the co-management of natural resources.  
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Widely touted as an era of ‘network governance’ or collaborative governance, this study 
examines the path-dependency forces that have shaped contemporary institutional 
arrangements as well as the enforcement complementarities in the governance of the 
Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana. This community provides a rich empirical 
case of how periods of ‘critical junctures’ help shape institutional arrangements in the 
governance of natural resources. In this dissertation collaborative natural resource 
governance and co-management have been used interchangeably to connote “the new 
governance system that places emphasis on different stakeholders (forging alliances between 
state and non-state actors) to prudently and methodically govern natural resources” (see 
Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016:20). 
 
 
1.3 Literature review and rationale for institutional assessment 
A preliminary search of the literature on co-management of environmental resources reveals 
an extensive contemporary academic discourse, especially from the 1990s. The literature 
covers a wide range of topics:  
 descriptions of conceptual and methodological approaches to co-management 
(Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Fraser et al., 2006);  
 studies that view the concept in a more holistic manner by focusing on the complexity 
of contemporary societies (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1999; Blaikie, 
2006);  
 examinations of how co-management in natural resource management could create 
public value (Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Mandarano, 2008; Muller, 2010; Rogers & 
Weber, 2010; Biddle & Koontz, 2014);  
 processes of continuous learning to improve collaborative outcomes (Berkes, 2010; 
Cundill & Rodela, 2012; Reed et al., 2014); 
 studies on the roles of traditional institutions in environmental resource conservation 
(Berkes et al., 2000; Colding & Folke, 2001; Koontz et al., 2004, Negi, 2010);  
 Adopting more quantitative techniques to assess socioecological mismatches in the 
co-management process (Maciejewski et al., 2015).  
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In spite of the plethora of literature on co-management of environmental resources, not much 
effort has been made to assess the contextual factors that shape the institutional dynamics as 
well as actual enforcement of contemporary ‘networked’ institutional regimes. This study is 
relevant as it firstly provides a more narrative-based approach to trace how cultural and 
historical interactions have shaped the institutional designs that underpin wildlife resource 
governance in the Boabeng-Fiema community. Though studies point out that institutions are 
created by individuals who are reflective, adaptive and active agents in changing institutions 
to suit a complex array of problem-solving needs, little attention has been devoted to the 
contextual factors or the narratives behind these institutional adaptations that underpin 
natural resource governance (Swedberg, 2012; Edwards & Steins 1999). 
 
Secondly, this study is relevant and current as on-going publications in natural resource 
governance tend to focus their attention on institutions or rules and institutional analyses 
(Fischer et al., 2014; Petty et al., 2015; Arts et al., 2014). Whilst all these studies appear to 
assess the role of institutional design in forest and wildlife governance, the approaches and 
methodologies adopted do not enable them to coherently and adequately explain how these 
institutions have evolved over time. For instance, Fischer et al. (2014:168) note “our findings 
suggest that such insights into historical institutions are absolutely indispensable for the 
design of today’s co-management arrangements … research and applied conservation work 
need to understand historical relationships between the relevant actors to make 
contemporary resource governance sustainable”. However, throughout their study, the 
presence of community or relevant actors is not readily evident in the analysis. Such a study 
requires people or community members telling their stories in the form of narratives which 
would clearly bring out the socio-cultural and ecological factors that have shaped the 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Thirdly, a study into institutional arrangements, their enforcement mechanisms and 
constraints in co-management using a transdisciplinary approach is very relevant. 
Institutional arrangements, their relevance and challenges in natural resource governance 
have been addressed in a fragmented way by scholars adopting perhaps mono-disciplinary 
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and more reductionist perspectives that lead to conclusions that do not really address the 
underlying factors. For instance, ecologists may be tempted to adopt a more reductionist 
view in developing models and variables that in the end may not bring to light the main 
picture and the underpinning reasons for institutional and governance evolution. In a study 
by Maciejewski et al. (2015), the authors themselves did point out a weakness or limitation 
that “while our analysis shows that socioecological elements inevitably interact across 
multiple scales to produce positive and negative outcomes, we do not investigate the 
mechanisms that produce cross-scale feedbacks and scale-mismatch” (Maciejewski et al., 
2015:21). This calls for a more transdisciplinary and holistic study that interacts with 
multiple stakeholders and community members in co-designing and co-producing 
knowledge on institutional processes underpinning the governance of their ecosystems. 
Transdisciplinarity connotes a research approach that cuts across academic boundaries, 
actors and concepts in a process of co-designing and co-producing practical knowledge that 
is more transformative. It is therefore essential that TD brings stakeholders on board who 
are able to synthesise ideas. Perhaps, it is through this iterative process that co-management 
is viewed as a process of continuous learning to improve collaborative outcomes (Cundill & 
Rodela, 2012; Reed et al., 2014). 
 
Moreover, though the literature on institutional arrangements in co-management is on-going, 
it appears to be predominant mostly in India (Singh et al., 2011; Ojha, 2014; Arts et al., 
2014) and the developed world, such as the USA (Petty et al., 2015) and Southern Australia 
(MacDonald et al., 2013). There is a paucity of literature from the African sub-region with 
only a few studies (Fischer et al., 2014 in Ethiopia; Kamoto et al., 2013 in Malawi). These 
few studies in the African context do not bring out the complex patterns of institutional 
evolution. There is a dearth of knowledge from that context, especially the West African 
sub-region, which is also heterogeneous in terms of governance systems (chieftaincy, 
priesthood and modern governance) which could have implications for contemporary 
institutional arrangements and complications. This study deals with perspectives from a 
transitional zone within a West African context, which could add greater detail and depth to 
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the on-going contributions on institutionalism and collaborative natural resource 
governance.   
In addition to the above studies, ongoing research on institutions tends only to assess the 
contemporary institutional arrangements; Fischer et al. (2014) dig into the past but mostly 
draw on secondary materials with the participants never reflecting in the analysis. This 
research also often makes proposals and draws inferences to stimulate further research to 
assess the trajectory of these contemporary institutions. Mostly neglected, however, are the 
implementation complementarities of these institutional patterns. However, the 
institutionalist school of thought argues for rules, not just rules but should be well-known, 
well enforced and internalised by the people (Leftwich, 2007). This study does not only 
assess the narratives that have shaped the institutions underpinning resource governance, but 
also examines the enforcement mechanisms and how they shape people’s behaviour. This is 
relevant as studies in developing countries point out that poorly designed institutions do 
produce counter-effects and these are even preferred to a situation where there are no 
institutions (Kamoto et al., 2013). 
 
 
1.4 Institutionalism in natural resource governance as a complex system 
Management of forest and wildlife resources from the 20th century has moved from the 
archetypical fortress approach to a networked system which is now referred to by various 
names, inter alia, environmental governance, collaborative process, co-management and 
community-based natural resources management. Though each of these varies slightly 
conceptually, the underpinning similarity among all of them is an emphasis on several actors, 
an interplay of divergent stakeholders, and a network of individuals and groups who jointly 
manage natural resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). For 
instance, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) forcefully argue that co-management should not be 
viewed as a two-way process, just between the state and community. This will appear as if 
the community is just one homogenous entity, but actors within the community are in fact 
heterogeneous and diverse. Co-management of environmental resources involves power-
sharing arrangements, responsibilities and benefits (Leach et al., 1999; Castro & Nielson, 
2001; Blaikie, 2005). 
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Even where one is tempted to narrowly view co-management as just two-way affair between 
government and the community, Duane (1997) identifies three types of communities; 
communities of places that are tied by physical geographical space, communities of identity 
which are tied to each other through social characteristics, and communities of interest, 
whose commonalities are derived from the benefits they receive from the resource in 
question or the cost they impose on it. This suggests that co-management of environmental 
resources is a complex, ‘fuzzy’, ‘wicked’ and ‘ill-defined’ phenomenon which requires a 
more transdisciplinary process in assessing the institutional arrangements underpinning 
contemporary co-management processes. How, why and what forces underpin the present 
institutional arrangement? Did they evolve naturally or as a result of conflict between the 
various stakeholders? To what extent are the institutional arrangements being enforced 
among the myriads of actors and community members, and what factors enhance or derail 
the process? 
 
Given the complexity of African societies – in this case, Ghana, where the people have 
traditional governance systems underpinned by conventions and taboos and also modern 
governance systems – how have these two systems mutually affected each other in the 
institutional arrangement governing the co-management processes of forest and wildlife 
resources? How do these two governance systems feature in the institutional design and 
enforcement complementarities? 
 
Finally, forest and wildlife resources per se are ‘fuzzy’ in nature in the context of sustainable 
development, and while the ultimate goal of foresters and wardens is to ensure ecological 
protection, that of the local people is to use the same resources for their primary survival. In 
the light of this situation, the interplay between the three main values of sustainable 
development – economic, social and environmental – finding a way to strike a meaningful 
and agreed-upon balance is more complex. Therefore, a study of how and why institutions 
have developed, how they shape people’s behaviour and enforced require systems thinking 
because the entire process is complex, fuzzy and there is so much at stake. 
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1.5 Transdisciplinary research in natural resource governance 
The complexity of institutional design and enforcement complementarities that underpin 
natural resources in the African context requires greater synthesis in the approach to research 
on it. However, the ever-increasing volume and complexity of scientific data, along with an 
emphasis on reductionism, has favoured scientific specialisation and knowledge 
fragmentation (Sidlauskas et al., 2010; Hampton & Parker, 2011). The fuzzy nature of the 
increasing depletion of forest and wildlife resources, however, requires solutions that 
transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries and a synthesis of knowledge (Carpenter et al., 
2009). A transdisciplinary approach (TD) entails a study that cuts across academic 
boundaries, actors, fields and approaches in an attempt to co-design and co-produce holistic 
knowledge that is more transformative. Pohl (2005) observes that two main motives tend to 
justify TD: (1) it is epistemologically challenging to search for a viewpoint that lies between, 
or beyond, disciplines; and (2) it is socially responsible to take knowledge which is produced 
and organised in accordance with a particular discipline and rearrange it so as to make it 
useful and meaningful for socially relevant issues. The complexity of social phenomena 
prompted Brewer (1999:328) to object to mono-disciplinary approaches by stating that “the 
world has problems, but universities have departments”. 
 
Reviewing relevant documents on TD, Pohl (2005) observes four key features or trends. 
Firstly, TD takes into account the complexity of an issue – meaning the complex system of 
factors that together explain the issue’s current state and its dynamics; it addresses both 
science and society’s diverse perceptions of an issue. Secondly, TD sets aside the idealised 
context of science in order to produce practically relevant knowledge; thirdly, it deals with 
the issues and possible improvements of the status quo that are involved in balancing the 
diverse interests and inputs of individual stakeholders and disciplines (Pohl, 2005:1161). On 
the final feature, the author then argues that TD could be viewed as a research approach more 
oriented towards the common interest, which is a term in the ‘policy sciences’ (Clark & 
Clark, 2002). For instance, Blaikie (2005) argues that in spite of the theoretical benefits of 
co-management, at the end of the day, it is what actually occurs in the field that determines 
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its worth. If indeed co-management in natural resources could create value (Leach & 
Sabatier, 2005; Mandarano, 2008; Muller, 2010; Rogers & Weber, 2010; Biddle & Koontz, 
2014), much has to do with the institutional designs and enforcement complementarities; it 
therefore requires TD, which brings a range of diverse stakeholders on board to synthesise 
ideas. Perhaps it is through this iterative process that co-management is viewed as a process 
of continuous learning to improve collaborative outcomes (Berkes, 2010; Cundill & Rodela, 
2012; Reed et al., 2014)  
Research on institutions and how they shape actors’ choices and behaviour in natural 
resources management needs to adopt a TD approach so that outcomes produce useful 
knowledge relevant to society. In other words, attempts to mitigate the environmental effects 
of global population growth and increasing socio-ecological complexity are a daunting 
challenge whose effective resolution requires synthesis, that is, the integration of disparate 
information to generate novel insights from heterogeneous, complex situations where there 
are diverse perspectives.  
 
 
1.6 Statement of the problem 
The need for management and conservation of natural resources has been professed by the 
global community, regional blocs, and national and local governments. For instance, the 
2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro (Rio+20) has as one of 
its two main themes, “strengthening the institutional framework for sustainable 
development”. 
 
Contemporary thinking on management of natural resources stresses a consensus-based 
approach mainly through a collaborative governance process (Chambers, 2003; Carlsson & 
Berkes, 2005; Ostrom, 2009; Muller, 2010; Ojha, 2014; Maciejewski et al., 2015). For 
instance, using the Nepal case, Ojha (2014) uses the term ‘regime’ to make a case for a 
conceptual shift away from the localised, community-centric view of community-based 
resource management to one that recognises multi-scalar politics involved in defining the 
meanings and practices of community forestry. This suggests a more collaborative approach 
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between local communities and other networks of actors to ensure the creation of value in 
the governance process. Other studies stress the need for incorporating local participation in 
the management process of protected areas; this has come to be referred to as the need for 
integrated conservation and development programmes (ICDP) which have shaped 
conservation thinking since the 1980s that aims at achieving globally agreed conservation 
goals whilst at the same time enhancing the socio-economic lives of community members 
(Saunders, 2011 cited in Tafon & Saunders, 2015). When these two goals are achieved 
effectively, local participation in the management process could enable enforcement of 
protection laws to reinforce conservation goals.  
 
Effective management is underpinned by the institutional arrangements and enforcement 
mechanisms, especially, where many actors are involved in the management process. The 
institutional arrangements that shape forest and wildlife governance do have a historical 
trajectory mostly propelled by periods of ‘critical junctures’. In a related argument, Fischer 
et al. (2014:168) assess co-management of forest resources using two cases from Ethiopia. 
The authors observed that the interplay of actors evolved over time and they consequently 
posit that “our findings suggest that such insights into historical institutions are absolutely 
indispensable for the design of today’s co-management arrangements… research and applied 
conservation work need to understand historical relationships between the relevant actors to 
make contemporary resource governance sustainable”. The above statements suggest that 
existing thinking in co-management of environmental resources appears to be more 
interested in the actual underpinnings and narratives behind the current institutional design 
and power arrangements as well as the triggers and forces shaping current natural resource 
institutions. It is driven by an increasing social science emphasis on the ‘contexts of practice’ 
for drawing up theoretical insights (Swedberg, 2012). Consequently, the main thesis of this 
study is to assess the theory and practice of natural resource governance collaboration with 
particular emphasis on institutionalism and the triggers of institutional evolution. Using an 
institutional analysis framework, this study examines the trajectory of institutional design as 
well as the interplay of formal and informal institutions in the collaborative natural resource 
governance of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana.  
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1.7 Research objectives 
The main objective of the study is to conceptualise analytical models to discuss the theory 
and practice of collaborative natural resource governance and to situate this within the setting 
of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS). It assesses the ‘institutional trajectory’ 
as well as the ‘formal-informal’ institutional interplay in the management of wildlife 
resources. In order to achieve this broader objective, the study is guided by the following 
specific objectives: 
 
1. To design a framework to optimise the facilitation of collaboration between local 
resource users and state agencies in natural resource governance; 
2. To examine institutional analysis in natural resource governance; 
3. To examine the institutional and governance evolution of Boabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary and its triggers; 
4. To empirically examine the interplay of formal and informal institutions in natural 
resource governance; 
5. To discuss the role of ‘a champion’ in a ‘bottom-up approach’ to natural resource 
collaboration. 
 
 
1.8 Research questions 
In an attempt to achieve the objectives outlined above, the study is directed by the following 
research questions: 
1. What conceptual design facilitates the drive to collaboration between local natural 
resource users and state agencies? 
2. What framework demonstrates how formal and informal institutions interact in 
natural resource governance? 
3. How has the governance and institutional design of Boabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary evolved over time and what were the triggers? 
4. How does the interplay of formal and informal institutions engender effective natural 
resource protection in BFMS? 
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5. How does collaborative natural resource governance evolve from below? 
1.9 Significance of the study 
The significance of the study could be assessed from three main perspectives: its contribution 
to policy, to practice and to the literature. 
 
Firstly, the study contributes to policy making on environmental conservation and 
management, which has become a major challenge for many developing African countries, 
specifically Ghana. Ghana has in recent times witnessed most of its environmental resources 
being depleted and destroyed as a result of mining, encroachment, logging and climate 
change. This study provides at least two appropriate frameworks that holistically embrace 
elements from the formal and informal institutions as well proffering realistic enforcement 
mechanisms that would help shape management of protected areas. Recommendations of 
the study serve as policy-relevant information to help national and local government decision 
makers, especially the Forestry Commission and its Collaborative Natural Resource Unit, 
and local governments, among others. 
 
Secondly, the study would be valuable in supporting public officials and NGOs, civil society 
organisations and traditional authorities who collaborate to ensure resources are managed 
appropriately. The use of empirical literature to design a step-by-step approach in natural 
resource collaboration as well as demonstrating its application and relevance would greatly 
help foresters and other key practitioners on how to undertake natural resource collaboration, 
including the skills and approach required for this. Finally, the study provides an empirical 
case of how the actions and processes of an individual (champion) who fostered and 
facilitated a ‘bottom-up’ approach to collaborative natural resource governance contributed 
to salvage threatened wildlife species.  
 
Finally, the study contributes to the literature on natural resource governance as five 
manuscripts have already been published. Chapter Five of the dissertation which is published 
as a manuscript titled “Rising to the challenge: A framework for optimising value in 
collaborative natural resource governance” in the Forest Policy and Economics Journal 
(Vol. 67, 2016, pp. 20–29) unpacks the factors that catalyse successful collaborative natural 
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resource governance. It reflects on these to design an ‘ABC framework’ aimed at providing 
signposts to agencies, governments and conveners of collaborative entereprises on how to 
execute this socio-technical process to maximise value. This paper has already received 
attention with over 160 reads on Researchgate alone, with six citations already. Another 
paper (Chapter Six of the dissertation), “Institutional Assessment in Natural Resource 
Governance: A Conceptual Overview” appears in Forest Policy and Economics (Vol. 74, 
2017, pages 1–12), published by Elsevier, which discusses an analytical framework to 
illustrate how formal and informal institutions structure natural resource governance. The 
paper (also with six citations already) points out that “it is not institutions per se but the 
‘nature of interaction’ between formal and informal institutions together with the 
‘enforcement mechanisms’ which will to a large extent determine the kind of resource 
outcomes”. A third manuscript (Chapter Four) is titled “Transdisciplinary Approach to 
Natural Resource Governance Research: A Conceptual Paper”, published by Emerald in the 
Management of Environmental Quality Journal (Vol. 29, Issue 1, 2018, pages 15-33). A 
fourth paper, “Complex Crisis and the rise of Collaborative Natural Resource Governance: 
Institutional Trajectory of a Wildlife Governance Experience in Ghana” appears in the 
Environment, Development and Sustainability Journal (Vol. 20, Issue 5, 2018, pages 2205-
2224) which also forms Chapter Seven of dissertation. A fifth paper titled “Two sides of the 
same coin: Synergy between formal and informal institutions in natural resource 
governance” (Chapter Eight of the dissertation) is with the Society and Natural Resource 
Journal to be considered for a special issue publication by Taylor and Francis. Chapter Nine 
of the dissertation forms a sixth paper titled “Comparative Conservation Studies: A ‘Bottom-
up’ Natural Resource Collaborative Governance” published as chapter by Springer in the 
Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance Project. The 
above publications and progress made demonstrate that the study has already started making 
a contribution to the literature on natural resource governance. 
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1.10 Chapter outline 
The study is organised into ten chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction, which 
provides a background to the study and statement of the problem and its complexity, its 
transdisciplinary context, the study objectives and research questions.  
The second chapter discusses collaborative natural resource governance in the Ghanaian 
context by assessing regulatory instruments relevant to natural resource collaboration. 
Specific portions of the 1992 Republican Constitution, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy 
as well as the 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy are reviewed. Specifically, the study discusses 
the Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) model which underpins 
collaborative natural resource governance in Ghana. 
 
Chapters three and four discuss and advance a robust methodology appropriate for 
undertaking collaborative natural resource governance (CNRG) research. Chapter Three 
presents the general transdisciplinary (TD) worldview which underpins the study. The 
chapter presents the research design, sources of data, sampling techniques and research 
instrumentation including data management. The chapter also presents a brief overview and 
context of the study area. For pragmatic reasons, the TD approach was adapted and 
interspersed with an ethnography design (see personal reflections in Chapter Ten). Although 
Chapter Three presents the general methodology, it is also observed that each of the 
empirical papers (from Chapters Seven to Nine) has designated sections on methodology, 
because they are also standalone papers published or considered for publication to advance 
knowledge in the field of CNRG. 
 
Chapter Four takes the transdisciplinary approach a step further by carrying out a systematic 
review of the literature on CNRG, the gaps in the research approaches, and how large-scale 
projects and research could incorporate TD research in their endeavours. The ontology and 
epistemology of the research design are explained and justified. The processes and steps in 
an ‘idealised’ TD approach were discussed and originally published as “Transdisciplinary 
Approach to Natural Resource Governance Research: A Conceptual Paper” (see footnote to 
chapter Four) 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
Chapters Five and six are largely conceptual as they provide the general theoretical basis 
and literature review of the dissertation. Chapter Five presents a framework that draws 
mainly from theoretical and recent empirical literature to unpack the factors that catalyse 
collaborative natural resource governance. The chapter reflects on the observations to design 
an ABC framework aimed at providing a signpost to agencies, governments and conveners 
of collaborative enterprises on how to execute this socio-technical process to maximise 
value. The ABC framework hinges on three broad pillars: Adopting and advancing human 
skills; Building integrity and legitimacy; and Creating a sense of attachment to the resource 
in question. These factors are discussed in the context of the theoretical and empirical 
literature. This chapter is published as “Rising to the challenge: A framework for optimising 
value in collaborative natural resource governance” (see footnote to Chapter Five). 
 
Chapter Six discusses an institutional model for assessing natural resource governance. The 
chapter examines key defining characteristics of both formal and informal institutions in the 
natural resource governance context. It examines how both formal and informal institutions 
combine to influence natural resource governance as well as measures to optimise the 
institutional enforcement process. It further builds on the literature to design a natural 
resource institutional framework consisting of five elements: a biophysical element, process 
and institutional element, behavioural choice element, enforcement complementarities, and 
an outcome or consequence element. This is published as “Institutional Assessment of 
Natural Resource Governance: A Conceptual Review” (see footnote to Chapter Six). 
 
Chapters Seven to Nine are empirical observations on the evolution, practice, experiences 
and lessons on institutionalism and collaborative natural resource governance. Chapter 
Seven adapts a four-phase institutional analysis framework to discuss the evolution and 
adaptation of wildlife governance structures and institutions using the unique experience of 
the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana. The chapter discusses how natural 
resource institutions evolved from an exclusive informal regime to a more collaborative 
approach demonstrating the synergy between informal and formal institutions. This is 
published as ‘Complex crisis’ and the rise of collaborative natural resource governance: 
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institutional trajectory of a wildlife governance experience in Ghana” (see footnote to 
Chapter Seven). 
 
Chapter Eight adapts the institutional and development (IAD) framework to examine how 
informal institutions complement the efforts of formal state regulation of natural resources. 
The chapter examines the interplay of formal and informal governance systems as well as 
key enforcement mechanisms inherent in the institutional underpinning of wildlife 
management in BFMS. This is in review to be published as “Two sides of the same coin: 
Synergy between formal and informal institutions in natural resource governance”.  
 
Chapter Nine of the study discusses how collaborative natural resource governance emanates 
from a ‘bottom-up’ approach. The literature is replete with collaboration efforts which are 
mostly propelled by state institutions or external actors. This chapter presents an empirical 
case that discusses the role of ‘champions’ in the development of adaptive responses in 
collaborative natural resource governance. The chapter presents the actions and distinctive 
strategies of an individual (champion) and examines how these helped to salvage a 
threatened wildlife species to revive and survive through collaborative governance and 
institutional evolution. This is published as ‘Comparative Conservation Studies: A “Bottom-
up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance’ (see footnote to Chapter Nine). 
The final chapter of the study presents general overview of entire dissertation by drawing 
the key conclusions from the relevant chapters. The conclusions have practical policy 
implications as they offer recommendations on how to appropriately foster collaboration in 
the natural resource governance context.  
 
 
1.11 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented a general overview of collaborative natural resource governance 
and has made a case for incorporating informal institutions into the governance process, 
especially in contexts where there are other mythologies and pre-existing traditional 
governance arrangements. The chapter has provided a background to the study, the problem 
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statement, and the study objectives and research questions. The chapter discussed the 
complexities of institutionalism in wildlife governance and reiterated the appropriateness of 
a transdisciplinary approach. The significance of the study has been presented as well as a 
chapter outline. The second chapter of the study presents the theory of collaborative natural 
resource governance in the Ghanaian context. 
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Chapter Two 
Context of Collaborative Natural Resource Governance in Ghana 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses collaborative natural resource in the Ghanaian context by assessing 
policy documents relevant to collaboration in the management of natural resources. Specific 
portions of the 1992 Republican Constitution, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy as well 
as the 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy will be reviewed. Specifically, it discusses the 
Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) model that underpins collaborative 
natural resource governance (CNRG) in Ghana. 
 
 
2.2 Background of CNRG in Ghana 
A cursory assessment of Ghana’s land tenure system in the 1992 Republican Constitution 
reveals that whilst the Constitution places land ownership in the hands of stool or skin 
(customary leadership) and families, the right to manage, together with the economic rents 
associated with the resource, is nonetheless appropriated to the state or government (Dadebo 
& Shinohara, 1999). Bringing the argument closer to home, Kasanga (2002) reports that land 
tenure and its associated rights and ownership in Ghana are administered within a plural 
legal regime. This suggests that customary laws and statutes operate hand-in-hand. 
Customary land owners in Ghana largely include stools (kingship and chiefdom), clans and 
families who possess close to 78% of the total land area in Ghana. The state owns 20% whilst 
2% is mutually owned in that the legal interest rests with the state whilst the beneficiary 
interest rests with the community (Kasanga, 2002). The rights of ownership of all customary 
lands, including forest reserves, resides in the original landowners. This is enshrined in 
Article 267(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution, which states that “all stool lands in 
Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool 
in accordance with customary law and usage”. The foregoing notwithstanding, the 
management rights of commercial natural resources such as timber, precious minerals and 
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salt found in such lands, are the responsibility of state agencies and are governed by 
legislation. It suggests that irrespective of the ownership or legal environment (whether by 
customary law or statutes), the management of any commercial natural resources discovered 
on or in the land remains the right of the state. 
 
This tends to place all the valuable natural resources in the hands of the state, whilst the very 
people who stay close to these resources appear neglected with regard to the ownership and 
management of these resources. This arrangement has not gone down well with local people, 
who have felt ignored over the years and hence had no incentive to protect these natural 
resources (Richards & Asare, 1999). To benefit from these resources, people involved 
themselves in unorthodox practices such as illegal encroachment and exploitation of natural 
resources, which resulted in colossal deforestation and degradation of forest resources as 
well as depleting wildlife resources.  
 
This trend has led to more innovative collaborative models that seek to empower local people 
to participate in the management of natural resources whilst also benefitting from them. This 
Bhattacharya et al. (2010) note that management of natural resources in many developing 
countries has gradually shifted towards a more participatory approach, which typically 
involves a collaboration between many sectors and stakeholders.  Kotey et al. (1998) map 
the trajectory of forest policy in Ghana into four discrete periods: a consultative phase (1874-
1939), the timberisation phase (1940-1953), the “diktat” (or centralised) phase (1954-
1990s), and the collaborative phase (since 1994). In Ghana, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife 
Policy (as revised in 2012) advances collaborative approaches in forest management. The 
focus of this chapter is on the collaborative phase with an emphasis on the main policy 
framework. Consequently, the sections below map out the collaborative elements enshrined 
in Ghana’s Forest and Wildlife Policies of 1994 and 2012. 
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2.3 Collaborative Governance Elements in Ghana’s Forest & Wildlife Policy 
2.3.1 The 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy 
The main object of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy was to promote the conservation and 
sustainable management of forest and wildlife resources with a view to maintaining resource 
sustainability, whilst at the same time optimising equitable distribution of benefits to all 
relevant stakeholders within the value chain (Forestry Commision of Ghana, 1994). 
Specifically, the policy was aimed at ensuring: 
1. The sustainable management of Ghana’s forest and wildlife resources, to preserve 
important soil and water resources and for conservation of biological biodiversity;  
2. The development of viable forest-based industries, especially in secondary and 
tertiary processing, so as to satisfy domestic and international demand; 
3. Public awareness and local community participation in forest and wildlife 
conservation, so as to maintain life-sustaining systems;  
4. Research-based and technology-led forestry and wildlife management;  
5. Effective capability at national and local levels for sustainable management of forest 
and wildlife resources.  
 
This policy was structurally different from the colonial one of 1948, which was more 
exclusive and fortress in nature; the 1994 policy sets the agenda to facilitate the participation 
of local people in forest and wildlife management. The policy had inherent provisions that 
recognised the rights of local people to access forest resources to sustain their basic 
livelihood. These broad principles appear in section three of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife 
Policy. They entail the following:  
1. The rights of people to have access to natural resources for maintaining a basic 
standard of living and their concomitant responsibility to ensure the sustainable 
use of such resources  
2. The need to incorporate traditional methods of resource management in national 
strategies where appropriate; 
3. A share of financial benefits from resource utilisation should be reserved to fund 
the maintenance of resource production capacity and for the benefit of local 
communities;  
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4. The need to develop a decentralised participatory democracy by involving local 
people in matters concerned with their welfare;  
5. The government proposes to place particular emphasis on the concept of 
participatory management and protection of forest and wildlife resources. 
 
In spite of the broader proposals for collaboration and the active engagement of local people 
and their livelihoods, actual implementation has not been significant as structural challenges 
remained. For example, the policy’s intention to prevent the wanton exploitation of forest 
and wildlife resources in off-reserve areas did not achieve significant results as a result of 
the illegal felling of trees and illegal mining activities (Wiggens et al., 2004; Teye, 2011). 
 
It could be seen that although the broader principles sought to engage the local community, 
it appears they do not adequately deal with the other stakeholders who make for more 
collaborative governance. Put differently, although the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy sets 
a broader agenda for the inclusion of local people in the management of forest and wildlife 
resources, these broad proposals did not achieve many concrete results.  
 
To optimise the quest for collaboration, the policy was revised in 2012 to give practical 
meaning and content to the approach of collaborative governance as well as specified 
directions to achieve this.  
 
2.3.2 The 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy: Collaborative governance elements 
The 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy envisions a paradigm shift from government-led 
towards a more collaborative governance of forest and wildlife resources which recognises 
the role of fringe communities, civil society, NGOs, the private sector and other relevant 
actors. The Policy establishes in clear terms specific measures that in principle seek to 
promote collaborative governance of forest and wildlife resources. To facilitate collaborative 
governance, the policy specifically mentions various actors or stakeholders who are relevant 
for collaborative natural resource governance in the Ghanaian context. For instance, 
provisions in the strategic direction 6.1.2 names the stakeholders and specifies the roles of 
traditional authorities, district assemblies, non-governmental organisations and community-
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based organisations in forest and wildlife management. By recognising these actors and 
defining their roles, it is clear that the 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy at least in principle 
envisages a networked system of governance or collaborative natural resource governance 
that has been conceptualised to mean a “new governance system that places emphasis on 
different stakeholders (forging alliances between state and non-state actors) to prudently and 
methodically govern natural resources” (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016:20). In his 
assessment of the 2012 policy, Adom (2017) contends that its acknowledgement of various 
stakeholders and interests and the multi-sectoral approach to forest and wildlife management 
is quite laudable as it is geared towards equity and fairness in the process. 
 
In this new policy, unlike the previous one which was silent on collaboration, the 2012 policy 
provides clear guidelines, definitions and directions on the participation of local people in 
the management of forest and wildlife resources as stated in the strategic direction 4.1.1 of 
the policy. 
 
Recognition of community members’ source of livelihood 
The 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy proposes making provision for alternative sources of 
livelihood for community members living around or close to forest fringe communities. The 
policy envisages the creation of employment opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for 
people who inhabit the forest fringe communities through forest plantation development (see 
strategic direction 2.1e of the 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy). Through this process, Forest 
and Wildlife officers could pragmatically work at the operational level with local community 
members in a more collaborative way, since the latter would not be working voluntarily but 
would be duly compensated. 
 
Community-wide incentive structure 
In order to facilitate community-wide benefits from the proceeds of forest resources, the 
2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy makes proposals for the adoption of a more deliberative 
approach in allotting or distribution of forest royalties among the resource owners, state and 
the users of the resources in a more equitable, transparent and accountable manner (see 
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strategic direction 5.1.1c). The issue of benefit sharing and allotment of forest rents had been 
a major challenge with the 1994 Policy, which had led to local stakeholders agitating over 
delays in payment and unfair allotments; in fact they sometimes never got paid but payments 
were carried forward as arrears. With the new policy proposing a more consultative approach 
to this process, the zeal and cooperation of local stakeholders in helping to manage forest 
and wildlife resources will be enhanced. 
 
Recognition of indigenous knowledge 
To facilitate active involvement of local communities, the 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policy 
incorporates and recognises the local institutions, customs, values, beliefs and cultural 
practices of forest fringe communities. This is against a backdrop that most forest and 
wildlife are effectively protected or sustained by the local institutions of community 
members; consequently recognising and incorporating them with a view to complementing 
them with formal institutions will help to optimise natural resource governance. To facilitate 
this, the strategic direction 1.5.1c of the policy stipulates the codification of the spiritual and 
religious or cultural values embedded in the narratives of natural sacred sites and wildlife 
resources, while maintaining their secrecy where applicable. The policy envisages 
promoting a recognition of the rights of local people including their customs and local belief 
systems, those institutions which have underpinned the management of the sacred sites or 
species and that any legislation which had obstructed this will be reviewed (strategic 
direction 1.5.1a). In short, the policy acknowledges and recognises the religious and cultural 
elements that underpin the protection of the forest and wildlife resources in the local 
communities. These spiritual and cultural beliefs include taboos and totemic practices that 
are viewed as potent for species protection and the sustainable use of forest and wildlife 
resources. The recognition given to the indigenous knowledge or local institutions and their 
role in forest and wildlife management would provide the impetus or incentive for local 
communities to sustainably manage forest and wildlife resources (Abdul-Baql, 2015).   
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2.4 Collaborative aproach to wildlife governance in Ghana 
In a quest to promote the robustness of wildlife management, the Wildlife Division of the 
Forestry Commission has established a Collaborative Wildlife Management Policy to 
enforce the provisions in Ghana’s Forest and Wildlife Policy of 1994 as revised in 2012. The 
policy has instituted measures and mechanisms to promote the participation of various actors 
including local communities, civil society organisation, NGOs, locally-based groups and 
other stakeholders in wildlife management in Ghana. A key institutional model that was 
adopted to optimise collaborative wildlife management both in and outside of Protected 
Areas in Ghana was the Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) approach. 
 
2.4.1 CREMA approach 
CREMA is an acronym which means Community Resource Management Area; it denotes a 
geographically defined area endowed with sufficient resources where communities of 
farmers and other key stakeholders organise themselves for the purpose of sustainable 
resource management. 
 
The CREMA approach adopted by the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission of 
Ghana is guided by a quest to create a ‘win-win’ situation where wildlife resources are 
effectively managed whilst community members do not become impoverished for 
harbouring the wildlife. Consequently, the underlying philosophy is that “if natural resources 
are given ‘value’ and communities are given the ‘authority’ to ‘manage’, then they will have 
the ‘incentive’ to sustainably manage and conserve natural resources”. The argument is that 
people will manage wildlife and other resources when they are provided with sufficient 
incentive to do so. This arrangement is primarily an economic inducement with direct 
financial benefits that provide one of the strongest incentives for farmers and community 
members. 
This approach is justified, fair and ethical along several indicators including, inter alia, from 
a conservation point of view, rural development point of view and a political and economic 
point of view. From a conservation perspective, CREMA envisions effectively protecting 
and managing endangered wildlife species and their habitats, as well as effectively 
safeguarding Protected Areas in Ghana. From a rural development point of view, the model 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
helps in improving the socio-economic livelihoods of people and their wellbeing because of 
the benefits. In the political sense, as CREMA is largely based on the use of local community 
stakeholders as primary drivers of wildlife management, it encourages participation, 
democracy and accountability in the resource community. Economically, CREMA promotes 
local economic development, as communities derive direct financial benefits as well as 
perhaps other external support which could diversify their livelihood sources. It is therefore 
evident that CREMA seeks to promote an eclectic system that synchronises ecological 
interests as well as socio-economic and political concerns.   
 
Organisationally, CREMA’s structure is designed along the prevailing social governance 
structure to make the system more legitimate. In that regard, the decision-making structures 
in resource communities become the instrument for enforcing CREMA. For example, in 
Ghana the rural communities have their own governance arrangement mostly headed by 
chiefs, who have sub-chiefs and traditional cabinets (council of elders) that help in the 
governance process. CREMA hinges on these governance structures for promoting the local 
management of resources. This is also in line with local land tenure arrangements in Ghana 
where local people and families own the lands. To ensure corporate governance, CREMA 
members are required to develop context-dependent operational rules codified into a 
Constitution, which is legitimated by the respective District within which the community is 
located through a by-law. The written Constitution is very important in the operations of 
CREMA as it clearly establishes the function of the organisational structure, the two 
committees mentioned above as well as other relevant bodies.The governance structure of 
CREMA has two components: a Community Resource Management Committee and a 
Community Resource Executive Committee.  
 
 
2.5 Collaborative governance in action 
The CREMA epitomises a paradigm shift where communities, people, land owners and land 
users are given the mandate and opportunity to govern and manage forest and wildlife 
resources within the territories of the CREMA and, more importantly, enjoy some socio-
economic benefits. In other words, the CREMA approach offers community-protected areas 
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a contextual process to manage wildlife resources prudently and appropriately. The CREMA 
approach of Ghana typifies the CAMPFIRE model, which is a Zimbabwean community-
based natural resource management programme (Child, 1996). CAMPFIRE stands for 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, and was one of the 
first programmes to regard wildlife as a renewable natural resource, while granting 
ownership and management to indigenous peoples in and around the protected areas. 
 
Ghana’s CREMA model had been in the formulation, reformulation and pilot phases for 
close to two decades before assuming the status of an authorised governance mechanism 
used by Wildlife Division of Forestry Commission pending full backing from Ghana’s 
Parliament. The CREMA model denotes a governance mechanism whereby the Wildlife 
Division cedes the authority and responsibilities for management of wildlife to rural 
communities living with and close to wildlife resources. Conceptually, it entails a 
territorially defined area endowed with peculiar natural resources where the people organise 
themselves for the purpose of the sustainable management of their natural resources. The 
main object is to provide the incentives for local community and various stakeholders to 
integrate wildlife management into their farming and land management systems as a 
legitimate land-use alternative. According to Amanor and Brown (2003), resources will be 
more efficiently, equitably and sustainably managed if decision-making is brought closer to 
the primary users. 
Before designing and instituting these governance models, key conveners or the Forestry 
Commission need to brainstorm on at least three critical factors: 
(i) Is there a sufficient resource base to make such a programme viable? In other 
words, in what ways could actors optimise financial gains from the resource 
without compromising its sustainability? 
(ii) Does the community have the ability to formulate and develop enforceable rules? 
In other words, is the prerequisite social capital needed to initiate a workable 
system available? 
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(iii)Is there an enabling policy and legislative environment? In other words, what are 
the informal institutions and how best could actors get formal legislation to 
underpin the resource protection?   
 
 
2.6 Formal agencies relevant to wildlife governance in Ghana 
2.6.1 Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources 
The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources is the overarching policy formulation and 
enforcement entity charged with management of Ghana’s lands, forest, wildlife and mineral 
resources. The Ministry is charged with, among other things, reviewing, updating, 
harmonising and consolidating existing Ghanaian legislation and policies relevant to forest 
and wildlife resources.  
 
2.6.2 The Forestry Commission 
Section 269 of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana sets the scene for the 
establishment of a contemporary Forestry Commission (FC), and provides broad guidelines 
on its composition and functions. The contemporary Forestry Commission of Ghana falls 
within the ambit of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources established under the 
Forestry Commission Act (1999, Act 571); it is a subdivision under this Ministry which is 
charged with safeguarding and regulating the governance, access and sustainability of 
Ghana’s forest and wildlife resources.  
 
2.6.3 Wildlife Division 
The Wildlife Division (WD) is one of the divisions of Ghana’s Forestry Commission under 
the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. The WD is charged with safeguarding the 
conservation, sustainable management and development of Ghana’s wildlife resources for 
the socio-economic benefit of all segments of society. It is responsible for the regulation and 
management of all wildlife in the country and administers wildlife Protected Areas (PAs), 
facilitates Wildlife Sanctuaries and also administers coastal Ramsar Sites in the country. 
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2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented a contextual overview of collaborative governance in the 
Ghanaian setting with a peculiar focus on wildlife governance. Relevant sections of the 1992 
Republican Constitution; an overview indicating trajectory of forest and wildlife 
governance, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy, Forest and Wildlife Policy (amended in 
2012). It also discusses the CREMA model, which demonstrates collaboration on natural 
resource management in action at the community level. The next chapter of the study 
discusses the general methodology, sources of data and processes followed in carrying out 
the study. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology and Study Context 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the general methodology employed in carrying out the study. The 
chapter presents the research paradigm, design and approach to the study, and sources of 
data. The chapter also describes the sampling technique and data-gathering process, the 
study population, sample size and sampling techniques. The chapter also outlines the 
methods of primary data collection, data-analysis methods as well as the data-management 
approach. A final section of this chapter presents an overview of the Boabeng-Fiema 
Monkey Sanctuary, which is the study context. 
 
 
3.2 Research paradigm 
The complexity and heterogeneity of actors in collaborative natural resource governance 
requires a transdisciplinary research (TD) approach, which is deemed more appropriate to 
co-design and co-produce knowledge on institutional designs, and how best they are (or 
could be) enforced in the management of forest and wildlife resources. There are overlaps 
between community members’ exploitation of those resources for survival (socio-economic 
issue) and resource protection (ecological issue), as well as in cultural values, and local 
conservation systems vis-à-vis formal governance and conservation structures. In 
collaborative natural resources governance the stakeholders are a multifaceted group, hence 
the institutional design as well as its enforcement requires an integrated approach. It is 
therefore prudent that a study on this phenomenon adopts a more iterative and 
transdisciplinary process that co-designs and co-creates contextualised knowledge which is 
viewed as legitimate and usable. 
 
Transdisciplinary research focuses on complex societal phenomena and emphasises the 
relevance of creating a process that stimulates mutual learning from diverse values, goals 
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and resources that individuals contribute. In other words, TD is focused on co-designing the 
study and co-producing knowledge that is more usable and relevant to the academic 
community as well as to the users (Pohl et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2012). A TD approach 
offers an opportunity to address the governance of complex socio-ecological phenomena by 
integrating an array of theoretical and methodological approaches across the socio-
ecological space (Evely et al., 2010; Lang et al., 2012). Nicolescu (2008) maintains that TD 
should not be conceptualised as a new discipline or super-discipline; it is a complementary 
form of research focusing on the correspondence between the external and internal world, 
i.e. between object and subject (Nicolescu 2008 cited in Mobjork, 2010).  
 
An ideal TD research process requires a more participatory approach that entails exhaustive 
collaboration between all stakeholders in all phases of the research project; however, because 
of the practical constraints of an individual PhD dissertation, it was deemed appropriate to 
adapt the process. Consequently, the study adopted the consultative typology of TD, which 
Mobjork (2010:56) conceptualised to mean that non-scientists are only partially engaged in 
the knowledge-production process and are involved only at certain points. 
 
In the problem-framing phase and the design, a range of actors from the disciplines of public 
administration, environmental governance and ecology were instrumental in shaping and 
reshaping the problem. In the data-gathering phase non-scientists (local community 
members and practitioners), who included traditional leaders, assembly member 
(councillor), farmers and youth groups, and past and current officers from the Wildlife 
Division of the Forestry Commission dominated the process in reshaping the problem, 
design and knowledge-production process. 
 
 
3.3 Design and approach to the study 
The study adopted an ethnographic design. Ethnography is an indigenous approach where 
researchers task themselves to undertake a systematic investigation of beliefs, processes, 
social interactions and behaviours, including the distinctive phenomena of relatively large 
group of people; the process entails participation and observation over a period of time 
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(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Reeves et al., 2008). The overarching goal of this design is an 
exploration, description and explanation of other cultures and contextual phenomena, and 
not to test a quantitative hypothesis (Barbour, 2007; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). 
Throughout the study the research was positioned within a prevailing knowledge system by 
recognising the information and knowledge base of participants. A key asset that enabled 
the research was the cultivation of social relationships and intermediaries to achieve 
unhindered access to key participants (see Chapter Nine). A limitation of ethnography is that 
since it is confined to a particular context, the outcomes or conclusions cannot easily lead to 
generalizations, the findings however could be adapted to suit different contexts. This study 
was more exploratory and adopted the use of indigenous approaches that were more 
participatory and qualitative in nature to generate knowledge on the theory and practice of 
collaborative natural resource governance. Developing generalisations was beyond the scope 
of this PhD dissertation. The design helped to co-produce relevant knowledge which 
although contextual to BFMS could be adapted to suit many other similar contexts. 
 
 
3.4 Sources of data 
Both primary and secondary sources of data were used for the study. Primary sources 
included data elicited from key participants such as the traditional authorities (chiefs and 
traditional priests), unit committee members, farmers, youth groups, management committee 
members, local residents and officers from the Wildlife Division of Forestry Commission 
(the specifics are discussed in Chapters Seven to Nine). 
 
 
3.5 Sampling techniques 
To encourage the co-designing and co-production of knowledge, the study involved an 
interplay of skills, expertise and experience drawn from the scientific disciplines and 
concepts including Public Management, Policy Implementation, Environmental 
Governance, Ecology, Institutional Analysis and Neo-Institutionalism. Experts from outside 
academia, include, those from Forest and Wildlife Division of Ghana, retired wildlife 
official, local chiefs, traditional priests in charge of monkeys in the study area among others 
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were integral part of the co-production of knowledge. The purposive sampling technique 
was used in the identification of relevant individuals and stakeholders. Additionally, the 
snow-ball sampling technique was used to get additional relevant actors who were identified 
at any point in time to participate in the process through referrals. This is because a TD 
worldview is iterative and involves a learning process that has no specified end point. In 
some instances, group interviews that were more deliberative and often took the form of 
informal focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted (see Chapters Seven to Nine). 
 
 
3.6 Data collection 
The complexity and iterative nature of TD research goes beyond a unified data collection 
process. This point is well argued by Wickson et al. (2006:1051): “the implication of this is 
that TD researchers go beyond a linear application of a static methodology and aim for an 
evolving, dynamic, or responsive methodology that is iterative and an ongoing part of the 
research process”. Rather than adopting a linear approach, TD researchers respond to and 
reflect on the particular problem and context being studied (Elzinga, 2008). 
 
This study was carried out through various brainstorming meetings where participants 
discussed the research concept at stake in a way that enabled participants tell their own 
stories, especially regarding how the current institutional designs evolved over time and the 
complexities of resource governance on the ground. To propel these stories and discussions, 
the researcher acted as a facilitator as a way of stimulating discussions. Additionally, in-
depth interview techniques were used to collect data from participants. In-depth interviews 
provide an opportunity to obtain more details about an issue or experience, and are especially 
useful for exploring experiences and the facts from participants. This instrument enabled 
participants to express their views and experiences in their own words and gestures. Because 
this method elicits people’s own views and accounts, it had an additional benefit of 
uncovering issues or concerns that had not been anticipated or considered by the researcher. 
The in-depth interviews were guided with the aid of a semi-structured interview guide which 
captured the main objectives of the study (see Appendix 1). More importantly, participants 
were allowed to tell their stories without restrictions.  
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3.7 Data analysis 
Data analysis refers to a process which entails an attempt to formally identify themes and to 
construct ideas as they emerge from the data and then attempt to validate these themes and 
ideas. The common steps in the analysis process involving soft data entail identification of 
themes, verifying the selected themes through reflection on the data and discussion, 
categorising the themes and recording of support data for the categories (Brockopp & 
Hastings-Tolsma, 1995). 
 
All proceedings with participants were later transcribed into words which has been sorted 
out into appropriate themes and used in the discussions. Data were analysed using inductive 
thematic analysis based on issues emergent from the observations and data gathered as 
common to people-centred studies (Reeves et al., 2008). The researcher analysed and 
examined the responses noting similarities and differences. A further step was to identify 
specific topics or themes in the narratives. In the course of presenting the analysis, 
participants’ narratives have been used where necessary to emphasise a particular point 
being expressed.  
 
 
3.8 The study context: Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) 
This study uses the unique case of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) in Ghana, 
West Africa. Boabeng-Fiema comprises two neighbouring communities, Boabeng and 
Fiema, which have similar beliefs and practices, hence the term ‘twin community’ for them. 
This twin community is located 20 km north of Nkoranza District of the Brong Ahafo Region 
(a transitional zone in Ghana), which is about 230 km from Accra, the capital of Ghana. The 
study area demonstrates a typical collaboration between formal and informal governance 
mechanisms in the management of wildlife. 
 
Boabeng-Fiema is a rural community with a population of approximately 1,900 people 
(GSS, 2010). BFMS lies in the transitional zone between the southern rain forest and dry 
northern savannah, and it has a mean annual temperature of 26 degree Celsius with a mean 
rainfall of 1,250 mm. The region experiences a double maxima rainfall pattern; the main 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
rainy period is between March and June, whilst the lean season occurs in September. The 
vegetation is a mixture of original forest, degraded forest, woodland and savanna (quoted in 
Attuquayefio & Gyampoh, 2010). The climatic conditions and physical characteristics of the 
area makes it suitable for farming activities, with over 80% of the working population largely 
engaged in farming. The soil allows for the cultivation of staple foods crops including maize, 
yam, groundnuts, cassava and oil palm. Subsistence farming is practised, with crops grown 
mainly to feed the immediate family, with the surplus sold for additional income. 
 
BFMS is a unique site in Africa where the two different species of monkeys – the black-and-
white colobus monkey (Colobus vellerosus) and the mona monkey (Cercopithecus 
campbelli) – continue to flourish in large numbers and interestingly co-exist somewhat 
harmoniously with humans in the Boabeng and Fiema villages, as they have since the a least 
1830s. The monkeys are protected and revered as “offspring of the gods”, daworo (female 
goddess of Boabeng village) and abodwo (male god of Fiema village). Legend has it that a 
great warrior entered the forest with his gun and discovered a shrine (which remains in 
Boabeng forest as daworo) which was guarded by two special monkeys; the monkeys did 
some mysterious things which made him consult a seer, who explained that the monkeys are 
‘children’ of the shrine or the daworo god and should never be killed or harmed. Spiritually, 
the god of Fiema abodwo is the husband of daworo, the latter told the husband that if you 
want to marry me, help me take care of my children and that is the reason why both gods 
became caretakers of the monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema.  
 
The BFMS case presents distinctive complexities, because the Boabeng-Fiema communities 
are surrounded by the Boabeng Forest, which is inhabited by the mona and colobus monkeys. 
The forest is demarcated into a core zone which is not available for farming activities (main 
economic activity), but to accommodate monkeys; then there is a buffer region, which 
indicates the boundaries where farming activities are permissible. Even though the core 
forest is reserved for the monkeys, they nonetheless trespass on people’s farms and destroy 
crops; they also troop into people’s homes to ‘steal’ food and cause damage to backyard 
crops. Although the monkeys originally used to be confined to the Boabeng and Fiema 
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communities, they have extended their range to seven neighbouring communities which has 
increased the complexities associated with dealing with them. Finally, the protection and 
sustainability of the monkeys have been underpinned by an interplay of the ‘government’ 
(formal) and ‘traditional’ (informal) institutional forces with their respective governance 
structures. This makes the BFMS a test case for an institutional assessment of collaborative 
natural resource governance. Figure 3.1 below illustrates BFMS in the context of Ghana. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Map of BFMS  
Source:  BFMS Office, 2016 
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Black and white colobus (Colobus vellerosus) 
In terms of kingdom, class and order, the colobus vellerosus belongs to the Animalia, 
mammalia and primates classifications respectively (Mittermeier et al., 2013). The colobus 
vellerosus is predominantly black and displays smallest amount of white fur which occurs 
in the form of a broad, snowy beard and frowzy facial fringe. It is this reason why they are 
also called black-and-white colobus. These species inhabit native semi-deciduous forests of 
Tropical West African countries including Ghana, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Togo. 
The black and white colobus in most of these countries is threatened either by hunting or 
deforestation (Campbell et al., 2008).  
Colobus vellerosus is listed as vulnerable species in the IUCN Red List (IUCN, 2010) and 
are highly protected under the African Convention (listed as Class A). The species are 
locally called “fo)” (pronounced as ‘phour’) in the Boabeng-Fiema communities. They are 
not so friendly to visitors (unlike their mona monkey counterparts) and are hardly seen in 
the homes and surroundings of the communities for food supplements because they feed 
predominantly on herbs and other micro organisms in their habitats. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Black and white colobus monkey 
Source: Photograph taken by Field Assistant 
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Mona monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) 
Mona monkeys are common primate species which inhabit tropical rainforests of West 
Africa. The mona monkeys have fur which is reddish-brown with white underparts and have 
their faces marked by pale bands across the forehead and thin black stripes between their 
eyes and ears. These species are lively and are one of the most widely exhibited members of 
primate species in Africa. The mona monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary are 
locally referred to as ‘kwakuo’ who could be found all over the homes and surroundings of 
the communities, especially, in the mornings and evenings during which they come to access 
food supplements from people’s homes. They remain friendlier to visitors and receive 
groundnuts and bananas from them. 
 
 
Figure 3.3a: Human-friendly mona monkeys 
Photograph taken by Candidate 
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Figure 3.3b: Human-friendly mona monkeys feeding on banana and groundnuts 
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 (Photograph by Field Assistant)  
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Figure 3.3c: Human-friendly mona monkeys 
Source: Photograph taken by Candidate 
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Figure 3.3d: Human-friendly mona monkeys 
Source: Photograph by Field Assistant 
 
 
3.9 Chapter summary 
The chapter has provided a general overview of the methods, approaches and procedures 
employed in carrying out the study. It has discussed the transdisciplinary research paradigm, 
which provides the broad philosophy underpinning the study. An indigenous research 
approach, which enabled the researcher to get into closer contact with the practices and belief 
systems of the participants, was deemed appropriate and also made the study more 
participatory. The chapter also details the sources of data for the study as well as the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
sampling techniques. The main instruments and processes for primary data collection are 
presented and their appropriateness justified. The data-management process is also discussed 
in the chapter. The chapter ends with an overview of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary, 
which is the context for this research. As was initially indicated, the chapter provides only a 
general overview of the methodology, as each of the subsequent chapters (duly published) 
have sections on their respective methods. The next chapter presents a published peer-
reviewed article that details the rationale, appropriateness, philosophy and processes 
involved in transdisciplinary approach as applicable in collaborative natural resource 
governance research. 
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Chapter Four 
Transdisciplinary Approach to Natural Resource Governance Research1 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Natural resources in contemporary times are mostly managed by a collaborative 
governance approach which hinges on complex institutional designs (rules, norms and 
strategies). Many studies have been designed and carried out to assess collaborative 
governance and the various institutional designs underpinning them. The main object of this 
paper is to unpack the methodological gaps in natural resource governance research (with an 
emphasis on co-management) and to conceptualise the appropriateness of a transdisciplinary 
(TD) research approach. 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper adopts a critical stage review of relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on natural resource governance. It discusses the 
complexities inherent in natural resource governance and juxtaposes these with the inherent 
weaknesses in methodologies employed by existing studies on the concept. We make a case 
for a TD research methodology that links scientists, practitioners and society in a joint 
problem design and solution process.  
Findings: The study observes a ‘fuzziness’ in the collaborative governance phenomenon, 
but notices a methodological gap in existing studies on the concept. The paper describes TD 
as a ‘tailor-made approach’ to researching complex societal issues and makes a case for its 
adoption in natural resource governance research. 
Keywords: Institutional assessment, natural resource governance, transdisciplinary, 
natural resources, co-management, collaboration 
 
                                                          
1 A version of this chapter was originally published as Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, 
K. A. (2018). Transdisciplinary Approach to Natural Resource Governance Research: A Conceptual 
Paper, Management of Environmental Quality, 29(1), 15-33. 
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4.1 Introduction  
Protecting the environment and its resources has been a key goal championed by the global 
community which featured in the erstwhile Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
were also very prominent in the Rio+20 outcome document “Sustainable Development 
Goals” as well as in various classic and contemporary international ratifications. Whilst 
earlier thinking on natural resource management tended to focus a great deal on the role of 
national governments and appeared to view the existence of communities as being 
detrimental to management and conservation, there has been a paradigm shift towards one 
that regards communities as strategic partners in natural resource conservation and 
management. After assessing research outcomes of the 1990s, Agrawal and Gibson 
(1999:630) observe a “break from previous work on development which considered 
communities to hinder progressive social change”. They noted that writings from the 1990s 
“champion the role of community in bringing about decentralisation, meaningful 
participation, cultural autonomy, and conservation” (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999:630). This 
“repentance” or turnaround is fundamentally attributed to a key narrative by Ostrom (1990) 
that  local communities, when granted sufficient property rights over local forests, can self-
organise and develop local-level institutions to regulate the sustainable use of natural 
resources. In a recent study Ojha (2014), however, maintains that community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) should be linked with the work of other actors 
(collaboration or co-management) in order to strengthen capacities to counter the shortfalls 
associated with mutually exclusive approaches.  
 
Generally speaking, all natural resources could be underpinned by co-management; 
however, those with supportive property or tenure rights possess suitable attributes that 
strengthen the basis and processes of collaboration (Borrini-Fayerabend et al., 2004:69-70). 
Collaboration for effective governance could be applicable to all natural resources, but is 
more pronounced in forests and wildlife resources, fisheries and coastal resources, grazing 
lands, among others. Even with regards to non-renewable resources such as oil and mineral 
deposits, although partnership arrangements used to be largely uncommon, there are 
emerging trends facilitating co-management (Mate, 2001; McCay & Acheson, 1987). For 
the purpose of this paper, natural resources as used here involve those that have clear 
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property and tenure systems (eg. forests and wildlife) with more or less manifest and latent 
(potential or plausible) stakeholders who have claims and entitlements to the resource.  
 
The idea of collaboration in managing natural resources has become a pragmatic approach 
to solving natural resource management problems by partnership, owing to the difficulty for 
indigenous communities to effectively manage natural resources on their own, because of 
the complexities and heterogeneity of contemporary societies. On the other hand, there is a 
plethora of evidence to support arguments that centralised management of local resources is 
equally problematic (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). Co-management of resources is not feasible 
without proper designs for the distribution of power, responsibilities and relationships 
among actors. This makes the role of institutional arrangements highly distinctive in natural 
resources co-management processes and policies. The concept of social scale has been used 
to describe the different dimensions of institutional size, various actors and their 
representation, as well as power-sharing arrangements, whose dimensions range from 
individuals to networks of organisations, involving inter alia the rules, laws, policies and 
norms that govern the extent of resource-related rights and management responsibilities 
(Gibson et al., 2000; Cumming et al., 2006).  
 
Although recent publications and policy documents on natural resource governance appear 
to place an emphasis on institutions or rules and their analyses (see Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 
2017; Fischer et al., 2014; Petty et al., 2015; Arts et al., 2014), the methodological 
approaches do not really make for a more holistic analysis. Whilst most of these studies 
appear to assess the role of institutional design in natural resource governance, the 
approaches adopted do not enable them to adequately explain how these institutions have 
evolved or been shaped over time. For instance, Fischer et al. (2014:168) write, “our findings 
suggest that such insights into historical institutions are absolutely indispensable for the 
design of today’s co-management arrangements … research and applied conservation work 
need to understand historical relationships between the relevant actors to make 
contemporary resource governance sustainable”. However, throughout that study the 
presence of community or other relevant actors is not readily evident in the analysis; such a 
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study requires people or community members to tell their stories in the form of narratives 
which would clearly bring out the socio-cultural and ecological factors that have shaped the 
institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements, their relevance and challenges in 
natural resource governance have been addressed in a fragmented way by scholars adopting 
somewhat mono-disciplinary perspectives, which may lead to conclusions that do not really 
reveal the underlying factors underpinning contemporary natural resource governance 
policies or institutions. In a study by Maciejewski et al. (2015:21) the authors themselves 
observe a major limitation by remarking that “while our analysis shows that socioecological 
elements inevitably interact across multiple scales to produce positive and negative 
outcomes, we do not investigate the mechanisms that produce cross-scale feedbacks and 
scale mismatch”.  
 
Adequately assessing institutional dimensions, institutional evolution and implications for 
natural resource co-management requires a transdisciplinary and holistic study that engages 
with multiple stakeholders and community members in co-designing and co-producing 
knowledge on the institutional processes underpinning the particular resources. The main 
object of this paper is to provide a review of the contemporary literature on natural resource 
governance (co-management and institutional designs) with a view to conceptualising the 
appropriateness of a transdisciplinary (TD) research approach. The paper conceptualises, 
through an illustrative framework, the key actors to be involved in such TD studies. The 
paper is underpinned by the following key research questions: To what extent do the 
prevailing approaches help link the researchers to the researched? To what extent do research 
outcomes really make known the voices of the researched? And to what extent does a TD 
research outcome influence natural resource policies and their enforcement?  
 
 
4.2 Conceptual overview 
The essence of this review is to tease out the complexities associated with natural resource 
co-management as well as the complexity of the corresponding institutional underpinnings 
and multi-layer stakeholders. This section discusses the concept of co-management and its 
ramifications, as well as the stakeholder theory which underpins the study. 
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4.2.1 The concept of co-management  
Coming to the realisation that natural resources management and conservation processes are 
multifaceted and involve different stakeholders, the traditional bureaucratic and state-centric 
approach is rapidly making way for a more inclusive model that recognises and involves a 
network of actors who have a stake in the resource in question. This process has become 
known inter alia as ‘collaborative natural resource governance’ or ‘co-management’ 
(Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). The concept connotes an approach to solving 
environmental problems by bringing together a network of stakeholders who are drawn 
together in an arrangement that addresses issues of power and responsibility. This reflects a 
definition by Berkes et al. (1991:12) that describes co-management as “the sharing of power 
and responsibility between the government and local resource users”. On their part, Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. (2000:1) conceptualise co-management as “an arrangement whereby two 
or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of 
the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set 
of natural resources”. The operational phrase here is “fair sharing of the management 
functions, entitlements and responsibilities”; this should be the hallmark of co-management 
regimes, but it should be viewed as a continuum and not static. Carlsson and Berkes 
(2005:67) maintain that “the system should be understood as a process in which the parties 
and their relative influence, positions and activities are continuously re-adjusted”. The 
foregoing argument also reflects the wise counsel by Garaway and Arthur (2004:33) that 
“there have been increasing calls for us to learn from our actions and from our mistakes, 
acknowledging that we can often learn as much, if not more, from why things did not work 
as we expected as from when they do”. This makes the role of learning, adapting and 
readjustment absolutely critical to the success of co-management processes.  In a subsequent 
publication Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004:69) define co-management as “a partnership by 
which two or more relevant social actors collectively negotiate, agree upon, guarantee and 
implement a fair share of management functions, benefits and responsibilities for a particular 
territory, area or set of natural resources”.  They explain co-management as involving a 
coalition of stakeholders drawn together to manage a particular resource, and such a 
relationship is maintained and sustained through sharing power and mutual responsibility.  
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The co-management of natural resources is a pragmatic approach to address a complex 
phenomenon through an array of stakeholders. Muller (2010:143) thus highlights the point 
that “it is therefore not surprising that the 1990s were hailed as the ‘Age of the Network’ 
characterised by modes of governance that link actors in the public, private, community and 
voluntary sectors”. See figure. 4.1 for a network analysis of actors in natural resource co-
management. 
 
Figure 4.1:  A network analysis of natural resource co-management  
Source:  Modelled by authors using ATLAS.ti 
 
The framework above indicates that co-management efforts for effective natural resource 
governance need to be cross-sectorial and encompass the reasonable interests of all 
stakeholders in managing the said resources. There is a relationship among all actors 
(iterative), hence the interaction is not unidirectional but intersectional. Each stakeholder 
interacts with the others so as to enable the effectiveness of the co-management process. The 
interplay of actors from diverse or heterogeneous backgrounds and interests (see Table 4.1) 
would lead to proper problem identification and boundary analysis, which in turn makes for 
a holistic problem definition and consequent policy formulation that is shared and agreed 
upon to a greater extent. It is true that conflict may inevitably occur because of the diverse 
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and mostly contradictory interests of stakeholders, but at the heart of the political process or 
any purposeful endeavour is conflict resolution and consensus building (Heywood, 2004). It 
is far better to confront the hurdles and address them head on than to ignore pressing issues 
and encounter implementation hiccups or Type (III) errors in the problem-solving process. 
A Type (III) error occurs in the policy process when the right policy solutions or effective 
policies are formulated but for poorly identified problems. To avoid this error, it is 
imperative to take the time to embark on a broader consultation to involve wider interests in 
order to appreciate the real problem, its scope and boundaries (Dunn, 2004). 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Generalised interests of stakeholders in co-management 
Actors Interests 
 
Central government 
Stated mandate over a given resource, sector 
or territory. Largely interested in productivity 
of the resources and their protection 
 
 
Local government 
District or municipal authorities who control 
natural resources as part of their governance or 
jurisdiction mandate. Mostly interested in 
managing jurisdiction conflict 
 
 
Commercial/private sector 
These are business and industry entities (local, 
national and international) who have 
economic interests in the resources, e.g. tourist 
operators 
 
 
Non-governmental organisations 
Local, national, international agencies 
interested in environment and/or development 
issues) whose domain encompass the resource 
and territory. Largely interested in 
representing and defending interests of local 
people 
 
 
Local resource users and groups 
Involves local and non-local, direct and 
indirect, organised and non-organised users 
who derive subsistence and economic benefit. 
Also includes a recognition of resource for 
cultural or religious purpose 
 
Adapted from Borrini-Fayerabend et al. 2004 (see Rathore, 1997; Triantafyllidis, 1996 for 
further reading) 
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4.2.2 Theoretical framework 
Wherever there are natural resources, different stakeholders will lay claim to aspects of those 
resources. People and groups have different attributes that attach them to a particular 
resource. For instance, three main primary stakeholders, with varying levels of influence, 
are identified by Duane (1997), as will be discussed in this section. The argument is that 
managing natural resources entails dealing with some complexities and higher stakes; 
therefore any research that seeks to understand the institutions or rules underpinning the 
management of particular resources needs to understand the respective points of view of the 
various stakeholders. It is only when one appreciates the complexities involved that one will 
understand the need to adopt a transdisciplinary analysis approach. This chapter is therefore 
underpinned by stakeholder theory. 
 
4.2.2.1 Stakeholder theory 
A common theme that runs through the understanding of what constitutes a ‘stakeholder’ is 
‘influence’ – the ability of stakeholders to influence the realisation of organisational goals. 
The level of influence of stakeholders is very important, which suggests that three 
dimensions – the organisation or entity in question, the particular goals to be realised, and 
the context – are critical in stakeholder analysis.  After a cursory analysis of about twenty-
eight definitions of the concept of stakeholder, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest three distinctive 
characteristics: (1) power, (2) legitimacy, and (3) urgency. 
 
Power involves the ability to influence the actions of others to do things to bring about a 
desired outcome. This ‘ability-to-do’ notion is advanced by Salancik and Pfeffer (1974), 
who recognise a fundamental attribute of those with power as “the ability … to bring about 
the desired outcomes they desire” (cited in Mitchell et al., 1997:865). Therefore, in natural 
resource governance, especially in rural areas, there are individuals and groups who are 
relatively powerful and have the ability to influence the outcomes of resource conservation 
or protection. It is imperative to identify various stakeholders irrespective of the strength of 
their power; however, a context-dependent approach is highly desirable. 
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The concept of legitimacy generally refers to the perception of the rightfulness of an action 
or entity which has influence on how people react or respond. In the words of Suchman 
(1995:574), it is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions”. The notion of legitimacy is a subtle one, and since it is more of a 
perception and socially constructed, embedded in conventions, usages, practices, history and 
norms, it suggests that the particular context of any intervention is key in identifying 
stakeholders. For instance, in natural resource management in rural African communities, a 
network of stakeholders that does not include traditional chiefs will be more likely to face 
legitimacy deficits, which in turn means that policies which emanate from such studies are 
likely to face enforcement challenges.  
 
The final attribute of stakeholders is urgency, which involves the sensitivity of the claims 
made by particular groups or individuals to the resource in question for which immediate 
attention might be required. This point is well explained by Jones (1993) as the extent to 
which stakeholder claims call for prompt attention. Jones further argues that this ‘call for 
attention’ is mainly driven by two key indicators: “time-sensitivity”, which refers to the 
degree to which managerial delay in responding to the claim or relationship is intolerable to 
the stakeholder; and “criticality”, which measures the worth or relevance of the claim or 
relationship made by the stakeholder (cited in Mitchell et al., 1997:867). 
 
In reality the dynamics of stakeholder engagement changes over time; Freeman (2010) 
observes that it may change depending on the strategic issue at stake. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
argue that if a stakeholder possesses only one of the three attributes (power, or legitimacy, 
or urgency), they are referred to as latent stakeholders and therefore possess minimal 
stakeholder salience. Stakeholders who possess only the attribute of power are referred to as 
dormant stakeholders; those who possess only the attribute of legitimacy are classified as 
discretionary stakeholders, whilst holders with a sense of urgency are demanding 
stakeholders. On the other hand, if stakeholders possess two of these three attributes, their 
relevance or salience will be higher. Stakeholders who possess both power and legitimacy 
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are referred to as dominant stakeholders; those with legitimacy and urgency are dependent 
stakeholders, whilst those with the attributes of power and urgency are dangerous 
stakeholders. Stakeholder salience is highest when stakeholders possess all three attributes; 
such individuals or groups are definitive stakeholders. These dynamics or attributes change 
or are shaped within a timescale and in accordance with the issues under consideration.  
The theory is relevant to this chapter, which basically argues that any research or study on 
the governance of natural resources and the associated institutions needs to identify the key 
stakeholders, so that reasonable brainstorming may be carried out among relevant actors. 
Effectively identifying various communities for purposive engagement provides a solid 
springboard for the development of social capital, which includes trust, norms and networks 
of relationships that could lead to more informed and widely acceptable policy outcomes 
(Putnam, 1993; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). However, the co-management of natural 
resources presents some complexities especially in the determination of stakeholders. For 
instance, moving from the traditional notion of communities as homogenous and relatively 
small with shared norms, the contemporary literature underscores a notion of community as 
more heterogeneous and conflictual (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Duane (1997) identifies 
three main types of communities (stakeholders) which it is critical to engage or call upon for 
effective participation in collaborative natural resource governance.  
1. Communities of place: these are stakeholders who are tied to physical space 
through geography – in other words, the physical or administrative borders where 
the resource in question is located needs to be engaged. This is critical as most 
ecosystems or natural resources span two or more geographical units; engaging 
one party and neglecting the other could create more conflict than not starting any 
engagement process at all, because the neglected places would perceive sabotage 
and state/external support for the others. 
2. Communities of identity: these are individuals who are also tied to each other 
through social characteristics and may also be scattered in more than one place. 
In any negotiation regarding a particular resource, especially in the African 
setting, where there are various ethnic groups, which has often been a source of 
brutal conflict, it is important to identify which social groups have a stake in the 
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resource. Community of identity could refer to the religious, cultural or blood ties 
that bind a group of people together. One cannot fail to appreciate the significance 
of the invisible bonds of informal institutions or traditional institutions here. 
3. Communities of interest: these are individuals and groups who may not be bonded 
by social or family relations or by geography, but their commonalities lie in the 
benefits they receive from a particular resource or the cost they impose on it. 
 
These three primary stakeholders (at times membership may overlap), together with an array 
of other secondary communities such as interest groups, private actors, non-governmental 
organisations, all need to be engaged effectively. 
 
Proper scoping would enable government agencies to decide which communities are 
relevant and at what point in time; this is what the American public policy analyst William 
Dunn refers to as “boundary analysis” (Dunn, 2004). Dunn posits that in problem structuring, 
proper boundary analysis helps in identifying relevant stakeholders, who can provide a more 
holistic view of the problem to be solved; such a holistic view enables effective solutions 
that do not result in a Type (III) error. 
 
Carlsson and Berkes (2005) present seven key complexities which should not be taken for 
granted, otherwise co-management of environmental resources will face real implementation 
hiccups. Therefore advocates and practitioners of co-management processes should take into 
consideration the complexities of (i) the State and its agencies, (ii) the community and its 
heterogeneity, (iii) the dynamism and iterative nature of the system, and (iv) the (enabling) 
conditioning factors that exist to support the system. Other complexities associated include 
complexities of (v) co-management as a governance system, (vi) co-management as a 
continuum involving adaptive learning and problem solving, and (vii) the complexities of 
the ecosystem producing the resources in question. The state is a major stakeholder in all 
natural resource co-management efforts; in contemporary times modern constitutions and 
formal institutions provide the state and its agencies with the power and authority to manage 
and regulate natural resources. The State is complex and, in most cases, more than two state 
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agencies are in charge of managing natural resources and perhaps each of these may have 
various arrangements of its own with the communities or stakeholders (Carlsson & Berkes, 
2005). In some cases other stakeholders who are to be recognised by the State and its 
agencies are explicitly or implicitly mentioned, but the actual authority resides in the State. 
The particular role of the state institutions and agencies as well as coordination is critical for 
the success of co-management models; they need to serve as catalysts and allow other 
stakeholders enough responsibilities and authority to deliberate (Muller, 2010).  
 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the complexities associated with natural resource 
co-management as well as the corresponding institutions that underpin these processes. What 
appears paradoxical is that most studies that undertake research on this ‘complex’ 
phenomenon are tempted to adopt a reductionist approach (see Maciejewski et al., 2015), or 
ignore the input of communities in the study (Fischer et al., 2014). This point has been 
forcefully argued by Borrini-Fayerabend et al. (2004:157), who observe that “conventional 
research on natural resource management is an activity carried out by experts (usually 
outside experts), which involves local actors only as informants or labour. Local people are 
asked to provide information, but are not let to elaborate on the context or meaning of such 
information, and even less allowed shaping questions, defining problems or testing 
solutions”. Appropriate research that informs policy and consequently the quality of 
environmental management adopts a more comprehensive form that goes beyond the 
traditional disciplinary boundaries and reductionist approach towards greater 
TRANSDISCIPLINARITY. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
The chapter undertakes a critical stage review of classic and recent empirical studies, mainly 
drawn from journal articles and scholarly books. The following four search domains – 
Sciencedirect, Emeraldinsight, TandFonline and Google Scholar – were largely used based 
on their relevance to the study and accessibility to the researchers. The literature search 
involved all terms approximately related to institutionalism in natural resource co-
management: “institutions and co-management”, “rules and power sharing in co-
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management”, “institutionalism in natural resource governance”, “institutions and 
collaborative environmental governance”. These and other search terms were combined in 
different ways to obtain a large pool of literature relevant to the study. The large pool of 
articles from these sources was initially sorted for relevance by skimming through their 
abstracts. After the selection was made, all abstracts were independently reviewed by each 
of the three authors. At the end of the process, the authors met to eliminate duplicates and 
made a shortlist of abstracts for detailed and systematic review. Throughout the process, 
whenever opinions differed over inclusion of a particular paper, a final decision was 
subsequently made following discussion and a majority decision by the three researchers. 
The purposive sampling technique was used to select the appropriate literature from the 
secondary sources relevant to institutions, co-management and transdisciplinarity.  
 
 
4.4 Discussion: Towards Transdisciplinary Research (TD) 
In this section the chapter discusses the philosophical assumptions underpinning a TD 
research approach; this we do by discussing its ontology and epistemology with the aid of 
models. The section ends with a discussion of the ‘four-phase’ process involved in 
undertaking the TD study and its appropriateness to natural resources governance research. 
 
A TD approach connotes research that cuts across academic boundaries, actors, fields and 
approaches in a process of co-designing and co-producing practical knowledge that is more 
transformative. The complexity of social phenomena (natural resource governance) and the 
focus on disciplinary boundaries made Brewer (1999:328) comment in exasperation that 
“the world has problems, but universities have departments”. The complexities of 
contemporary and future socio-ecological phenomena (challenges) require a solution 
(research process) involving a collaboration between researchers, ideas, disciplines and 
fields from diverse orientations. 
 
Reviewing relevant literature on TD, Pohl and Hirsch Hardon (2007) observe four key trends 
facilitating TD research. Firstly, TD takes into account the complexity of an issue – meaning 
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the complex system of factors that together explain the issue’s current state and its dynamics; 
it addresses both science and society’s diverse perceptions of an issue. Secondly, TD sets 
aside the idealised context of science in order to produce practically relevant knowledge. 
Thirdly, it deals with the issues and possible improvements of the status quo that are involved 
in balancing the diverse interests and inputs of individual stakeholders and disciplines (Pohl, 
2005:1161). Finally, TD research is more oriented ‘towards the common interest’. For 
instance, Blaikie (2006) maintains that in spite of the theoretical benefits of co-management, 
at the end of the day it is what actually occurs in the field that determines its worth. If co-
management of natural resources could indeed create value (Leach & Sabatier, 2005; 
Mandarano, 2008; Muller, 2010; Rogers & Weber, 2010), this has much to do with the 
institutional designs and enforcement complementarities. It is therefore essential that TD 
brings stakeholders on board who are able to synthesise ideas. Perhaps it is through this 
iterative process that co-management is viewed as a process of continuous learning to 
improve collaborative outcomes (Cundill & Rodela, 2012; Reed et al., 2014). 
 
The complexity and heterogeneity of actors in co-management of environmental resources 
requires a transdisciplinary research (TD) approach, which is deemed more appropriate to 
co-design and co-produce knowledge on institutional designs, and how best they are (or 
could be) enforced in the co-management of natural resources. The growing consensus on 
the complexity of environmental resources has made TD an emerging design that underpins 
contemporary research (Lang et al., 2012; Ignatieva et al., 2015). 
 
With natural resources co-management, however, the situation is more complex and ‘ill-
defined’. In this case there are overlaps between community members’ exploitation of the 
resources for survival (economic issues) and the need for resource protection (ecological 
issues), and between dealing with local protection and conservation systems vis-à-vis formal 
governance and conservation structures. In co-management of natural resources the 
stakeholders are multifaceted and consequently the institutional design as well as 
enforcement requires an integrated approach. It is therefore prudent that a study of this 
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phenomenon should engage in a more iterative and transdisciplinary process that co-designs 
and co-creates contextualised knowledge that is viewed as legitimate and usable.  
Transdisciplinary research focuses on complex societal phenomena and emphasises the 
relevance of creating a process that stimulates mutual learning from the diverse values, goals 
and resources that individuals contribute. In other words, TD is more focused on co-
designing a study and co-producing knowledge that is more usable and relevant to the 
academic community and users (Lang et al., 2012). A TD approach offers an opportunity to 
study and proffer hands-on solutions that address complex governance issues by integrating 
an array of theoretical and methodological approaches across the socio-ecological space 
(Lang et al., 2012).  
 
4.4.1 Ontology of TD 
Ontology deals with the nature of reality; in other words, it answers the question of what 
constitutes reality. Obviously, owing to the iterative process and collaborative nature of TD, 
it definitely has a contested view of reality relative to the various actors in the knowledge-
production process. Relativism is the view that reality is subjective and differs from person 
to person (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). Reality emerges when consciousness engages with 
objects that are already pregnant with meaning (Crotty, 1998). There are multiple levels of 
reality, that is, perspectives and worldviews which are mediated by a ‘Hidden Third’ 
(explained below). Hence it is imperative to seek diverse perspectives on any human prob-
lem because the intention is to integrate many levels of truth while generating new TD 
knowledge (Nicolescu, 2010). TD ontology recognises the complex and dynamic 
relationships among multifarious realities organised at three levels, culminating in at least 
ten realities as discussed below:  
 
1. The internal world of humans: The level of reality where human consciousness 
flows, that is, the TD subject (this entails, inter alia, political, social, historical and 
individual realities);  
2. The external world of humans: The level of reality where information flows 
including inter alia environmental, economic and cosmic/planetary realities;  
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3. The Hidden Third: The level mostly latent and embedded in peoples’ experiences, 
interpretations, descriptions, stories, representations, images and formulas. (This 
includes the culture and art, religious and spiritual belief systems). TD acknowledges 
these multiple realities and attempts to incorporate them in knowledge production 
(Nicolescu, 2010; McGregor, 2012).  
 
4.4.2 Epistemology 
The root of the concept ‘epistemology’ is the Greek word episteme, which simply means 
‘knowledge’. Epistemology is concerned with what constitutes knowledge and the processes 
involved in obtaining knowledge (Trochim, 2000). It also indicates the relationship between 
the researcher(s) and the participants or the problem being investigated, the processes 
involved in knowing as well as what constitutes acceptable knowledge (Krauss, 2005).  
 
As with its varying ontology, TD epistemology involves an emergent knowledge obtained 
through ideas that have been synthesised from the interaction between different social actors 
who are integrated into an expanding field of research inspired by scholars from diverse 
backgrounds together with practitioners and community members by bridging the barrier 
between science and society (Flinterman et al., 2001; Regeers & Bunders 2003; Nicolescu 
2012). The entire process entails active consultation with and participation of the 
communities of practice, which involve inter alia the research team, practitioners and 
community members (see Regeers & Bunders, 2003). If research is conducted in this way, 
the research outcome is able to identify (1) how institutions in the co-management process 
have behaved in the past, (2) the forces that have shaped contemporary institutions as well 
as the enforcement laxities, and (3) how actors want future institutional arrangements (with 
the necessary requirements) to address natural resource challenges. The above could be 
achieved through a TD process whose outcome produces three main forms of knowledge: 
systems, target and transformation knowledge (Pohl & Hirsch Hardon (2007), as explained 
in Figure. 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2:  Knowledge obtained from TD in co-management research 
Source: Adapted from Pohl & Hirsch Hardon (2007); Messerli & Messerli (2008) 
 
Systems knowledge seeks answers to questions on the origins of co-management and its 
corresponding rules and power relations (institutions), possible development of the 
institutions, benefit structure as well as interpretations of the institutional arrangement.  
Transformation knowledge seeks answers to questions about the socio-technical, legal, 
cultural and other mechanisms required to act, so as to transform existing practices and 
introduce desirable ones. It seeks knowledge to shape the transition from the current to a 
target situation (what it is and how to get there).  
Target knowledge seeks answers to questions related to the determination and explanation 
of the need for change, improvements in the status quo, desired goals and appropriate 
practices. It seeks knowledge about a desired or ideal situation, suggesting a zeal to move a 
step ahead to improve or transform the situation. 
 
A more reductionist approach may mostly stop at seeking systems knowledge by perfectly 
modelling the prevailing challenge or situation (Maciejewski et al., 2015). A TD process 
jointly carries out this phase, forecasts for a desirable situation, and designs the requirements 
for such transformation or brighter future. With the TD participatory process the solutions 
are more context-specific and legitimate, and compliance would also be less problematic 
Target knowledge
Transformation 
knowledge
Systems 
knowledge
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(Walter et al., 2007; Pohl, 2008). A TD research approach adopts a multi-sectoral and 
iterative process that harnesses knowledge and expertise from academia, practitioners and 
community members. 
 
Any attempt to arrive at more holistic and transformational knowledge requires a team of 
researchers from inside academia (diverse backgrounds and disciplines), practitioners and 
state agencies (who have more practical experience and are crucial in enforcing research 
outcomes). More importantly, there is a need to involve different sections of the resource 
community, who possess contextual information and who are mostly the primary resource 
users (they will be the ones affected by the institutions as well as crucial when it comes to 
enforcement of local natural resource institutions). Involving community members and 
paying attention to local stakeholders (e.g. traditional authorities, landholders, those with 
access rights) in research on natural resource governance helps to avoid legitimacy 
challenges (Brown & Lassoie, 2010) and it enables effective adoption, enforcement and 
monitoring of research outcomes (Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). Various groups who have a 
stake in the tenure right systems, including vulnerable and marginalised groups, need not be 
relegated to the background. In discussing an integrated policy network model, Teye 
(2013:70) contends that by neglecting vulnerable groups during research on natural 
resources and the associated policy formulation phase these “marginalised groups [will be] 
able to depend on their networks with forest guards to harvest forest resources illegally”. It 
is within this context that community members should be actively engaged in the research 
process, so that the outcomes would largely include ‘community ownership’ and hence 
enforcement will gain relative legitimacy and patronage with less sabotage. 
 
Drawing these actors together in a joint research process through various phases of 
interaction, TD produces more context-relevant research outcomes.  
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4.5 Application of the TD Research Process: from theory to practice 
This chapter argues that bridging the gap between theory and practice depends not so much 
on the good intentions of the researcher as on the process itself. The researchers can, by 
following certain process design specifications, try to maximise the probability that the 
outcomes of a TD project will embody the TD paradigm’s philosophy of co-production of 
societally relevant solutions. The chapter proposes that a four-phase iterative approach 
should form the basis for the design of a TD study (see schematic view of the TD process in 
Figure 4.3 below).  The four fundamental phases are the initiation phase, formulation phase, 
execution phase, and communication and utilisation phase.  
 
Figure 4.3:  An iterative four-point TD process 
Source:  Author 
 
The phases are inter-linked and iterative, where feedback is always obtained from one 
process to the other as well as through a ‘backward loop’. Each process interacts with the 
others in a more comprehensive form and is not purely unidirectional (i.e. the phases are 
closely interwoven). 
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The initiation phase (also known as the formative phase of team and trust building) involves 
recognition of the research problem or interest, where the relevant research team is built 
around the research concept. The convener or team leader needs to communicate the concept 
(preliminary problem observation or research interest) to potential (relevant) team members 
to get them to buy into or express interest in being part of the research project. The team is 
to be drawn from relevant academic disciplines, practitioners and community members. The 
phase requires a familiarisation process and an account of the modus operandi of the team, 
allotment of specific tasks, meeting periods and venues. It also involves familiarising 
themselves with the research area and individuals or groups associated with the phenomenon 
or case to be researched (see Norris et al., 2016 for strategies in TD team formation). 
 
The formulation phase (also known as the joint-research definition phase) involves active 
brainstorming which produces and synthesises knowledge, ideas or opinions from a variety 
of actors across disciplines, practices and orientations on a particular research interest or 
problem. The paper conceptualises this as ‘formulation’, because it requires the generation 
of various ideas, alternatives and possible problem definitions and approaches; these are then 
synchronised and synthesised. This is the critical phase during which the team of researchers 
reaches an appreciable level of agreement on ‘common terms’ regarding the research project; 
this involves inter alia jointly defining and developing the research concept, designing the 
objectives and appropriate questions as well as the approach (Schäfer, & Kröger, 2016). If 
the research project is a dissertation, this stage involves actively engaging with project 
supervisors, reviewers from other faculties, practitioners and community members. This 
approach, especially engagement with non-academics (practitioners and community 
members), helps to define the research problem and how best to carry out the project. In this 
way the real-world problem therefore serves as a boundary object that draws together various 
stakeholders with experience, expertise or some other ‘stake’ to jointly proffer solutions 
(Clark et al., 2016; Lang et al., 2012). 
 
The execution phase represents the action part of the research process, which involves a 
search for a joint solution through appropriate methods, designs and approaches adopted to 
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reconcile the various form of knowledge and perspectives coming on board. The TD process 
enables the researchers’ idea to be executed or carried out in a more functional and dynamic 
way; here the procedures, specific approaches and time lines are drawn to guide the process 
(Lang et al., 2012). What makes this interesting is that all participants design the most 
feasible and nearly best approach with respect to the context. 
 
The communication and utilisation phase serves as the ultimate goal of TD research as it 
seeks to address real societal (natural resource governance) problems. This final phase 
involves communicating the co-designed and co-created research outcome (emergent 
knowledge) to relevant actors and authorities to be implemented in a way that brings about 
a significant improvement in the current situation. In TD this phase is executed with relative 
ease and, furthermore, knowledge is more likely to be enforced to bring about societal 
improvement, since the respective stakeholders (practitioners and community members) 
were involved in the co-creation process, and hence the co-designed solutions would be 
deemed legitimate and easily applicable (Walter et al., 2007; Schäfer, & Kröger, 2016).   
 
 
4.6 Relevance of TD Research for Natural Resource Governance and 
 Institutionalism 
On the basis of the review so far, we have argued for a TD approach in carrying out research 
that addresses institutional assessment of natural resources co-management. The reasons for 
implementing a TD approach are briefly outlined below. 
 
Firstly, natural resource management has gone through an evolution, from being largely 
bureaucratic and state-centric through to community-based management to co-management 
or collaboration. The contemporary emphasis is on co-management, which involves power 
sharing, and power sharing requires institutions to structure it. The process is inter-relational 
and involves a complex range of stakeholders, which in turn requires a TD research approach 
to understand the trajectory and performance of institutions. A study that adopts a TD 
approach will be able to elicit target, systems and transformation knowledge (see Figure 4.2). 
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The intricacies, high stakes and complexities associated with the co-management of natural 
resources, coupled with context-specific issues, require a TD knowledge that is co-created 
and developed from the specific context. Especially from the later 20th century, the 
management of natural resources moved from the archetypical fortress approach towards 
adopting a networked system which is now referred to by various names, inter alia 
environmental governance, collaborative process, co-management, joint forest management, 
and community-based natural resources management. Though conceptually each of these 
varies slightly, the underpinning similarity among all of them is an emphasis on multi-actor 
governance, the interplay of takeholders with divergent interests, and a network of 
individuals and groups who jointly manage natural resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; 
Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). For instance, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) argue that co-
management should not be viewed as a two-way process, just between the State and 
community; this will make it seem that the community is simply a homogenous entity. 
However, it is important to note that actors within the community are heterogeneous and 
diverse. Co-management of environmental resources involves power-sharing arrangements, 
mutual responsibilities and benefits (Leach et al., 1999; Blaikie, 2006). This suggests that 
co-management of environmental resources is a complex, ‘fuzzy’, ‘wicked’ and ‘ill-defined’ 
phenomenon that requires a more transdisciplinary process to assess the effectiveness of the 
institutional arrangements underpinning contemporary co-management processes. 
 
Institutions have a backward and forward loop, in that they have a past as well as contextual 
factors that have shaped contemporary institutions which underpin natural resource co-
management. More importantly, TD research produces, among other things, transformation 
knowledge, which is required to address prevailing laxities in institutional processes and 
enforcement. This will make it relatively easier to co-opt members since they co-created the 
solutions and way forward. 
 
Finally, natural resources per se, especially forest and wildlife resources, are ‘fuzzy’ in 
nature in the context of sustainable development. For instance, whilst a major goal of 
foresters may mainly be to ensure ecological protection, the goal of the local people is largely 
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to use the same resources for their primary survival.  Because of this, the interplay between 
the three main values of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental – 
and how to strike a meaningful and agreed balance between them is highly complex. 
Therefore, a study of how and why institutions have developed, how they shape people’s 
behaviour as well as their enforcement needs to adopt systems thinking, because the entire 
process is complex and fuzzy, and the stakes are high. The TD approach encourages 
researchers to co-develop more workable and contextual strategies that facilitate human-
environment interactions and eventually boost the resilience of social-ecological systems. 
 
It should, however, be acknowledged that the iterative nature of TD study, the stakeholders 
involved, its ontological and epistemological flexibilities make the process somewhat 
laborious, albeit useful, to provide effective research outcomes that impact on society. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the contemporary literature on the co-management of natural 
resources. The chapter has observed that, even though recent publications tend to emphasise 
the role of institutionalism in natural resource governance, there is a need for a more complex 
systems analysis. It is prudent for researchers to adopt a more all-encompassing approach 
that links academics and practitioners and more importantly community members in the 
research process. Institutional design in natural resource governance is an interesting study 
in that the relationship between actors, their responsibilities and powers in any particular co-
management regime has a rich history often embedded in the narratives or stories of the 
community stakeholders, which could better be appreciated if researchers adopt a 
transdisciplinary approach that links academia (lead researchers) to the non-academic world 
(practitioners and community members). Because it is just not enough to assess natural 
resource institutions and rules, TD aims at integrating science with society to co-produce 
relevant knowledge that would help solve natural resource governance problems and also to 
strengthen institutions and their enforcement. TD has a problem-solving focus; its active 
inclusion of practitioners and landholders/communities throughout the research phases 
makes the communication of research outcomes to communities very much easier and more 
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readily accepted, and they thus command greater legitimacy, which makes solutions easier 
to implement or enforce to improve governance of resources (Benham & Daniell, 2016). In 
other words, TD involves a study with landholders/communities to co-create legitimate and 
practicable solutions towards finding an institutional system that encourages the sustainable 
use of natural resources in the service of poverty reduction and the empowerment of 
marginalised communities/people. 
 
The more reductionist (traditional) approach of designing purely quantitative models to 
unilaterally assess complex resource governance issues and attempt solutions hardly 
commands legitimacy these days and conclusions may end up fading away in academic 
journals, which means they may not really impact on the study communities per se. The 
future of communities, resources and the ability to link research to policy and 
implementation requires a TD process which recognises systems knowledge, target 
knowledge and transformation knowledge, all of which are relevant to solving societal 
problems. It is high time researchers on resource governance adopted a more TD approach 
to incorporate scientific knowledge into the knowledge and experiences of practitioners as 
well as the local knowledge of community members so as to co-produce more legitimate 
knowledge that would have a greater impact on society. The TD approach to assessing 
resource governance issues offers a ‘tailor-made approach’ to solving real societal problems. 
When one wants to have a suit made for oneself, one goes to the tailor to be measured and 
the suit is cut and sewn appropriately based on the specific size and specifications. Similarly 
the TD approach suggests that in knowledge generation and proffering solutions to complex 
societal problems, the specific context, actual practitioners and people are to serve as points 
of contact and active participants in the research process. On the other hand, if one wants to 
buy an already made suit, one usually goes through a tedious process of trying on different 
suits (sizes vary based on designer or country of origin) before identifying which one of the 
alternatives fits one’s size and shape relatively well. This is far more tedious than the other 
scenario where the measurement is done in advance and would wear it to check 
appropriateness after perhaps a little alteration. Societies cannot go through such trial-and-
error processes of importing other knowledge into communities experimentally. In short, the 
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specific complexities of societies and their realities should be factored into the knowledge-
production process. Involving researchers, communities and practitioners more closely for 
the purpose of conducting research and structuring the problem brings out and synthesises 
new information and ideas which may not have occurred to the researchers individually, or 
if they had just sat in their armchairs to design questionnaires to be filled in by community 
members and practitioners.  
 
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
The chapter has provided a general conceptual overview of collaborative governance and 
the multiple actors as well as interests in natural resources governance, which it did by 
deploying the stakeholder theory. Observing the multiple actors and stakes in the 
collaborative governance process, the study makes a case for adopting the transdisciplinary 
(TD) research paradigm. The chapter discusses the conceptual overview as well as the 
ontology and epistemology of the TD approach and its appropriateness for natural resource 
governance research. The final part of the chapter provides a four-phase framework which 
guides researchers in embarking on a TD research process. The next chapter of the study 
provides a conceptual and theoretical contribution to natural resource governance by 
discussing a framework for collaboration in natural resource governance. 
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Chapter Five 
A Framework for Collaborative Natural Resource Governance2 
 
Abstract  
The complexities of the post-NPM era have resulted in a new governance regime based on 
‘collaboration’, a network-based model that links various stakeholders (state and non-state 
actors), ostensibly to maximise public value. The ‘consensus model’ has its underpinning 
‘rules of the game’, without which collaborative outcomes may end up being conflictual and 
counter-productive. Adopting a critical stage review, this chapter draws mainly from 
theoretical and recent empirical literature to unpack the factors that catalyse collaborative 
natural resource governance. The chapter reflects on these to design an ‘ABC framework’ 
aimed at providing signpost to agencies, governments and conveners of collaboration on 
how to execute this socio-technical process to maximise value. The ABC framework hinges 
on three broad pillars: Adopting and advancing human skills, Building integrity and 
legitimacy, and Creating a sense of attachment to the resource in question. It discusses these 
with specific indicators synchronised from recent collaborative experiences described in the 
literature. 
Keywords: collaboration, environmental governance, complexities, stakeholders,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 A version of this chapter was originally published as Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, 
K. A. (2016). Rising to the challenge: A framework for optimising value in collaborative natural 
resource governance. Forest Policy and Economics, 67, 20-29. 
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5.1 Introduction 
A much trumpeted approach to forest resources governance, especially from the 20th century, 
is one that adopts a network governance regime, a multi-actor-based approach (Muller, 
2010). This approach has become very popular and emanates mainly from lessons derived 
from the failure of the former regime, which tended to be too bureaucratic, centralised, state 
monopolised and, worse of it all, regarded local communities as destroyers of the 
environment and resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). The thinking of that time was based 
on environmental management that depended much on the technical know-how and 
expertise of state agencies, a bureaucratic and monopolised environmental regime; however, 
there has since been a paradigm shift towards what is known as environmental governance. 
The term governance suggests that various actors, including state agencies, are involved. 
According to Mitchell (2013), the concept of environmental management involves “actual 
decisions and actions concerning policy and practice regarding how resources and the 
environment are appraised, protected, allocated, developed, used, rehabilitated, remediated 
and restored, monitored and evaluated” (Mitchell, 2013:7). The notion of management 
connotes a hierarchical, top-down policy process where state agencies are pervasive and 
mostly influence policies through command and control, as well as a great deal of reliance 
on expert knowledge. However, with the ‘age of networks’ that developed mostly in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, there has been a paradigm shift towards an emphasis on ‘people’, 
‘stakeholders’ and ‘communities’, where policies on natural environmental resources are 
devised through a deliberative democratic process (Chambers, 2003). This approach has 
become known as, inter alia, collaborative environmental governance or co-management. 
 
Singleton (1998:7) defines co-management as associated with “governance systems that 
combine state control with local, decentralised decision making and accountability and 
which, ideally, combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each”. The process 
through which state agencies forge links with resource communities, local leaders and 
groups and local institutions promises value to both state agencies and local communities. 
However, in most cases, it appears that state agencies tend to be oblivious of the cumulative 
net value of collaboration, and are often tempted to think that value flows only to their 
partners or community members. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) provide a critical teaser 
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that if we were to ask for a fundamental reason as to why agency staff would want to 
collaborate with other actors or community members to manage natural resources, we are 
likely to hear laughable responses from agency staff. Some of these answers would perhaps 
be “the law requires this”, or “it is politically correct” or an “agency leader’s mandate”, 
among other ridiculous answers, which suggest that most people do not know the actual 
value of collaborating with communities. We argue in this chapter that collaborative 
environmental governance, when effectively carried out, provides a win-win solution for 
both the state agencies and the communities in question. The value it provides to state 
agencies is summarised in an argument by Putnam (1995) and forcefully brought home by 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000). The idea of collaboration is the foundation for developing 
‘social capital’ – trust, legitimacy, norms and networks of relationships – which could lead 
to a better, more effective and efficient policy outcomes (Putnam, 1995; Wondolleck & 
Yaffee, 2000). A more appropriate reason for collaboration and effective participation of 
communities is that “collaboration can lead to better decisions that are likely to be 
implemented and at the same time, better prepare agencies and communities for future 
challenges” (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:23). ‘Value’ as used in this chapter denotes the 
extent to which natural resource collaboration provides mutual benefits to state agencies and 
the collaborating communities. See Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1:  Value of collaboration to agency and communities 
Developed from Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) 
 
Whilst the above is the ideal value expected from collaboration, there is ample empirical 
evidence to suggest that poorly devised collaboration has unintended consequences that are 
even more devastating than the situation which prevailed before the flawed collaboration 
(Mwakaje et al., 2013; Silva & Mosimane, 2013; Kamoto et al., 2013; Scheba & Mustalahti, 
2015; Thondhlana et al., 2015). Recent evidence suggests that this governance regime may 
at times result in elite capture, poor accountability, low community involvement (Kamoto et 
al., 2013; Thondhlana et al., 2015); domination by expert knowledge and community co-
optation and disillusionment (Ribot, 2009; Scheba & Mustalahti, 2015); the potential to 
create new conflicts and even rekindle latent ones (Castro & Nielson, 2001; Thondhlana et 
al., 2015). Collaboration ideally ought to come with benefits; if these benefits appear 
marginal or illusory to the participants, then the sustainability of the process appears bleak. 
For instance, Scheba and Mustalahti (2015:8) put it succinctly: “in Mihumo/Darajani there 
was a general feeling of deep disappointment. … very little has materialised of what was 
promised; frustration, anger and disappointment about the lack of benefits have become 
dominant feelings in the village”.  
state agencies
communities 
(stakeholders)
Agencies
building understanding
building support
building capacity
Communities
economic 
social
environmental
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Given such experiences, among others, prospective collaboration or co-management 
arrangements with communities or groups are likely to face initial challenges. How could 
practitioners and conveners approach collaboration so as to meaningfully overcome these 
hurdles? Using a critical stage review, this article discusses pointers essential to achieving 
natural resource collaboration; this we do through an ABC framework.  
 
 
5.2 Methodology 
This chapter analyses existing theoretical and empirical studies, mainly drawn from journal 
articles and relevant books, to assess the challenges encountered in collaborative natural 
resource governance. The literature search covered all terminology as approximately related 
to collaborative natural resource governance: “collaborative natural resource management”, 
“CNRM”, “networked environmental governance”, “co-management”, and “collaborative 
environmental governance”. In the process, we combined adjectives related to common 
obstacles faced in the collaborative processes; these words included ‘challenges’ 
‘constraints’ ‘problems’, ‘setbacks’ and ‘hindrances’. Finally, we also included adjectives 
related to ways of enhancing the process; these words included ‘value’, ‘enhancing’ 
‘promoting’ ‘successful’ ‘effective’. The different adjectives and the concept of 
collaborative natural resource governance (CNRG) were combined in different ways to 
obtain a pool of more relevant literature on the study. The following three search domains 
were mainly adopted based on their relevance to the study and accessibility to the 
researchers: Sciencedirect, Tandonline and Google Scholar. The large pool of articles from 
these sources was initially sorted for relevance by skimming through their abstracts. After 
this heuristic process, all abstracts were independently reviewed by author and two 
supervisors. At the end of the process these met to eliminate duplicates and made a shortlist 
of abstracts for detailed and systematic review. The individual themes raised in each paper 
were then categorised and in various stages; through this, we were able to arrive at a more 
comprehensive classification of factors (ABC framework) which combine most of the 
elements discussed in the review papers and the relationships among them. 
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5.3 Literature review 
Co-management of natural resources promises high public value (see Figure 5.1), yet 
contemporary experiences suggest that such processes are mostly challenging, albeit not 
impossible to manage in practice (Hahn et al., 2006; McClanahan et al., 2009). Since co-
management is socio-technical in nature, the complexity of societies and groups makes such 
ventures laborious; however, recognising some of these potential challenges and adopting 
the right skills required for collaboration, could make the process more effective. This 
section highlights some key issues that constrain the collaboration process and discusses 
pointers to help address them.  
 
5.3.1 Common constraints agencies encounter in collaborative natural 
 resource governance 
5.3.1.1 Poor experiences of co-management arrangements 
Co-management arrangements are carried out with socio-economic and ecological benefits 
attached; however, observations tend to suggest that some co-managements appear not to 
have been very successful in qualitatively reducing poverty levels of communities and have 
not been effective in empowering the ‘have-nots’ in societies where these models have been 
implemented (Jentoft, 2000; Jentoft et al., 2003; Bene & Neiland, 2004; Kamoto et al., 2013; 
Scheba & Mustalahti, 2015; Thondhlana et al., 2015). In some cases co-management 
processes end up reinforcing or even increasing the disparity between the poor and the rich 
by buttressing the existing social order. In other words, actors who are economically poor 
and politically weak appear not to experience any real impact in terms of equity, effective 
participation and benefit sharing, as observed by Wilson et al. (2006) in the fishery cases of 
four study countries – Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Indonesia; the same applies 
to India’s forest management (Nayak & Berkes, 2008). With such experiences and news 
around, community members and organisations who might be inclined to open up to 
collaboration do so with some scepticism, which mostly affects prospective co-management 
processes. This point has been brought home forcefully by Wondolleck and Yaffee 
(2000:58): “mistrust, a general sense of wariness and scepticism frequently pervades all 
sides of the collaboration equation due to past interactions, stereotypes and a societal 
context that breeds mistrust. In most cases, the people may not trust forest officials, perhaps 
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because of previous experiences with them and could be vice versa”. This may have 
implications for doubting the actions and inactions, information and even approaches 
adopted or suggested by partners. This is a hurdle that needs to be overcome from the outset.  
 
5.3.1.2 Prejudices and scepticism 
In the light of the above experiences, it may be that scepticism, prejudice and cynicism are 
natural; and even in situations where there is no prima facie reason to be sceptical, it may 
still be latent. Bazerman describes this as the “myth of the fixed pie”, where individuals in 
most cases have preconceptions that “their interests directly conflict with the other party’s 
interests, even when creative win-win solutions are possible” (Bazerman, 1986:128). Yaffee 
(1997) notes that a major challenge is competitive human nature which drives out 
cooperative behaviour, and that individuals and groups have a tendency to promote 
competitive and egoistic tendencies. But in the real world in most cases this zero-sum game 
hardly occurs in natural resource management (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Groups form 
identities and boundaries for a variety of sociological and psychological reasons, and those 
boundaries keep them apart even when they share some common interests (ibid.). Kaplan 
and Kaplan (1982) point out that individuals develop cognitive models that help them to 
understand and act on their world, and other individuals with whom they socialise reinforce 
those models. Because of this, an issue may be conceptualised quite differently by different 
groups and that will make communication between them difficult. Therefore, the 
characteristic of agencies or conveners of collaboration is critical and they should be viewed 
as unbiased and trustworthy. If stakeholders have a reason to doubt the credibility of 
conveners, “other stakeholders may refuse to participate or even try to subvert the 
collaborative attempt” (Gray, 1989:72). In a study using four US planning experiences, 
Lachapelle et al. (2003) observe some distinct challenges that affected the process; these 
included lack of agreement on goals and a lack of trust. In a recent study of the Pendjari 
National Park in Benin it was observed that distrust, scepticism and prejudices led to ‘picking 
and choosing’ in the selection of stakeholders for engagement: “the management considered 
the CPLs (Chasseurs Professionels Locaux or Local Professional Hunters) as outsiders and 
they excluded them from the park management ... [they] were stereotyped as antagonists of 
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the system” (Idrissou et al., 2013:73). This eventually made the process more prone to 
distrust, conflict and subsequent disequilibrium. 
 
5.3.1.3 Rationality of actors and groups 
For groups to collaborate, each actor or party needs to allow for a degree of compromise; 
coming into a negotiation with a winner-takes-all mentality or a hard position weakens 
collaborative efforts. Consequently, a prima facie challenge that may hinder most 
collaborative arrangements is perhaps the homo economicus nature of man and groups 
(Hobbes, 1947; Wilson & Dixon, 2012). Man is by nature selfish and competitive and adopts 
a winner-takes-all stance; in other words, rational actors are keen to be engaged in zero-sum 
games (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). A widely applied model to explain the 
competitive and selfish motives of man regarding public assets is Hardin’s “tragedy of the 
commons”; Hardin posits that “each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without limit – in a world that is limited” (Hardin, 1968:1244). From the foregoing, 
it is evident that rational actors and the zeal for self-maximisation may create initial hiccups 
in collaborative arrangements, but this is not to say that they are not doable. In his five-point 
schematic assessment of common challenges that affect natural resource collaborative 
governance, Yaffee (1997) notes that individuals and groups have a predisposition to short-
term rationality which may blind them to long-term rationality. He argues that people are 
inclined to make decisions that appear effective in the short run, even if the long run would 
be problematic. In a recent study of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in South Africa by 
Thondhlana et al. (2015), a majority of study participants (80%) suggested that SANParks 
rules sanctioned by the San Traditional Sub-committee do not necessarily represent the 
utilitarian or collective interests of the San people, but mostly appear to be born out of the 
particularistic interests of the ‘traditionalists’3. 
                                                          
3 The San community comprises mainly two categories of population apparently divided into 
traditionalists and modernists. The ‘traditionalists’ strongly identify with the traditional San 
culture, a belief in subsistence use of resources and seek to establish institutions that restore 
and protect the San traditional values (Thondhlana et al., 2011). The ‘modernists’ regard 
land as a pathway out of poverty and that institutions should allow land inside and outside 
the KTP be used productively and sustainably (Thondhlana et al., 2011).  
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Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) discuss and broadly classify the problems associated with 
co-management, among other things, into institutional/structural and process challenges. 
These are discussed and illustrated in the sub-sections below: 
 
5.3.1.4 Institutional and structural barriers 
Using two cases from Spain, Pecurul-Botines et al. (2014:3497) observe that where local 
institutions appear formidable, forging or adopting a new form of natural resource 
governance collaboration appeared relatively more difficult than in the case where there was 
an institutional vacuum. This has implications for agency officials who operate at the 
operations level in devising practical workable approaches. However, state agencies are 
mostly underpinned by rigid and inflexible policies that could affect adapting to a context. 
Put differently, the red tape and burdensome procedures are frequent obstacles that may 
hinder effective collaboration. Lack of administrative flexibility in agency procedures for 
implementing agreements may frustrate cooperative efforts, especially at the local level. The 
lack of discretion allowed to field officers to undertake some collaborative decisions at the 
operations or field level may frustrate their efforts. Again, different organisations and groups 
may have differences in data-collection methods, analytical techniques and evaluation tools, 
which at times can make it quite frustrating for these groups to combine information in useful 
ways (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:57). The study by Lachapelle et al. (2003) in the USA 
also observed that rigidity in process design, procedural obligations and requirements were 
critical barriers that affected environmental planning and collaborative processes. 
 
5.3.1.5 Process challenges: technical 
Since collaborative efforts involve a socio-technical process of building bridges among 
individuals with different and mostly competing interests, the process requires a prudent 
approach to communication, problem solving, team building and decision making. If any of 
these processes are not handled professionally and with tact, they may even create greater 
problems than the challenges for which solutions are sought. Poor management of the 
process, inadequate process skills, poor stakeholder or network analysis mostly produce 
unintended consequences in collaborative environmental governance.  
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Firstly, unfamiliarity with the process may often lead agencies not to appreciate the 
importance of the process and the need to allot adequate time and attention to it. Gray (1985) 
has noted that “convenors and negotiators frequently underestimate the critical role of 
process in ensuring successful collaboration”; consequently, much attention is given to the 
substantive issue without giving the necessary attention to the preliminary process itself. The 
background checks, team building, scoping, stakeholder analysis and network formation 
phases are critical to the actual process itself, because a flawed pre-process (preparatory 
stage) would bring with it baggage laden with suspicion, scepticism, mistrust, neglect, 
powerlessness, among others. The collaborative governance of Pendjari National Park in 
Benin was not sustainable because “the project did not start with the information, negotiation 
and engagement of all relevant stakeholders” (Idrissou et al., 2013:73). 
 
Secondly, there could be lack of process skills among many agency officials and convenors 
of collaborative environmental governance. The problems associated with managing 
collaborative efforts suggest the need for effective process management, as well as 
interpersonal and relational skills, yet few agency officials have the required expertise and 
knowledge of them. Some of the essential skills include setting ground rules, management 
of data, creation of a congenial climate, communication and human skills, and empathy. In 
most cases natural resource agency officials appear not to have sufficient public relations 
and communication skills; this is reflected in a response from a forest service official that 
“We have a lot of technically competent people, but they would have done something else 
for a career if they were interested in people; they are not the best of communicators” 
(Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:65). However, in this collaborative initiative, expert forest 
resource managers first need to adapt to a new role, which requires them to move from the 
‘expert opinion’ role in traditional environmental management to an empowerment role as a 
facilitator, broker or catalyst. 
 
Finally, the process of managing tension between the process and the world around it usually 
creates a challenge for the process. In most cases, the peripheral activities that occur outside 
the official collaborative process could have an effect on the process; for example, if 
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members of the partnerships are engaged in conflicts on issues outside the partnership, this 
may have a ripple effect. Stakeholders who participate in collaborative efforts are often 
bound by the perspectives and procedures of their groups. This point was noted in a group 
task-solving model that observed: “despite their desire to work together and create a 
visionary proposal, most members were constrained by their political orientations and the 
viewpoints of their associations; and as leaders of their groups, they represented their groups’ 
points of view and were reluctant in this public forum to compromise or change these” 
(Roberts & Bradley, 1991:221) 
 
5.3.2 Addressing the challenges of collaborative governance 
From the foregoing section one might be tempted to get scared with hindsight, but the task 
is not impossible. Building bridges among groups, organisations and stakeholders requires 
tact and adequate skills in order to get things right. The literature on cooperation 
conceptualises human nature as largely egoistic and driven by self-interest; therefore, the 
driving force behind collaboration among groups is for actors to view a project as mutually 
beneficial. Processes that work at building understanding, trust and relationships between 
disparate groups can help create a climate in which collaboration can develop (Wondolleck 
& Yaffee, 2000:66-68). For instance, Castro and Nielson (2001:236) indicate key factors 
required for successful collaboration, including “the nature of the negotiations, the intent 
and content of the agreement (including acknowledgment of local rights and decision-
making powers), the institutional arrangements contained in it, the manner of 
implementation, and the continued commitment of the participants”. This suggests that there 
is a methodical approach to achieving effective process.  
 
Owing to the value it promises, scholars have attempted to provide various measures to help 
make environmental collaborations more productive. Because CNRG is primarily a 
technical process (requiring skills, expertise and experience of state agencies), there have 
been various exclusive studies on this theme in the literature (Jones, 2004). For instance, 
Reed et al. (2013:304) posit that “our examination … reveals that local officials within the 
same agency and operating with the same policy directives can indeed shape present 
practices and long-term trajectories for ongoing collaboration because of their skills, 
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interpretations of their mandates, exercise of formal or informal power, and other 
relationships”.  
 
On the other hand, many other scholars have advanced a need to devise practical approaches 
for CNRG, paying equal attention to a non-technical (political, economic, socio-cultural) 
context of the forces inhibiting or enabling key collaborative processes (Nelson & Agrawal, 
2008; Edwards & Steins, 1999). For instance, Edwards and Steins (1999:207) maintain that 
“context must be integrated as part of analysis of specific CPR (natural resource) situation”. 
The ‘context’ could be based on the nature of the natural resource in question, actors 
involved and peculiar issues at stake. Whilst context of community is imperative, it is more 
important to acknowledge the bigger picture, with its own the peculiarities and dynamics; 
this attempts to correct a simplistic notion of community “as a small spatial unit, as a 
homogenous social structure, and as shared social norms” (Agrawal & Gibson, 
1999:630).This point has been brought home forcefully by Plummer and Hashimoto 
(2011:232), who state that “an understanding of context should play a more central role in 
issues related to adaptive co-management and, more broadly, collaborative conservation”. 
More related to context, the issue of ‘institutional fit’ has been stressed by scholars. It is 
conceptualised as the manner in which institutions are integrated within the biophysical and 
social context within which they operate (Folke et al., 2007).  
 
Recognising context is not just enough, the ‘good will’ or ‘good faith’ of agencies and 
conveners as well as the approach contributes to legitimacy of the process. For instance, 
using the Agoua Forest Management case of Benin, Iddrissou et al. (2011a:130) observe that 
“if potential problems are not properly discussed at the beginning, conflicts emerge during 
implementation”. Information should be accurately disseminated and all social actors should 
be engaged early on in the planning process to ensure their cooperation and overcome the 
limitations of hierarchical planning processes (Díez et al., 2015). The role of social learning, 
trust and managing expectations has been highlighted; Davies and White (2012:168) write: 
“satisfactory outcomes require investment of all stakeholders in learning, building trust and 
establishing mutual goals, and the explicit allocation of resources to support the processes 
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required … explicitly recognizing that ‘collaborative’ partners may not have equal power, 
influence or interests is essential to avoid differing expectations that could lead to 
disengagement”. Perceived legitimacy is also linked to the perceived quality of deliberation, 
and stakeholders’ level of policy support and their views about the procedural fairness appear 
strongly related to instrumental substantive considerations rather than any deliberative or 
democratic qualities of the participatory process (Birnbaum et al., 2015:448). The authors 
maintain that such process opens up the space for social learning and exchange which could 
“facilitate the development of new, better informed and shared views, and to stimulate 
public-spirited (as opposed to private-instrumental) views and orientations among the 
participants” (Birnbaum et al., 2015:448). In their study they posit that “certain distinctively 
deliberative elements associated with the identification of common ground and shared 
understandings likely served as a catalyst for bridging disagreements and for advancing the 
joint preferences of stakeholders” (Birnbaum et al., 2015:457).  
 
To make way for such trust and good faith in CNRG, emphasis has been placed on a need 
for neutrality in the brokerage process, hence a neutral arbiter who does not have greater 
stakes in the resource in question. In an empirical study by Ford et al. (2002), a collaborative 
process ended up in a prolonged conflict which failed to create a new reality by 
deconstructing stakeholders’ perceptions; this they explain was due to the stakes all the 
parties had in the issue or process. Consequently, Gray (2003:32) argues that “since 
reframing requires perspective taking, it is often difficult for parties to reframe without the 
help of a neutral third party or someone who does not have a direct stake in the conflict”. 
 
More importantly, the role of institutions has been discussed as linchpin in CNRG 
(Saarikoski et al., 2010; Idrissou et al., 2011a). With this in mind, Idrissou et al. (2011a), 
for instance, conceptualise participation (or here, collaboration) as interaction between 
frames, social cohesion and institutions (including informal institutions). The nature of the 
rules, power and benefit arrangements has implications for success of CNRG. Although the 
role of formal institutions has been amplified in the literature, recent studies have observed 
that as the collaborative process gets started, progressively informal institutions and 
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relationships emerge and even become decisive in the further implementation of the process 
(Iddrissou et al., 2011b).  
 
In addition, the agency-community relationship has been discussed in the CNRG literature. 
Some scholars have debated the approach, nature and role of state agencies in the 
collaborative process (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2007). In a case study in Himachal Pradesh, the 
authors observe that “the success of local resource governance institutions may be adversely 
affected by the close involvement of higher-level government officials in decision-making 
processes. Greater autonomy to local actors is associated with better resource-related 
outcomes” (Agrawal & Chattre, 2007:83). This point has been advanced by Coulibaly-
Lingani et al. (2011), who express a need to build and empower local environmental 
governance structures as well as involving elected local leaders, traditional village leaders 
and representatives from various stakeholders to serve as a more viable option to 
accommodate conflicting interests and resolve struggles for decision-making power among 
local actors than simply devolving power to local administrative authorities. They caution 
that state agencies to serve as facilitators or advisory groups with greater powers given to 
the local people (p. 484). For this to succeed, community actions and role of local structures 
and groups are quintessential. The role of individuals, groups and organisations at the local 
level working through networks has a tremendous effect on collaborative processes and 
outcomes in terms of increased transparency, accountability and participation at the 
community level (Khanal, 2007:23).   
 
To maximise the utility of local participation in natural resource governance, it is also critical 
to have collaboration between those community members as well as inter-association 
harmony (Thakadu, 2005). Social networks comprise actors who are tied to one another 
through socially meaningful relations (Prell et al., 2009; Scott, 2012). The creation of social 
networks is essential to the success of cooperation and conflict management in the natural 
resource governance context. Scholz and Wang (2006) argue that in the context of 
institutional enforcement and people’s compliance with ecosystem restrictions, social 
networks could have a higher potential even than the existence of formal restrictions (Cross 
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et al., 2002; 2006). Social networks provide a great deal of impetus to collaborative 
governance processes by the facilitation, generation, acquisition and diffusion of different 
types of knowledge and information about the natural resource in question (Crona & Bodin, 
2006; Schusler et al., 2003) as well as the mobilisation and allocation of key resources for 
effective governance (Carlsson & Sandstrom, 2008; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). This 
facilitates actors’ commitment to ground rules whereby each agrees to engage in monitoring 
the enforcement processes of collective rules (Dietz et al., 2003; Scholz & Wang, 2006) and 
also helps in conflict management and resolution (Hahn et al., 2006, cited in Bodin & Crona, 
2009). These and other related factors for a successful collaborative natural resource 
governance have been illustrated in table 5.1 below. 
 
 
Table 5.1:  Factors for effective CNRG 
Factors Sources 
Skills and experiences of agencies Jones, 2004; Reed et al., 2013 
Context and institutional fit Folke et al., 2007; Nelson & Agrawal, 
2008; Plummer & Hashimoto, 2011) 
‘Good will’ of agencies and quality of 
approach 
Iddrissou et al., 2011; Davies & White, 
2012; Birnbaum et al., 2015 
Role of institutions, power relations, 
benefits 
Castro & Nielson, 2001; Buizer & Van 
Herzele, 2010; Saarikoski et al., 2010; 
Idrissou et al., 2011 
Greater autonomy to people and groups Agrawal & Chhatre, 2007; Coulibaly-
Lingani et al., 2011 
Community and group harmony, social 
network, stakeholder approach 
Crona & Bodin, 2006; Khanal, 2007; Prell 
et al., 2009;  Lin & Chan, 2011; Scott, 2012 
Neutral arbiter Ford et al. 2002; Gray, 2003; Berkes, 2009; 
Margerum, 2011 
Relating to the natural resource Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000 
Source: Authors’ compilation from recent literature, 2018 
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5.4 Discussion: The ABC Framework 
With lessons drawn from the empirical review, together with theoretical studies and practical 
experiences with natural resources collaboration, this section synchronises and discusses key 
prerequisites for collaboration. Whilst there could be other factors that bother roles of 
communities  or other entities (such as individuals, groups, private sector), the focus of this 
framework is to reflect on those that greatly bother on what agencies and conveners could 
do to enhance the process. As a guide, we present a socio-technical approach, referred to as 
the ABC framework, which involves three iterative processes that explain a central idea – 
an effective collaboration process. This is illustrated in figure 5.2 and table 5.2: 
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Figure 5.2:  ABC framework 
Source:  Developed by authors 
Table 5.2:  Key to the ABC framework 
Acronym Meaning Methods or Approach 
 
A 
 
Adopting and advancing 
human skills 
Communication (at different 
levels), stakeholder 
engagement, people interaction 
 
 
B 
 
Building integrity and 
legitimacy 
Institutions and benefit 
systems, role of bridging 
organisations and neutral 
broker, good will, adequate 
autonomy, network 
 
 
C 
 
Creating a sense of 
attachment to the resource 
‘Fitting to context’, local focus, 
sponsoring field trips, clean-
ups, being part of activities 
such as festivals 
 
 
effective 
collaboration 
process
A
B
C
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The process should be regarded as an iterative activity in that it is not a neat linear process, 
but socio-technical in nature; whenever the need arises to engage other stakeholders, this 
should be done. This is because “as the social actors get involved, they bring about 
refinements and improvements in defining, understanding, deciding and taking action – but 
a good beginning positively affects all future outcomes” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 
2004:146). The process should not be rushed through as if it were unidirectional in nature, 
lest it may end up as a Type (III) error, or serious implementation challenges. This error 
occurs when the right solution is adopted but for a wrongly diagnosed or structured problem 
(Dunn, 2004) 
 
5.4.1 Adopting and advancing human skills 
The power of communication, stakeholder assessment and engagement 
Human skills and relationship management is a first step in building a collaborative team 
and even carrying across an agency’s message. A good message poorly packaged or ill-
communicated would hardly sell. The power of communication and engagement with people 
is critical to arrive at a mutually beneficial discussion and negotiation. For instance, 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) debunk the widely touted framework of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, which has underpinned most research publications, ostensibly to rationalise the 
complexity of managing human behaviour in collaborative efforts. They agree, however, 
that in the case of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, if the two prisoners (kept in separate cells with 
no interaction) had cooperated and remained silent without confessing, their prison sentence 
would have been minimised. But because they were driven by “individual, rational choices 
promoted by self-interest, mistrust and lack of communication”, they did not cooperate with 
each other and this in turn led “to an individually and collectively suboptimal outcome” 
(Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:49-50).  
 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) consequently argue that though this metaphor has 
underpinned much research that explains human behaviour in cooperative and collaborative 
processes, most real-life human interactions are fundamentally different from what the two 
prisoners faced. They note “individuals have the ability to communicate directly with one 
another and often have the ability to establish rules of the game together … most will 
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continue to interact with each other” (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:50). Therefore, the kind 
of dilemma faced by the two prisoners appears very latent in most real human interactions, 
who should apply the power of communication and ‘rules of the game’ effectively. Borrini-
Fayerabend et al. (2004) use the notion of ‘social communication’ and argue that it is the 
linchpin of the negotiation among representatives of various interest groups on concrete 
decisions, such as collaborative processes (Habermas, 1984). This form of engagement 
should not be a façade or disguised co-optation, but should be constructive and be based on 
adequate information. Scholars and practitioners advocate the value of meaningful 
engagement and warn against hypocrisy; “negotiations, however, are not meaningful if they 
happen in an ‘information vacuum’, with only a few people aware and concerned about what 
is being discussed and what consequences the decisions will entail” (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al., 2004:155).  
 
On the selection of actors for negotiation, Turnhout et al. (2010) explain that there is mostly 
an intentional or unintentional marginalisation of some actors. This occurs because agencies 
may place restrictions on who is to be involved in the process and negotiation space; 
assumptions about the issue at stake; and expectations about process outcomes and people’s 
behaviour towards them. However, in all these assumptions proper scoping and inclusion of 
relevant actors should be the hallmark. Agencies at times adopt an illusory mechanism; 
instead of broadening the approach, relevant information and the dialogue are confined to 
the individuals holding positions of power and local privilege, and therefore the agency may 
not get the broader picture of the prevailing situation (Delville, 2000). The ABC framework 
maintains a need for conveners or agencies to foster ‘good will’ by being open in the process 
through active engagement with all relevant interested parties and granting adequate 
autonomy (Agrawal & Chhatre 2007; Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011a; Idrissou et al., 2011a; 
Birnbaum et al., 2015) The framework ensures that the right approach is used to scope and 
identify all relevant stakeholders based on their power, legitimacy and sense of urgency 
(Freeman 1984; see also Reed et al., 2009 on stakeholder analysis).  
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In a recent study on actors and collaborative governance of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
in South Africa, Thondhlana et al. (2015) observe that while in principle the process was 
supposed to be underpinned by inclusiveness and participatory decision making, these have 
become elusive to most of the people because the process appears too restrictive and does 
not promote meaningful participation of all relevant stakeholders. Consequently, real issues 
might be developing on the blind side of outside agencies. Therefore, informal discussions 
with a number of local actors is a useful approach. With a context-dependent communication 
strategy, all the interest groups need to be well informed, knowledgeable and aware of the 
issues on the table. According to Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004), the communication 
strategy could be personal, involving one-on-one conversations with key actors, or inter-
personal among a few individuals; or social, involving groups such as a local community 
(see also Cundill et al., 2013; Moorman et al., 2013). Communication tactics needs to be 
proactive and adaptable even within the same socio-cultural and ecological setting, 
depending on context. The approaches include, inter alia, community meetings, posters, 
maps, drawings, poetry, debates, films and photos, radio, the print media, street theatre and 
other folk media (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). In a project in Congo Brazzaville some 
conservation issues and associated information were recorded on cassette tapes which were 
then, among other things, distributed to the drivers of public transport, where people could 
listen to them and perhaps initiate some discussions even prior to the project (ibid).  
 
5.4.2 Building integrity and legitimacy 
Institutional arrangements and a non-stakeholder referee or neutral arbiter 
A fundamental point in building legitimacy would depend to a large extent on how ‘rules of 
the game’ structure power and responsibility relationship, benefits to be derived and costs 
imposed on breaching the terms. This is important right from the beginning and becomes 
even more relevant as the process advances (Idrissou et al., 2011b) 
 
An important element that serves as ‘a glue’ to bond actors together is trust (Lewicki, 2006; 
Lijeblad et al., 2009). In this trust-building project the parties involved as well as the social 
context within which the process occurs have great influence. The propensity for 
communities to trust is mostly derived from their cultural identity, personality, previous 
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experiences and also perceptions about the actors involved (Gray, 2003; Dewulf et al., 2009). 
The data about ‘the trustee’ or agency relates to perceived trustworthiness, which is the 
people’s perception of the ability and magnanimity of the trustee (agency) to act in the 
interests of the ‘trustor’ (community) as well as the perceived integrity to execute the 
people’s shared principles. Collaboration in most cases involves compromises, sacrifices, 
benefits and power relationships. It appears problematic when a major stakeholder in the 
process turns around to assume the position of arbiter or referee; this may naturally lead to 
prima facie suspicion and a feeling of distrust. As has been discussed in the previous section, 
mistrust is anathema to collaboration (Redpath et al., 2013:102). To encourage trust and 
legitimacy among actors, Berkes (2009) advocates the need for a bridging organisation that 
would help mediate between formal actors (government) and the other actors (including 
community members and informal institutions). The role of this bridging organisation is 
reflected in the framework below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Bridging organisations in collaborative environmental governance  
Source: Berkes (2009) 
 
Trust building 
Social learning 
Networking 
Conflict resolution 
Building vision and goals 
Bridging science and local knowledge 
Bridging local government institutions 
Co-producing knowledge 
Accessing information and resources 
 
 
Government 
agencies 
User-groups 
or communities 
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The role of bridging organisations in co-management cannot be over-emphasised. The 
credibility of bridging organisations is very important to enhance their legitimacy as well as 
obtaining the confidence of stakeholders. These organisations mostly mediate between state 
actors and other stakeholders. This is against the backdrop that most people mistrust and are 
suspicious of state agencies – whether rightly or wrongly, founded or unfounded, justified 
or unjustified. The presence of a neutral arbiter tends to neutralise or at least reduce this 
legitimacy deficit, which will in turn inject vibrancy into the process. In a discussion of the 
peculiarity of brokers in collaborative natural resource arrangements, Margerum (2011:65) 
explains that it “can be challenging for a broker to convene a group when they are considered 
a stakeholder, because participants may be suspicious about their motives; alternatively, the 
broker may be able to convene the group, but may not be able to easily lead it because they 
are a significant stakeholder”. Margerum summarises indicators to measure broker 
legitimacy in Table 5.3. 
 
 
Table 5.3:  Indicators of a broker’s legitimacy at all three levels 
Collaborative type Factors influencing broker legitimacy 
 
Action 
 Broker connections to the community often an 
important factor 
 Government-based brokers can make convening 
more difficult 
 
Organisational 
 Broker validity includes both personal connections 
and organisational affiliation 
 Resources to initiate consensus building an 
important aspect of legitimacy 
 
Policy 
 Broker validity includes both policy-level 
reputation and connections 
 Resources to initiate consensus building is an 
essential aspect of legitimacy 
Source:  Margerum (2011)  
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5.4.3 Creating a sense of attachment to the resource 
 
 ‘Fitting to context’, Merging with or living the community way 
To win the trust of the community and obtain the ‘social currency’ required to forge 
collaboration between communities/stakeholders and agencies, it is imperative for conveners 
to ‘fit into the latter’s context’ or empathise with them. In other words, live the community 
way, feel the community way and perhaps attempt acting in the community way; the 
activities of agencies and conveners should fit the society (Folke et al., 2007; Wondollock 
& Yaffee, 2000). 
 
Wondollock and Yaffee (2000:68) indicate the factors that have proven to help bridge the 
gap between state agencies, communities and other partners. They highlight key themes: a 
sense of place or community, highlighting shared goals or fears, developing a common 
vision, and capitalising on compatible interests. We maintain that the ‘Wondolleck-Yaffee’ 
factors discussed below could be adaptable and contextualised to facilitate prospective 
collaboration. 
 
A sense of place or community 
Most successful collaborative projects got started through strong identification with a 
geographic location, a biophysical feature or a community which serves as a springboard 
from which the collaboration was further developed. This starts with agencies or interested 
parties trying to identify themselves with the resource concerned. For instance, the 
Applegate Partnership involved industry, community groups, federal agencies and 
environmental groups; its success could partly be attributed to the fact that all the actors had 
a strong attachment to the Applegate River Watershed. The process was initiated and it 
flourished through, inter alia, field trips and community events as well as a local focus. The 
authors discuss how field trips and community events that are tied and linked to the particular 
resource enhances legitimacy and nurtures collaboration. Agencies or prospective 
collaborative partners could sponsor some community programmes such as clean-ups, 
sporting events and festivals, among other things (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). When such 
efforts are applied, they promote a sense of place in connection with the particular resource, 
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and they encourage actors and community members to direct their routine actions and efforts 
towards an ultimate goal in actions geared towards the particular resource in question. This 
semblance of community outreach through social events is very important in that it draws 
communities to support the objectives of agencies; as a programme director pointed out, 
“despite all the statutes on the books that mandate water-quality protection, the laws still 
don’t protect rivers; people do” (quoted in Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:74). Getting various 
actors to identify with the particular resource provides a powerful symbolic association that 
encourages people to reframe their identity and their perceptions of groups that have 
traditionally been classified as ‘outside’ of or ‘inimical’ to their community or interest.  
 
Secondly, there is a need to have a local focus; programmes perceived as ‘local’ in nature 
have a higher tendency to elicit identification with a place. Collaboration is positively 
enhanced by the physical proximity of the stakeholders and this means that local-level 
initiatives have a greater chance of reaping the added advantages associated with geography, 
possibility of shared language, common values and norms (Gray, 1985); people perceive a 
possibility of sustaining protracted and long-term interaction (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). 
A pragmatic approach to build legitimacy and local focus is to hire and train people from the 
community to assist in operational activities; this is because people become sceptical when 
new groups come into their communities for partnerships. This means that even with the 
right kind of information and proposal, ‘the carrier’ and the approach matter most. For 
instance, in Congo Brazzaville a collaboration project encountered initial opposition to 
penetration from the local people until a person of local tribal descent understood the issue 
at stake and agreed to visit the local communities and initiate a series of open negotiations. 
That intervention, and the views of the people heeded, suggests that until local people or 
stakeholders accept the ‘carriers of information’, even a genuine call on them to engage in 
discussions may fall on deaf ears (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004:156) 
 
Shared goals or interests 
Collaborative arrangements become natural when stakeholders or actors realise that they 
share some commonalities in terms of interests and objectives. For instance, the Oak 
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Opening project in Ohio provides a classic example of how shared interests could forge 
collaborative governance. The project coordinator notes “all these agencies were working 
towards the same thing, and it was just getting everybody to sit down and realise we’re all 
working towards the same goals” (quoted in Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:79). Members 
realised that it was imperative for them to cooperate in order to get some of their shared 
goals accomplished. 
 
In an attempt to get started through acknowledging a shared goal, it is at times better to find 
objectives above and beyond any immediate conflict. In other words, there should be a 
superordinate goal which is far above the current conflicts between groups or stakeholders. 
For instance, researchers deliberately activated conflict between cabins at a summer camp 
and tried to find out which approach could best foster cooperation among the groups. The 
approach that worked perfectly was the introduction of a superordinate goal above their 
current misunderstanding. For instance, the camp’s water system broke down and the groups 
had to fix it together. Also, when competing cabins went on trip and the bus broke down, 
this time too all the boys pulled together to fix it and get back to camp. A bigger and 
immediate superordinate goal helps individuals and groups to come together to cooperate, 
notwithstanding any pre-existing misunderstanding on other issues (Wondollock & Yaffee, 
2000. 
 
 
5.5 Summary and conclusion 
Collaborative natural resource governance offers prospects for both state agencies and 
collaborating partners, especially resource communities. This chapter has argued that 
although the process has intrinsic value, a poorly designed and adopted collaborative 
enterprise could be catastrophic and could even worsen the situation that used to exist or the 
so-called problem that needed to be addressed. We have highlighted potential challenges 
that are commonly faced by conveners of natural resource collaborations; these include, inter 
alia, overt rationality of actors and groups; prejudices and scepticism; institutional and 
structural barriers; and technical challenges with the process itself. Unpacking these 
challenges is not intended to scare agencies from undertaking collaboration, but creating 
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awareness of the potential pitfalls to be faced in itself serves as a partial solution to the 
problems; this will not only prevent initial disappointment but encourage fortitude to forge 
ahead. More importantly, the chapter argues that collaboration involves a socio-technical 
process; we have therefore discussed some skills and procedures that could be adapted to 
suit the particular context. The key factors discussed revolve around: the power of 
communication, interaction and engagement; mediating and neutral brokers between major 
stakeholders; proper scoping, stakeholder and network analysis; developing a sense of place 
or community with actors; identifying with the people’s shared goals or interests.  
 
We conclude that collaborative natural resource governance should be viewed as socio-
technical in nature, an art and a science with its own socio-technical rules. This is because it 
requires key competences, skills and procedures in bridging barriers among people and 
groups. Being oblivious of these ground rules and approaches may deepen conflict, even 
escalate new ones, which may make the ‘promised values’ of collaboration seem 
increasingly elusive (see also Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004:368 on how poor consultation 
led to a co-management debacle). Poor community engagement is a socio-technical error, 
which suggests that it is not mostly the case of the message or the content, but how the 
message carrier is able to identify and engage appropriately with important actors at the local 
level.  
 
Adopting an ABC model helps; indeed. Thondhlana et al. (2015:128) explain that 
“communities are unlikely to invest in collaborative governance unless local institutions can 
ensure the benefits of this outweigh the costs”. Prospective processes thus need to be tactical 
through applying the ABC model, firstly, by advancing human skills through 
communication and engagement with relevant actors at the local level and, at best, manage 
expectations. The scoping process for relevant and influential stakeholders is important; for 
instance, Cox et al. (2014:54) demonstrate how religious institutions could have an 
important role to play in at least eight of 15 governance functions they discussed. This 
reinforces the essence of social capital as well as how local institutions and culture could be 
more relevant to active engagement in collaborative processes, which could help “lower 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
transaction costs” and enable the system to be “self-enforcing”. Secondly, the scepticism, 
mistrust and people’s prejudices could be reduced by building integrity and legitimacy 
through the involvement of neutral brokers. Finally, there is a need to create a sense of 
attachment to the resource in question and to the local people. Although we regard the 
management of collaborative processes as an art and a science, or as being socio-technical 
in nature, the ‘socio’ attached to our typology suggests it is not too rigidly methodical, but 
accommodating, flexible and context-dependent.  
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Chapter Six 
Institutional Analysis in Natural Resource Governance4 
 
 
Abstract 
Natural resource governance is enhanced and structured by rules, norms and strategies; this 
makes institutionalism quintessential in the natural resource governance discourse. 
Undertaking a retrospective analysis of classical theoretical literature and recent empirical 
experiences of natural resource institutions, this chapter discusses institutional analysis as it 
pertains to the natural resource governance context. Synthesizing from the relevant 
literature, this review designs and discusses an analytical framework to illustrate how formal 
and informal institutions structure natural resource governance. The key elements in the 
framework are: biophysical element, process and institutional element, behavioural choice 
element, enforcement mechanisms and an outcome element. The chapter argues that for 
formal rule to be more effective greatly depends on its relationship with the informal 
institutions and more importantly their enforcement complementarities. The study 
consequently discusses key elements that influence the effectiveness of natural resource rule 
enforcement. This review concludes that both formal and informal institutions serve as 
catalysts to reinforce natural resource governance; however, the two could also combine to 
form a clandestine network to facilitate unethical resource exploitation. The chapter puts 
forward the view that it is not institutions per se, but the “nature of interaction” between 
formal and informal institutions together with the “enforcement mechanisms”, which will to 
a large extent determine the kind of resource outcomes. 
Keywords: institutionalism, natural resources, formal institutions, informal 
institutions, enforcement 
 
                                                          
4 A version of this chapter was first published as a peer-reviewed article by Elsevier as Yeboah-
Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2017). Institutional assessment in natural resource 
governance: A conceptual overview. Forest Policy and Economics, 74, 1-12. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Modern thinking on sustainable development (SD) maintains that the philosophy of 
development should view each of the three SD values (economic, social and environmental) 
as complementary and not substitutory (Tafon & Saunders, 2015; Hartanto et al., 2003). 
Research has been advanced for a need to adopt an approach that seeks to harmonise natural 
resource protection, on the one hand, and people’s reasonable usage for socio-economic 
purposes on the other hand, albeit, in an uneasy relationship (Gbedomon et al, 2016; Nkhata, 
et al, 2012; Silva & Mosimane, 2012). Achieving such balance requires appropriate access 
and tenure rights on the part of people and groups together with a robust institutional 
underpinning which will help drive sustainable behaviours (Leach et al, 1999; Ceddia et al, 
2015). 
 
Scholars contend that even in situations where there are access and tenure rights systems, 
their enforcement may not be effectively guaranteed when exclusively left in the hands of 
formal state regulators, especially in the developing world (Gauld, 2000; Sundar, 2000). 
Merging the above goals (socio-economic and ecological imperatives) requires a prudent 
approach that defies exclusive management of state agencies. In other words, there is a need 
to balance formal institutions with community attributes5 to avoid legitimacy challenges 
(Brown & Lassoie, 2010) and to enable effective monitoring (Górriz-Mifsud et al., 2016). 
This is largely because of the widespread failure of centralised management of natural 
resources in the 1970s, which brought to the fore the realisation that achieving resource 
sustainability cannot be achieved without effective participation of relevant stakeholders 
(Brown & Lassoie, 2010; Mohanty, 2004). There has, therefore, been an increasing 
movement away from the archetypical centralised administration towards more 
collaborative governance based on active participation of various actors at the local level 
(Deguiguinet et al., 2014; Evans et al. 2006; Hulme & Murphree 1999), which adequately 
                                                          
5 Community attributes include the number of agents involved, heterogeneity of their values, interests 
and power, as well as the levels and types of social capital they possess (Paavola & Adger, 2005:356); 
relations among groups and individuals (Coleman, 1990); networks of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition; social obligations and connections (Bourdieu, 
1986:248); institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions between 
people (North, 1990).  
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recognises people’s rights and benefits (socio-economic development) in the conservation 
process (Nelson, 2004; Haller et al., 2008).  
 
The centrality of collaborative natural resource governance hinges on how the ‘rules of the 
game’ structure the power, benefit and responsibility relationships between state agencies, 
local agencies, the people and other various stakeholders. Owing to the complexities (the 
nexus between attainment of conservation and delivery of local socio-economic benefits) 
associated with natural resources and multiple stakeholders involved, ‘institutions’ are 
required to structure patterns of interaction (Brown, 2003; Saunders, 2011). They help to 
mediate and  structure interactions  (Ensminger, 1992; Agrawal, 1995; Gibson, 1999). Any 
meaningful assessment of natural resource governance cannot rule out the centrality of 
institutions and the way they shape conceptions and values of people regarding particular 
resources and their management (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Agrawal, 2001; 
Cleaver, 2012). The main objective of the chapter is to provide a critical overview of 
‘institutions’ in the context of natural resource governance and to illustrate, with the help of 
a framework, how formal and informal institutions structure natural resource governance. 
More importantly, the chapter discusses key measures to enhance the enforcement of formal 
and informal rules to maintain a balance between natural resource protection and people’s 
socio-economic usage.  
 
This chapter is organised into five main sections. Section one provides a general introduction 
and background; section two conceptualises the nexus between formal and informal 
institutions. The levels of formal rules are highlighted whilst three different connotations of 
informal institutions are conceptualised in this section. The third section provides a brief 
methodology. Section four discusses the natural resource institutional framework depicting 
six key elements. With the use of empirical literature, the framework demonstrates how 
formal and informal institutions structure natural resource governance. The final section 
provides the conclusions drawn from the study. 
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6.2 Conceptual overview: institutions 
North (1991:97) conceptualises institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interactions; they consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights)”. The author notes that human societies have devised and adopted 
institutions in an attempt to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. North’s 
definition appears to emphasise ‘institutions as a constraining mechanism’; however, 
institutions should not just be seen as constraints but also as ‘enabling’ mechanisms that 
provide rights and benefit systems, powers and responsibilities and choice sets. This study 
therefore, defines natural resource institutions as mutually shared codes and prescriptions 
that regulate human actions and their relationships by constraining and enabling people’s 
choice sets regarding a particular biophysical element; as well as the means and strategies 
for ensuring compliance. 
 
The definition is premised on the fact that institutions serve as the ‘rules of the game’ that 
underpin common pool resources management or governance, the absence of which may 
lead to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ where “each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited” (Hardin, 1968:1244). The 
combination of both formal and informal institutions tends to define the choice set available 
to actors, which provides them with a set of transaction costs,6 and who by acting rationally 
will embark on actions with least costs (Paavola, 2007). The mention of ‘institutions’ 
connotes a ‘shared understanding between entities or parties’; this is mostly devised by 
individuals, groups and communities to guide repetitive interactions organised by norms and 
rules (Ostrom, 1990). Norms as used in institutionalism suggest moral behaviour, ethical 
standards or patterned (conventional) ways of doing things; they are shared prescriptions 
largely enforced by participants themselves (Ostrom, 1999a). Rules, on the other hand, 
connote regulations characterised by enforcement complementarities, enforced by 
                                                          
6Although transaction cost implications have not been given much recognition in natural resource 
governance research, they do elucidate the implications of institutional designs for governance 
outcomes (Paavola, 2007; Paavola & Adger, 2005). 
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designated agencies, processes and procedures in a more predictable manner, usually by a 
third party (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995).  
 
6.2.1 Distinguishing between formal and informal institutions 
6.2.1.1 Formal institutions 
Imperial (1999) discusses formal institutions as those that include laws, policies, regulations 
(rules and prescriptions) which forbid and permit, together with the expected outcomes and 
sanctions associated with deviation. According to the institutionalist school of thought, 
formal institutions are closely related to the corridors of state, its agencies, officials and state-
sanctioned activities (Boussard, 2000). From that perspective, they are conceptualised as all 
actions, principles, procedures and agencies involved in the act of controlling the organised 
instruments of the state and the political process (Friedrich, 1953; cited in Lauth, 2000). 
Lauth (2000) therefore states that formal institutions involve the prescriptions, instruments 
and instructions that are largely codified, having the status of constitutional clauses and laws 
that are guaranteed and sanctioned at multiple levels largely by public agencies. Formal 
institutions as used in the context of natural resources governance are therefore characterised 
by:  
(i) National and federal constitutions, statutes, laws, directives and local government 
laws regarding natural resources; 
(ii) the activities, procedures and operations sanctioned by state agencies and 
officials, e.g. forest agencies and officials;  
(iii) rules that are authoritatively passed (with public or state power) to govern a 
particular resource and to shape relationships between stakeholders and the 
resources; 
(iv) rules that are generally binding with prescribed enforcement complementarities; 
(v) adequate certainty of outcomes when one deviates from such rules and generally 
not borne out of discretion. 
 
From the above account, it is evident that formal institutions and structures are designed to, 
among other things, regulate how humans interact with natural resources (see Paavola, 
2007). The ability to structure the interaction to a large extent depends on the effectiveness 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
 
of the enforcement mechanisms. The rules which structure human-nature interactions and 
actions are organised on three main levels (see Table 6.1).  
 
 
Table 6.1: Levels of formal rules 
Level of rule Elucidation 
 
 
Operational rules 
Decisions about when, where, and how to do something, 
who should monitor the actions of others, how actions 
should be monitored, what information should be 
exchanged or withheld, and what rewards and sanctions 
will be assigned to combinations of actions and 
outcomes (e.g. appropriation, provision, monitoring and 
enforcement) 
 
Collective-choice rules 
They influence operational activities by determining 
how operational rules can be changed and who can 
participate in these decisions (e.g. policy making, 
management and adjudication) 
 
 
Constitutional-choice rules 
They influence operational rules by determining who is 
eligible to participate and collective choice rules by 
determining how they are changed (e.g. governance and 
modification of constitutional decisions) 
Adapted from Imperial (1999); Kiser and Ostrom (1982)  
 
The operational rules (also known as surface-level rules, see Thomson & Freudenberger, 
1997) involve the routine decisions at the local level dealing with when, where, how and who 
questions; the directives to sustainably use or manage a given resource system and the 
authority to change, enforce or selectively neglect to apply a given set of rules is a collective 
choice right. Those who can make such collective choices are determined by constitutional 
choice rules, including the fundamental question of who owns the land and its resources. In 
effect, the three levels of rules together with their enforcement provides directions to 
individuals and groups in their actions and inactions with respect to how people access 
natural resources by way of indicating what is detestable, permissible, the extent of access 
and the cost of deviation. The point has been made by Ostrom (1999b:51) that ‘the working 
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rules’ or ‘rules in use’ involve “the set of rules which participants would make reference to 
if asked to explain and justify their actions”.   
 
Apart from the centralised rules, political decentralisation (devolution) has enabled local 
governments and communities to have their own by-laws fbor regulating natural resources. 
Additionally, through administrative decentralisation of state agencies (de-concentration), 
many local communities have within their jurisdiction personnel, offices and structures of 
state to represent and enforce the directives of the central agency. For instance, Agrawal and 
Ostrom (2001) observe the role of forest councils (FC), which formally govern vast 
territories of at least three districts in Kumaon (India); this indicates how formal institutions 
underscore natural resources governance through decentralisation. As part of the local 
(operational) rules sanctioned by the council, villagers have been given permissible 
parameters, beyond which the villagers cannot cut down trees.  
 
6.2.1.2 Informal institutions 
The mention of ‘informal institutions’ may connote different meanings at different times.  
This suggests that informal institutions may elicit more than one meaning depending on the 
context. Helmke and Levitsky (2004:727) define informal institutions as socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels. From the above definition and its context, the conceptualisation of 
informal institutions hinges on some indicators which include, inter alia, (i) social and 
cultural beliefs and norms, (ii) mostly not codified, (iii) non-state-sanctioned regulations, 
(iv) systems enforced by actors (local people) themselves, and (v) rarely could mean 
clandestine activities such as bribery and corruption. In the latter regard, Helmke and 
Levitsky contend that “informal institutions are used to virtually connote any behaviour that 
departs from, or is not accounted for by, the written-down rules” (Helmke & Levitsky 
(2004:727). 
 
Informal institutions as tradi-cultural systems and norms 
Informal institutions have been discussed as involving the traditional governance 
arrangements, including chieftaincy and priesthood systems as well as cultural belief 
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systems. These are mostly seen in the developing world, where traditional systems continue 
to wield influence. In a retrospective analysis of eight (8) natural resource governance cases 
from the southern African context, it was observed that one element which ranked very 
prominently was the essential role played by traditional leaders. The authors observe that 
where traditional leadership was strong and legitimate, their influence had a corresponding 
impact on the sustainability of environmental resources (Shackleton, et al., 2002; Larcom et 
al., 2016). One unique trait associated with traditional institutions and environmental 
conservation is the animate role attached to the resources that makes their protection more 
like a ritual and linked to the people’s wellbeing. Shackleton et al. (2002) have noted that 
natural resources in the African context have not only been considered for the products and 
valuable ecological services derived from them, but those resources such as trees, animals, 
water bodies and aquatic lives, and mountains have also been the linchpin of the people’s 
religion and cultural beliefs and were to be kept free from abuse by human activities.  
 
From this perspective institutions connote customary rights or pre-existing rules passed 
down from generation to generations, ostensibly to protect, maintain and sustain natural 
resources within a particular context and mostly not codified into law (Otsuka & Place 2002). 
They are promulgated, monitored enforced and sustained within the culture and narratives 
of a given community, even though this may appear questionable to people from a different 
culture or context. For instance, Colding and Folke (2001) assess the role of ‘social taboos’ 
(resource and habitat taboos – RHTs) in natural resource and biological conservation. They 
group the RHTs into six categories, depending on their role in natural resource conservation 
and management.  
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Table 6.2: Taboos and natural resource regulation 
Category of taboo Function 
Segment taboos Regulate particular natural resources withdrawal 
Method taboos Regulate methods of  natural resources withdrawal 
Temporal taboos Regulate access to natural resources in time 
Life-history taboos 
Regulate withdrawal of vulnerable life-history stages of 
species 
Specific-species taboos Total protection of species in time and space 
Habitat taboos Restrict access and use of resources in time and space 
Source: Colding and Folke (1999) 
 
Table 6.2 demonstrates how informal institutions tend to control and regulate, through 
traditional and cultural belief systems, the way people interact with particular natural 
resources within a particular traditional area. Some particular taboos could have more than 
one conservation value (see Berkes et al., 2000; Colding & Folke, 2001; Negi, 2010). In a 
study in northern Ghana, Millar (2003) notes that the traditional informal institutions and 
belief systems have major conservation value, which becomes more robust when combined 
with modern democratic elements.  
 
In spite of the conservation values associated with traditional belief systems, in most cases 
they tend to be downplayed in the design of natural resource governance frameworks; this 
has been a major cause of the failure of most environmental management regimes in the 
global south (Fairhead & Leach, 2004:13; see also Kamoto et al., 2013).  Osei-Tutu et al. 
(2015) contend that the fortress approach adopted by central governments to govern natural 
resources overruled and undermined most of the then existing informal local institutions. 
Observing the relevance of functional institutions in a study context in Ghana, the authors 
argue for “effective incorporation of informal local institutions in forest management 
(which) requires effort to revitalise traditional institutions, and where necessary develop new 
ones” (Osei-Tutu et al., 2015:34)  
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Informal institutions as outside the proper sphere of official space 
The idea is that acceptable behaviour, actions and groups organise their interactions within 
the formal space, adopting proper channels of communication and procedure. Consequently, 
any acts, actions, behaviours or activities developed outside of formal law or formal space 
and channels, are usually viewed as ‘informal sectors’ or ‘informal economies’ (Guha-
Khasnobis et al., 2006). Any arrangement or transaction outside of formally established 
rules, procedures and practices could be viewed as informal. In that regard, norms and 
routines that formal enforcement agents and forest resource users enter into (outside of laid-
down procedures) constitute an informal institution. These may be “acceptable norms” 
generated out of good will, or “unacceptable norms” propelled by dubious motives (Teye, 
2013a) or social relations (Nunan et al., 2015). Whilst the former is largely advocated the 
natural resource governance literature, the latter have not been adequately discussed in the 
literature.  
 
This chapter argues that any clandestine activity which occurs ‘within a black market’ or 
blind side of formal institutions should be viewed as an informal institution. For instance, if 
forest officials bend the rules and acceptable norms to solicit financial favours from loggers, 
the action occurs outside proper sphere of official rules, procedures and established norms, 
and it then becomes corruption viewed as informal institution. It is within this context that 
Robbins (2000) conceptualises “informal institution” to connote any behaviour that departs 
from, or is not accounted for by, the written-down rules. This also reflects a view of Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004:727), who define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels”. The concluding phrase “communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” is to be understood in this regard, because the authors had initially 
identified terms such as “clientelism, corruption, clans and maﬁas”, and it was within this 
context that they gave their substantive definition. This perspective is also shared by Pacheco 
et al. (2009:7), who define informal rules as those occurring “out of the reach of formal 
judicial frames in any level of decision-making and elaborated outside of official spheres” 
(Lauth 2000; Brinks, 2003; Casson et al., 2010). These include activities such as bribery and 
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corruption, clientelism, nepotism, favouritism, and illicit use of discretion. Put differently, 
this typology of informal institutions applies when rules and acceptable norms (habits, 
values and practices) are illicitly bent, side-stepped or massaged to render them impotent, so 
that unethical and illegal transactions could operate freely. For instance, Teye (2013a) 
observes how corruption through neo-patrimonialism encourages exchanges between top 
officials of the Forest Services and timber contractors in Ghana, which affects formal 
monitoring and enforcement of rules.  
 
Informal institutions as community sanctioned activities  
Informal institutions have also been viewed as shared approaches that are adopted and 
locally enforced by particular communities through their own leaders. Firstly, people self-
organise to create, apply and enforce rules to protect and manage a given resource system 
when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs, and the said communities can pursue such 
ends without the interference of a third party (e.g. the state).   
 
In most natural resource communities, people form groups to communally enforce rules and 
norms in an effort to collectively protect their interests. These informal groups such as watch 
dog committees, community protection groups, youth groups and gender-based groups tend 
to augment the work of formal state agencies. For instance, Ballabh et al. (2002) illustrate 
how informal groups contribute to natural resource governance in India. They observe how 
since 1996 a village ‘Parwara’ has formed three Woman Forest Protection Committees, each 
comprising 13 members, and demarcated their forests into three parts, with each committee 
having a monitoring role over their assigned territories. They monitor forests to assess the 
damage done and the extent of encroachment on monthly basis.  
 
These community-sanctioned committees have been present in India where Van (forest) 
Panchayats emerged as a response to the people’s movement against forest reservation at the 
beginning of the 20th century. This culminated in the phenomenon of Forest Protection 
Committees geared towards addressing the severe degradation of natural (particularly forest) 
resources (Bhattacharya et al., 2010). These village committees were so successful in the 
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protection of forest resources that they did not even want to join the formal Joint Forest 
Management (JFM), which they believed may reduce their effectiveness (Ghate, 2000). 
 
 
6.3 Methodology 
The chapter undertakes a literature analysis of theoretical and empirical studies mainly 
drawn from journal articles and scholarly books that are relevant to natural resource 
institutional analysis. The research initially began with the framing of key search phrases 
and questions to help sample relevant literature for the review. The author therefore keyed 
in structured phrases and questions (variously) to help identify a large pool of literature. 
Three main search domains – Sciencedirect, TandFonline and Google Scholar – were mainly 
used based on their relevance to the study and accessibility to the researcher. The search 
process involved the use of key phrases and questions related to institutionalism in natural 
resource governance. For instance, “institutions and natural resource governance”, “rules 
and power sharing in co-management”, “institutionalism in natural resource governance”, 
“formal and informal rules in natural resources” were used. These phrases were at times 
posed in question form and keyed into different search engines to obtain a large pool of 
literature relevant to the study. This large pool was initially sorted for relevance by scanning 
through their abstracts. The search process pooled out close to 150 peer-reviewed articles. 
After sorting them, all abstracts were independently reviewed by the author and two project 
supervisors. At the end of the process, the three met to eliminate duplicates and made a 
shortlist of abstracts for detailed and systematic review. The study finally agreed on some 
90 relevant sources; however, in the process of writing up and analysis, other equally 
relevant materials especially from the journal Forest Policy and Economics were added 
(included in References). The evidence that emerged from the materials was analysed using 
content analysis; the researcher classified the content into themes, especially in the 
discussion section.  
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6.4 Discussing institutional analysis in Natural Resource Governance 
The discourse on natural resource institutions involves interplay of rules, norms, structures 
and actors together with their interactions. Institutional analysis involves the task of 
“identifying the possible multiple and overlapping rules, the groups and individuals affected 
by such rules and the processes by which the particular sets of rules change in a given 
situation” (Agrawal & Gibson 1999:638). 
Any study aimed at adequately assessing natural resource institutionalism ought to 
schematically analyse (i) the institutional arrangement; (ii) the nature of the institutional 
arrangement (whether polycentric or hierarchical); (iii) the action arena to determine the 
extent to which different stakeholders or actors make informed decisions; and (iv) the rules 
and strategies that structure relationships between actors and resources. See Table 6.3. 
 
 
Table 6.3:  Institutional analysis 
Element Meaning 
 
Institutional analysis 
The process of analysing the design and performance 
of institutional arrangement 
 
Institutional arrangement 
 
The structure of the relationships between the 
institutions involved in some type of common 
endeavour (action arena) 
Polycentric institutional 
arrangement 
One that has multiple centres of shared or overlapping 
authority 
Hierarchical institutional 
arrangement 
One that has a clear hierarchy of authority 
 
Action arena 
Those individuals or organisations that make 
decisions based upon information about how actions 
are linked to possible outcomes and the different costs 
and benefits attached to actions and outcomes 
 
Rule 
Prescription that forbids, permits, or requires some 
action or outcome and the sanctions associated with 
failing to follow a rule. They can be formal (e.g. laws, 
policies, regulations, etc.) or informal (e.g. 
behavioural norms). 
Source: Adapted from Imperial (1999) 
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6.4.1 How institutions structure natural resource governance: A framework  
On the basis of the review above, we provide a graphical view of how institutions underpin 
and influence outcomes in natural resource governance, with empirical evidence from the 
literature. Largely drawing from the works of Ostrom (2005), Oakerson (1990), North 
(1991) and Ostermeier (1999), this study adapts the institutional analysis and development 
design to discuss a conceptual framework to explicate how natural resource institutions 
structure relationships and outcomes in natural resource governance. See Figure 6.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Natural Resource Institutional Framework 
Source: Author, adapting ideas from Ostermeier (1999); North (1991), Ostrom (2005) 
 
 
From the framework (Figure 6.1), institutional analysis involves a biophysical element 
which interacts with a process and institutional element (together with enforcement 
mechanisms). The interplay between the biophysical element, institutions and enforcement 
determines the behaviour of stakeholders or actors towards the natural resource. This 
interplay determines how actions generate particular behavioural choices (including the 
costs and benefits associated with particular actions and inactions) and the ensuing natural 
resource outcomes. The framework discusses five elements; biophysical element, process 
and institutional element, behavioural choice element, enforcement mechanisms and an 
outcome element.   The main object here is to assess how process and institutional elements 
together with enforcement complementarities produce behavioural choices and particular 
Process & 
Institutional choice 
element 
 
Biophysical 
elements 
Enforcement 
mechanisms 
Behavioural 
choice element 
(Interactions) 
Action Arena 
Outcome 
elements 
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resource outcomes. The chapter discusses this using evidence from different contexts drawn 
from the empirical literature. 
 
6.4.1.1 Biophysical element 
A biophysical element refers to the particular natural resource (common pool resource) 
available in the community which has various stakeholders. The biophysical element could 
be a forest resource or reserve, wildlife, marine and aquatic resources, or mineral resources. 
These are natural endowments available to the community and mostly have societal values 
and economic demands, which could perhaps mitigate the poverty situation of community 
members. The biophysical element has numerous potential uses and users, which largely 
entails an interplay between conservation goals and local socio-economic demands on the 
resource. Even at the local level there are interlocking demands and stakeholders; this 
requires clearly defined ‘rules of the game’ to ensure positive, sustainable or equitable 
outcomes. Put differently, biophysical resources have multiple stakeholders who may 
perhaps want to use the same resource for conflicting purposes. Blyth et al. (2011) explain 
that human preferences evolve and it is more likely that different societal members and 
interests will develop different preference clusters, which means a significant variation 
within populations; and “individuals may have multiple and often conflicting preferences” 
(p. 12). The argument is that these are common pool resources – and therefore subtractable 
and non-exclusive, which in turn makes such resource systems problematic, because positive 
outcomes require collective action (Ostrom et al, 1994; Williams, 1998). 
 
6.4.1.2 Process and institutional element 
Owing to the potentials inherent in the biophysical element, a second component, a process 
and institutional element, is crucial in order to prevent a ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
syndrome, where “each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited” (Hardin, 1968). The role of institutions is, therefore, 
quintessential in the ordering of human relations, preferences and choices. Institutional 
arrangements are conceptualised as the interplay of formal rules and state agencies (at 
multiple levels), on the one hand, and informal institutions and norms, on the other hand 
(North, 1991). This arrangement together with the subsequent processes collectively 
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provides a framework that shapes natural resources and also provides incentives that 
determine how people behave and interact with the resource and among themselves. Ostrom 
(2011) provides six key pointers useful for analysing the operationalisation and efficacy of 
‘rules in use’ in the natural resource governance context. These are illustrated in Table 6.4. 
 
 
Table 6.4:  Institutions and natural resource governance 
Forms of rules Elucidation 
 
Position rules 
What criteria are used to promote people from ‘ordinary member’ 
status to a position or a specialised task, for example, chairperson 
of a wildlife management committee? 
 
 
Scope rules 
What is the level of knowledge and understanding with regards 
to what is permissible and forbidden (geographic and functional 
domains)? Are there documents (including maps) to delineate 
who can access from which territory?   
Choice rules What is the awareness level with regards to acceptable, required 
or mandatory resource harvesting technology or approach? For 
instance, must forest users use some cutting tools and not others? 
Aggregation rules What is the awareness level with respect to the rules affecting the 
choice of harvesting activities? For instance, do people need prior 
authorisation or consent of others? 
Information rules What kind of information needs to be kept secret and what must 
be communicated publicly? 
Payoff rules What is the extent of sanctions that could be imposed for breaking 
any of the five rules above? How do people monitor rules to 
ensure compliance and who is responsible for sanctioning non-
compliance? 
Adapted from Ostrom (2011:20-21) 
 
 
Table 6.4 shows that working rules structure natural resource governance by providing clear 
guidelines and answers to the above elements via position provisions, scope provisions, 
choice provisions, aggregation provisions, information provisions and payoff provisions. 
These provisions are critical to regulate how individuals and groups interact with or approach 
natural resources. Though institutions are useful, their relevance is more determined by the 
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extent to which they interact or forge alliances with one another to elicit the preferred 
patterns of behaviour from societal members (Ostermeier, 1999). The institutional process 
remains the cornerstone for social interaction by assigning roles, enhancing actions and 
constraining behaviours; they are also critical to the decision-making process and determine 
the extent to which decision making should be open or closed, who should be involved as 
well as how conflicts are managed in society (ibid.). Institutions have deliberately been 
designed (they also evolve) with societal and organisational embedded values, interests, 
goals and resources that constrain or enable human behaviour in society (North, 1991; 
Hodgson, 2006; Leftwich, 2007; see also Kiser & Ostrom, 1982 as discussed in Table 6.1). 
The ‘process’ and ‘institutional element’ in natural resource governance (see Figure 6.1) 
essentially provide the arena and choice sets for relevant stakeholders to organise, structure 
and carry out their tasks in an orderly way, whilst providing the appropriate mechanisms and 
channels to effectively address concerns through a well-established procedure or norms of 
practice (Habermas, 1984). The argument is that, without the procedure and institutional 
structures, individuals and groups will find it difficult to interact among themselves and with 
the common pool of resources; more problematic will be the way to resolve any 
misunderstanding that may arise.  
 
6.4.1.3 The enforcement mechanism 
A third element, the enforcement mechanism, is a crucial part of the institutional process. 
Gibson et al. (2005) maintain that it is fundamentally critical to achieve the desirable 
outcomes in natural resource management. Among other factors, including ‘high level of 
social capital’, ‘presence of formal organization’ and ‘people’s degree of dependence on 
forest products’, Gibson et al. (2005) rate ‘institutional enforcement and monitoring’ to be 
the most critical for a consequent improvement of forest management interventions (Ghate 
& Nagendra, 2005). The institutionalist school of thought argues that there should be rules, 
which are well known and effectively enforced so that they are internalised. North (2005) 
states that achieving effectiveness through institutionalism involves an interplay between 
three important elements: the formal rules, informal norms and their enforcement 
characteristics. Institutions become less relevant if they are unable to structure human 
interaction; without the tools, skills, personnel and requisite level of autonomy to forge a 
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link between rules and their enforcement to adequately enable or constrain human actions, 
institutions remain largely useless and dysfunctional.  
 
In most cases, enforcing natural resources rules to elicit preferred human actions or 
behaviour (conformity) becomes quite problematic. Agrawal (2003:257) notes that “actual 
human behaviour, even in the context of well-enforced institutional rules, is unlikely to 
conform precisely to institutional contours … perfect enforcement is far too costly ever to 
be achieved”. Ballabh et al. (2002) use two cases from India to discuss the rise and fall of 
institutions involved in the management of forest resources. The study observes that 
although local institutions (Van Panchayat of Parwara) had been empowered to sanction 
offenders by slapping fines on them, enforcement has been problematic. Between 1992 and 
1996 a default rate (in terms of fines and actual payments) of 79% was recorded (see p. 
2161). In Garhmal village, however, there is no record of fines, even though there is evidence 
of frequent tree felling in the forest. These enforcement laxities are widespread, especially 
in developing societies where informal institutions (in the context of clandestine activities 
such as bribery, corruption etc.) make public officials illegally transact formal rules for 
material gains (Teye, 2013a). These empirical findings suggest that natural resource 
institutions are hardly effectively enforced. The biggest question is: How could we achieve 
enforcement effectiveness? This section discusses some key themes required to enhance 
effective enforcement of natural resource institutions.  
 
Principles underpinning natural resource institutional effectiveness 
Cox et al. (2010) provide some indicators for enhancing natural resource institutional 
effectiveness. The authors underscore that rules should possess some specific indicators that 
will enhance their influence in terms of regulating behaviours. This has been illustrated in 
Table 6.5 
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Table 6.5: Principles for NR institutional effectiveness 
Principles Elucidation 
User boundaries Should delineate clear and locally understood 
boundaries between legitimate users and non-users 
 
Resource boundaries 
Should delineate clear boundaries that separate a 
specific common-pool resource from a larger social-
ecological system 
 
Fit to local condition context 
Appropriation and provision rules are to be 
congruent with local social and environmental 
conditions  
 
Appropriation and provision 
Appropriation rules are congruent with provision 
rules; the distribution of costs is proportional to the 
distribution of benefits 
 
Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by a resource regime are 
authorised to participate in making and modifying 
its rules 
 
Monitoring users 
Individuals who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the appropriation and provision levels of 
the users 
Monitoring the resource Individuals who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the condition of the resource. 
 
Graduated sanctions 
Sanctions for rule violations start very low but 
become stronger if a user or users repeatedly 
violates a rule 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms Rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist for resolving 
conflicts among users or with officials 
Minimal recognition of rights The rights of local users to make and enforce their 
own rules are recognised by the government 
Source: Adapted from Cox et al. (2010) 
 
Generally, the principles emphasize the need for localizing the institutional design and 
monitoring. Observing enforcement laxities in India’s JFM institutions, Singh et al. 
(2011:132) emphasise “an urgent need for the establishment of credible local monitoring, 
local rule-making and local enforcement systems in every village-level JFM organisation to 
facilitate local learning and adaptation. Further, local enforcement is often most effective in 
the case where forest management is initiated by the community”. 
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Pandey (2010) also provides additional principles to underpin institutional arrangements of 
natural resources (forests) so that enforcement will be effective. See Table 6.6 below. 
 
 
Table 6.6:  Institutional effectiveness ‘fitting to context’ 
Institutions Locally evolved institutional arrangements 
 
Interaction 
Stakeholders maintain frequent face-to-face 
communication 
 
 
local enforcement 
Continuous learning about the social-ecological 
systems, rule compliance, patrolling, guarding against 
unauthorised use, fines and sanctions in dealing with 
offenders 
 
Monitoring and adaptations 
Local monitoring is a powerful tool for management 
of ignorance among stakeholders and managers 
 
Livelihoods improvement 
Livelihoods improvement through employment, 
village development, sharing of goods, and sharing of 
service payments.  
Generating and linking 
knowledge to action 
Adaptive actions and contextualised enforcement 
enables the creation of ideas which result in solid 
innovations.  
Source: Adapted from Pandey (2010) 
 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide principles to enhance the enforcement process and indicate how 
natural resource institutions could elicit compliance most effectively. How could such 
principles be converted from thought to action? The themes below are discussed to 
demonstrate how enforcement of natural resource institutions could be enhanced.  
 
Adequate technical resources 
Officials or agencies need to be tactful in the natural resource enforcement process; this is 
because natural resource issues involve maintaining a balance between political, social and 
technical imperatives.7 Enhancing institutional effectiveness requires some specific criteria 
                                                          
7 Natural resource issues involve a whole set of actors and stakeholders. It is not just about “providing 
technical solutions to objective problems of development and environmental conservation [but part 
of a bigger] political process” (Agrawal, 2003:258). 
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involving implementation resources, including personnel, finance, tools and equipment, 
technology, legal arrangements and autonomy. When these are poorly provided, natural 
resources rules will be poorly enforced and cannot elicit the preferred human behaviour and 
compliance. Agrawal (2003:257) argues that “when resources devoted to enforcement of 
institutions are limited, resource use patterns are far more likely to diverge from what rules 
specify”. For instance, if forest officials do not have the motor bikes or vehicles to detect, 
chase and arrest offenders, monitoring will be ineffective. Similarly, if the officials do not 
have adequate autonomy or powers to work without fear or favour, they remain toothless 
bulldogs. It should, however, be noted that too much discretionary power and autonomy 
without adequate accountability is likely to facilitate clandestine transactions and could 
foster corruption (Transparency International, 2010:2). 
 
Attention to local power brokers and local politics 
Concentrating solely on rules and resources (as above) becomes more structural in nature 
and that alone cannot meaningfully elicit effective enforcement. A critical criterion is 
institutional complementarity, which measures the extent to which formal rules are 
supported by the informal values and norms of people in the society or resource community 
(Helmke & Levisky, 2004). Rule enforcement requires some form of local politics and 
crafting alliance with local power brokers.  Agrawal (2003:258) maintains that “issues of 
agency, the mutually productive relationship between domination and resistance, and the 
creation of institutional arrangements can be understood only with greater attention to micro-
politics”. Agrawal further explains that “management is not just about providing technical 
solutions to objective problems of development and environmental conservation [but part of 
a bigger] political process” remaining oblivious to this fact will render natural resource 
institutions ineffective. Understanding the local context has an added advantage of getting 
local support, which is much needed for monitoring purposes. Local monitoring is a 
powerful tool for institutional effectiveness; participatory monitoring helps engender locally 
relevant data, information and knowledge, and induces adaptive actions by stakeholders for 
putting knowledge into action (Pandey, 2010). 
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Blending management science with good governance principles 
It is very important to involve community members and relevant groups in the enforcement 
process, but that alone would be useless without recourse to sound implementation and 
management science (Kabiri, 2004). Likewise, relying solely on rational science or a linear 
scientific approach will not produce effective outcomes. Arts et al. (2014) challenge linear 
accounts of governance processes and the role of knowledge in these processes as overly 
idealistic and mechanical. The authors argue that interventions cannot be externally imposed 
on a system, but local factors should always be an integral part of that practice. They 
maintain that the institutions people readily heed do not just emerge naturally or through a 
neat process, but are the result of a combination of history, context and practice.  
 
Drawing inferences from (i) a situated agency gendered-mainstreaming policy in Forest 
Protection Committees in Andra Pradesh, India; (ii) a case where a logic of practice of 
artisanal loggers in Bolivia made them behave as indigenous community members to outwit 
laws; (iii) finally performativity in EBONE project (the European Biodiversity Observation 
Network, funded by the EU FP 7 programme), Arts et al. (2014) apply rational choice and 
neo-institutionalism lenses to argue that individuals and groups may not necessarily respond 
to the main logic of rules but in most cases may respond based on the historical and their 
own interpretation of the rules and how they best fit their context. The approach is based on 
an assumption that effective enforcement of rules and policies ought not to be regarded as a 
linear application of a set of external rules, but as an internal and dynamic process of 
interpretation and negotiation of policies in specific contexts (Fischer & Forester, 1993).  
 
In a related empirical study, Weiss (2000:252) observes that policies (institutions) are more 
easily understood in the context of the institutional settings and through the interplay of 
interests and values of political actors than by the formal characteristics of the policy 
instruments. He concludes “in practical application, the informal functions of policy 
instruments are more important than their formal characteristics … all three instruments 
presented (the case studies) were not primarily implemented in the way they were formulated 
in the law”. 
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Natural resources involve greater stakes, with an array of messy problems, needs and 
concerns in a context of multiple uses and users; paying attention to essential governance 
(human skills) principles is imperative. This point is forcefully brought home by Lockwood 
et al. (2010) that natural resource governance occurs in a context where “interests are 
diverse, and (involves) a coordination among public, private, and voluntary sectors”; it is 
therefore imperative for agencies to adopt good governance principles to enhance success 
(Lockwood et al., 2010:997). The authors highlight and discuss eight principles that are 
relevant for enhancing institutional enforcement in a way to get the best results in natural 
resources governance. These good governance principles are: legitimacy, transparency, 
accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, integration, capability and adaptability (Lockwood et 
al., 2010:1997). Good governance practices on the part of state agencies are critical to rule 
enforcement and there have been instances where the unscrupulous practices of agencies 
have undermined a process that used to perform very well when it was under community 
enforcement.  
 
Ballabh et al. (2002) provide a typical case where Van Panchayats (forest protection 
committees) had provided vibrant systems when they were controlled, managed and devised 
by the local people. However, with the passage of time when these resources were placed 
under heavy control by the Forest Departments, involving the loss of autonomy of the people 
and their local structures, the consequence was conflicts and serious challenges to resource 
governance and institutional effectiveness.  Ballabh et al. (2002) observed high rates of 
encroachment on forestlands and pilferage, exacerbated by bribery and corrupt transactions 
among forest officials and individuals or groups where the net social loss affected the entire 
society (Teye, 2013a). This suggests that neglecting sound management and good 
governance practices by the agencies leads to poorer outcomes, an implication being that by 
adopting good governance practices (sound science) and blending this with social capital 
will make rule enforcement more effective (Kabiri, 2004). 
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Social capital and network 
As has been indicated above, enhancing institutional effectiveness also requires ‘social 
capital’ which is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986:248). Bourdieu’s thesis is that habitus – 
structuring structures – operate and are enforced unconsciously through social norms and 
values that shape subsequent strategies and perceptions. The structuring process is 
developed, nurtured and eventually becomes institutionalised through strategies oriented 
towards inter-group collaboration and appeal to relevant opinion leaders. Through networks 
and trust building, individuals and groups are more likely to participate in the execution, 
monitoring and oversight processes of institutions. In other words, the nurturing of social 
networks is essential to the success of cooperation and conflict management in the natural 
resource governance context.  
 
Scholz and Wang (2006) argue that in the context of institutional enforcement and people’s 
compliance with ecosystem restrictions, social networks could have a higher potential even 
than the existence of formal restrictions (Cross, et al., 2002; 2006). An appreciation of the 
array of rules and norms, rooted in history and social relationships, nurtured and reshaped 
on a regular basis lead to the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how institutions could 
lead to preferred behaviour and outcomes (Cleaver, 2001; de Koning & Cleaver, 2012). The 
nurturing of social capital requires adequate cooperative activities and working relations; in 
their study Borg et al. (2015:96) contend that “the finding that there are more ties of trust 
between communities than within them suggests that trust has not been built on common 
goals or information exchange, but on working together… it is important to notice that ties 
and connections form between very different actors even though there are differences in their 
goals”. The above suggests that the use of information exchange, peculiar strategies aimed 
at advancing human skills to get relevant societal actors and groups on board is very feasible 
in natural resource governance, even though it may require some effort (Yeboah-Assiamah 
et al., 2016). 
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The above notwithstanding, social networks could also be a source of laxities in the 
enforcement of natural resource institutions. In an empirical study Nunan et al. (2015) use 
the concept of critical institutionalism to discuss how institutions influence the governance 
of natural resources (fisheries) in East Africa and Malawi. They observe that enforcement 
of rules and regulations is affected by a range of socially-embedded institutions interacting 
with bureaucratic institutions. They note that friendship, kinship and peer relations facilitate 
the unwillingness of some fisheries stakeholders, including members of community-based 
co-management structures, to enforce regulations where there is a relationship with the 
offender. This means that social relationships could influence rule enforcement positively or 
negatively. There have been various studies on the positive effects of social networks: they 
promote the mobilisation and allocation of key resources for effective institutional 
enforcement (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005). They facilitate 
actors’ commitment to ground rules whereby each agrees to engage in monitoring the 
enforcement processes of collective rules (Dietz et al., 2003; Scholz & Wang, 2006) Social 
networks also help in conflict management and resolution (Hahn et al., 2006, cited in Bodin 
& Crona, 2009). On the negative side, they could serve as softer ground for informal 
activities including bribery, corruption, favouritism and nepotism. Nunan et al. (2015) 
observe that such relationships may provide opportunities to demand or accept bribes in 
return for allowing fishing during closed seasons or returning seized gear by officials which 
may hinder the effectiveness of rule enforcement.  
 
Initiation and issues surrounding design of the institution 
How did an institution come about? Was it initiated and designed through a more democratic 
and consensus approach? Or was it imposed on community members by government (forest 
and wildlife) officials? The politics behind the particular institution, they way it was 
structured and role of forest officials has major implications for policy effectiveness 
(Agrawal & Chhatre, 2007). There is a need to allow a greater space to enable local 
involvement in formulation and execution, instead of ‘micromanaging’ the entire process. 
Agrawal and Chhatre (2007), on the basis of an empirical study in Himachal Pradesh, 
maintain that “the success of local resource governance institutions may be adversely 
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affected by the close involvement of higher-level government officials in decision-making 
processes. In other words, to enhance institutional effectiveness there is a need to allow 
greater scope (power, responsibility and resources) to be controlled by local people, whilst 
state agencies act as facilitators (see Bryson et al., 2014 on post-NPM governance). To 
prepare the context for this take off, Coulibaly-Lingani et al. (2011) underscore the need to 
design and resource (empower) community governance structures and to involve local 
leaders (elected officials, traditional leaders and representatives from various stakeholders) 
as far as practicable. In this regard, constitutional-choice rules that determine and grant 
decision-making roles should endeavour to open up the decision-making arena to varying 
actors and stakeholders.  
 
Decentralisation in natural resource governance should not lead to elite capture, where only 
a few dictate the process, or to a ‘disguised’ form of centralisation where the forestry 
department indirectly determines local forestry affairs in spite of legally elected local bodies 
(Faye, 2015). Additionally, attention should be devoted to customary ownership and rule 
systems; there should be a recognition of the importance of tenure rights and security, 
especially of vulnerable and marginalised groups (Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2009:523; 
Lambini & Nguyen, 2014). Lanbini and Nguyen (2014) reiterate a need to ensure the 
effective enforcement, monitoring and evaluation of these rights, which are equally 
imperative for the promotion of people’s socio-economic livelihoods and sustainability of 
the resource. Teye (2013b:70) contends that, in an integrated policy network model, 
neglecting vulnerable groups during natural resource policy and rule formulation, means that 
these “marginalised groups are able to depend on their networks with forest guards to harvest 
forest resources illegally”. Teye argues that in the formulation process, relevant 
stakeholders, including marginalised groups, should be actively engaged in order to 
strengthen the support base of the institutions when it comes to enforcement. 
 
Demand side of enforcement 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that the introduction of new institutions (such as forest 
legislation, norms and standards) faces enforcement challenges (Bartley et al., 2008; 
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Lockwood et al., 2010; Arts & Babili, 2012; Schure et al., 2015). Case analyses from 
developing countries indicate that decentralisation reforms and institutions, instead of 
enhancing equity, enabling greater local participation and empowerment, fostering 
responsiveness of government to citizens and furthering conservation, may actually result in 
a transfer of power to private bodies, customary authorities and non-governmental 
organizations (Ribot, 2007; Tacconi, 2007).  
 
The laxities in institutional enforcement could be structural challenges or clandestine 
activities between agencies and some resource users, which in the end would affect the 
people and national interest (Teye, 2013a). The exigency, therefore, for community 
members and all stakeholders (including NGOs, media, interest groups) to show much 
interest in the enforcement process, so that it yields equitable socio-economic benefits and 
resource sustainability without compromising the collective rules, cannot be over-
emphasised (Pretty & Guijt, 1992). Pretty and Guijt (1992:22) adopt a concept of “primary 
environmental care” defined as “a process by which local groups or communities organise 
themselves with varying degrees of outside support so as to apply their skills and knowledge 
to the care of natural resources and environment while satisfying livelihood needs”. This 
suggests that local groups and other non-state actors have a role to ensure, monitor and 
demand sound natural resource governance from state agencies.    
 
Observing enforcement challenges largely propelled by rent-seeking activities in Joint Forest 
Management institutions, Behera and Engel (2006:360) argue for “an independent vigilance 
system to monitor and supervise JFM activities at the village level to improve accountability 
… the involvement of existing institutions, such as the panchayats as well as the 
identification and engagement of reputed and committed NGOs”.  The demand side of 
enforcement has been underscored by Agrawal and Yadama (1997), who assess various 
forms of local participation (regular elections, frequency of meetings, or investment in 
monitoring and protection) in three district of Kumaon (Almora, Pithoragarh and Nainita). 
Of all the indicators of participation assessed, the authors observe that the most significant 
factor happened to be the level of investment in monitoring and guarding the particular 
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natural resources. In terms of implementation, the authors intimate that “unless local 
communities [possess and] exercise the rights to participate in protecting their resources and 
monitoring their condition, the benefits from other forms of participation may well be 
nullified” (Agrawal & Yadama, 1997:457). More related to this, Agrawal and Ostrom 
through a study of four Nepalese programmes underscore the role of local stakeholder 
participation in order for their interests to be met. Their conclusions indicate that people’s 
participation is not necessarily a requirement to kick start the programme (mostly externally 
initiated by donor support and pressure); local groups and stakeholders have to be active or 
else the decentralisation structures and institutions will be hijacked by elites and will not 
yield significantly to benefit the masses (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001:507).  
 
 
Make deviation expensive 
Most people ignore formal and informal institutions because the cost of being caught or 
punished sometimes may appear less expensive. Individuals, groups and companies mostly 
flout rules with impunity because the sanctions appear not proportional to the gains they 
would obtain if not caught. Private individuals as well as state officials find themselves in 
this syndicate who transact (through bribery and corruption) rules for personal enhancement 
at the expense of natural resource efficiency and sustainability. This transaction flourishes 
when three key elements are prevalent: opportunity, motive and cost of being detected. 
Formal rules such as laws, local by-laws, constitutions and procedures are intended to 
significantly seal or counter opportunities for non-compliance. However, those who are to 
enforce these rules tend rather to create the opportunities, tend to give confidence for illegal 
access, entry and exploitation (increase motive) and reduce the cost of being caught. People 
who defy institutions, in most cases, do so with the help of state officials who aid and abet 
the process. For instance, Teye (2013b:70) argues that people in most cases use their 
networks with forests guards to harvest forest products illegally. He quotes an illegal 
operator who had this to say: 
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I have to buy fuel and also get something for the guards who have been nice to me 
always. … If I have to take the wood to ‘Somanya’ myself, then I have to pay some 
money to the guys at the barrier (i.e., police), otherwise they can seize the wood 
(chainsaw operator, quoted in Teye, 2013b). 
 
An empirical study by Ryvkin and Serra (2011) maintains that illegal transaction 
(corruption) is lowest when potential ‘corrupters’ and potential ‘corruptees’ are uncertain 
regarding each other’s ‘corruptibility’ and have asymmetric bargaining powers. This 
suggests that, when citizens are certain or have sufficient information that an agency or 
official is ethically compromised he/she is more likely to have many visiting corrupt clients 
and deals. There is therefore a need to occasionally reassign officials so that they do not stay 
at a particular location for a long period. Routine reshuffling and operations by different sets 
of inspectorate teams is required to create uncertainties so that people will not be able to 
predict corruptibility easily. More importantly, offenders (both state officials and private 
people) should be given punishments commensurate with their offence or motive when 
apprehended. This will help reduce the desire to undermine institutions. 
 
6.4.1.4 A behavioural choice element 
Various scholars have argued that institutions are the humanly devised rules of organisation 
in which values, interests, goals, and resources that constrain or enable human behaviour in 
society have been embedded (North, 1991; Hodgson, 2006; Leftwich, 2007). Following 
from the institutional arrangement put in place and the kind of enforcement 
complementarities embedded in it, a fourth element, a behavioural choice element, which 
refers to the nature and pattern of interactions among members in the resource community, 
is determined. By resource community, Duane (1997) identifies three types of resource 
communities; communities of place, who are tied by physical geographical space; 
communities of identity, which are tied to each other through social characteristics; and 
communities of interest, whose commonalities are derived from the benefits they receive 
from the resource in question or the cost they impose on it. The institutions, and more 
importantly the enforcement complementarities, evoke particular behavioural outcomes 
likely to be exhibited by stakeholders. 
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How do institutions influence behavioural choice? 
The literature indicates that human beings and groups mostly have a propensity to cooperate 
and collaborate, whilst they also reveal a disposition to act on the basis of self-interest 
(economic man) depending on the context (Thayer, 2004; Bowles & Gintis, 2005; 2011). 
Whether human behaviour or pattern of interaction would ‘comply with’ or significantly 
‘deviate from’ acceptable norms greatly depends on the institutional arrangement and how 
it is designed and enforced. This suggests that institutional interplay and processes around a 
resource in question should be given special recognition in natural resource governance, 
because of the value of the resource to people, multiple interests involved and power plays. 
What makes institutions imperative in natural resource governance? 
(i) Institutions influence human behaviour and group interactions by offering a choice 
set; provide what is permissible and what is despicable. As Oakerson (1990:4) puts it, 
institutions “structure the alternatives available to individuals and groups by creating 
incentives and disincentives to choose one alternative over another” (Ostrom, 1990, 
1999b; Imperial, 1999).  
(ii) Institutions determine the approach and means by which people or stakeholders relate 
with the resource in question. Nunan et al. (2015:204) state that “Institutions influence 
whether and how people get access to resources, how much they can access, when, for 
how long and access to which resources”. 
(iii) Institutions determine the ‘who’ and ‘how’ resource decisions are made and enforced. 
Nunan et al. (2015:204) write that institutions “influence whose voice matters in 
decision-making and what kinds of practices are accepted”. 
(iv) Institutions “provide information and counteract opportunism, and thus help human 
beings to overcome the constraints of co-operation” (Ballabh et al., 2002:2163). 
(v) Institutions become the point of reference to resource stakeholders (users, state and 
local government agencies). Participants use institutional frames to pursue their 
actions. For instance, Ostrom (1999b:51) posits that “the working rules” involve “the 
set of rules which participants would make reference to if asked to explain and justify 
their actions”. 
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Engendering a corresponding compliance or acceptable pattern of interaction requires a 
complex set of joint actions which would basically determine how well the institutional 
elements and processes are carried out, embracing relevant stakeholders to reach some form 
of consensus. Poorly designed and enforced rules would make this kind of interaction quite 
hostile and inimical, and negative value may be obtained from the biophysical element.  
 
Although formal institutions mostly underscore the relationship between stakeholders and 
have been amplified in the literature, recent studies have observed that in the natural resource 
governance process, informal institutions and relationships progressively emerge and even 
become decisive in the further implementation of the process (Idrissou et al., 2011).  
 
 
What do informal institutions do? 
Enforcement of formal institutions related to natural resources has to deal with serious 
laxities, especially in the developing world. Iritie (2015:202) notes that “at the institutional 
and legal level, most countries, especially African countries, have a satisfactory framework 
for protected areas,… however, despite an abundance of laws and institutions, the framework 
is often ineffective and less strictly enforced for management of protected areas, and 
especially when there are economic interests [at stake]”. 
 
Without informal institutions “filling in the vacuum”, there will be discrepancies in the 
institutional process. Informal institutions interact with formal institutions at various stages 
and levels, either by introducing defined meanings to the spirit of formal institutions by 
augmenting them, or competing with and at times attempting to substitute the formal 
institutions in a subtle way (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). They explain the following roles of 
informal institutions 
1. Individuals and groups design and adopt informal rules because the formal rules 
appear ‘half-finished’ in structuring interactions between actors. Helmke and 
Levisky (2004) refer to these as complementary informal institutions, which include 
norms, procedures, routines that seek to “fill in gaps” either by addressing 
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contingencies not dealt within the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of 
individual goals within the formal institutional framework. 
2. Informal rules emerge because formal rules may be obsolete, ineffective and perhaps 
poorly enforced. Consequently, informal institutions develop along the formal ones, 
because the former cannot completely replace the latter. Helmke and Levisky (2004) 
tout these as accommodating informal institutions, which create incentives to behave 
in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but without directly violating 
them.  
3. Informal rules emerge when actors seek to pursue goals that are publicly detestable. 
Actions such as bribery and corruption by natural resource officials or agencies may 
make these officials bend the formal rules and substitute them with discretion or an 
approach that will substitute the spirit and letter of the existing rules.  
 
Informal institutions do shape formal institutional outcomes in a less visible way by creating 
or strengthening incentives to comply with formal rules. They reinforce the enabling and 
constraining roles that are widely attributed to formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2010). 
For instance, using an analectic from political governance, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
argue that the stability of the United States’ presidential democracy does not just hinge on 
the formal rules laid out in the Constitution, but also on deeply ingrained in informal rules, 
which include, inter alia, minimal usage of certain formal prerogatives and adoption of a 
bipartisan approach to various pertinent issues. Relating the above to natural resource 
governance, this chapter argues that an effective relationship together with informal 
interactions between groups and stakeholders helps in no small way in the resource 
governance process. The argument is that informal institutions provide for diverse and 
effective monitoring mechanisms (largely enforced by groups themselves) which enhances 
the enforcement of resource governance rules and norms (Anderson et al., 2014)  
 
6.4.1.5 An outcome or consequence element 
Finally, there is an outcome or consequence element that includes multiple outcomes, inter 
alia, environmental, economic, social and political. The nature, mechanisms and interaction 
between both formal and informal rules in natural resource governance yields a 
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corresponding outcome (value) to state agencies and community members – either   positive 
or negative (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). A positive value refers to an arrangement where 
an effective institutional process leads to economic growth among people, social cohesion, 
resource efficiency and environmental sustainability (three canons of sustainable 
development).  
 
Benefits and rights systems enshrined in natural resource institutional arrangements seek to 
attain the right socio-economic and environmental outcomes through positive human 
attitudes (Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Scanlon & Kull, 2009). The types of benefits available 
to stakeholders and how they are distributed is important, because it influences the 
perception of whether benefits are meaningful, appropriate, sufficient and equitable (Scanlon 
& Kull, 2009; Silva & Mosimane, 2012). If promises regarding benefits are realised and 
prescriptions well enforced, institutions will engender compliance. However, in most cases, 
what is stipulated does not get realised, or the people’s expectations never become 
concretised. For instance, Silva and Mosimane (2014) note that Namibian conservancies do 
provide economic benefits to some members, but fail to deliver community-wide 
improvements (e.g. improved infrastructure and services), and thus improve the livelihoods 
of a relatively small proportion of members. Given that scenario, agitated community 
members may encroach or openly defy the institutional restrictions which will have a 
negative impact on the resources in question. 
 
The value becomes untoward when a poorly arranged institutional framework or weak 
enforcement tends to degrade the economic status of community members, provoke social 
upheavals and lead to environmental degradation. Poor enforcement of forest rules, for 
instance, yields negative value on natural resources and species sustainability. For instance, 
Transparency International (2008:1) states that “forestry officials and law enforcement 
officers who are in the pockets of corrupt logging firms often turn a blind eye to illegal 
activities that threaten the sustainable management of the forest’s biodiversity”. The effect 
of poor institutional enforcement is not just environmental but also socio-economic. Moneys 
or royalties meant to be paid to resource communities or the state mostly get diverted into 
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private pockets because of corruption. For instance, Young (2005) states that of the total tax 
revenues to be collected from Ghana’s forestry sector, an estimated amount of USD 100 
million, is not reflected in state coffers. These huge sums may perhaps remain uncollected 
because of clandestine transactions between some state officials and large timber companies 
(Awudi & Davies, 2001). What remains common in these three references is that, according 
to the official government documents, huge amounts of money remain uncollected, but 
behind the scenes through informal arrangements (informal institutions as outside proper 
sphere), some state officials may engage in illegal transactions and so become compromised. 
 
 
6.5 Summary and conclusion 
The need to achieve significant progress in natural resource governance has reignited the 
discussion and scholarship on natural resource institutionalism. This chapter has noted that 
balancing socio-economic demands and natural resource protection requires an interplay of 
formal and informal rules. We discussed formal rules and their relevant roles, which include 
influencing human behaviour and group interactions by offering them a choice set, 
determining the approach and means by which people or stakeholders relate with the 
resource in question and determine how resource decisions are made and enforced and by 
whom. The chapter concludes that the interplay of formal and informal institutions that are 
effectively enforced provides has far-reaching consequences for natural resource governance 
(see Lambini & Nguyen, 2014:189). It is within this context that Giessen and Buttoud (2014) 
conceptualise natural resource (forest) governance to entail all formal and informal 
institutional arrangements; the interactions between relevant actors as well as the outcomes. 
We argue that for formal rules to be effective greatly depends on the enforcement 
complementarities (structures, procedures and mechanisms). The chapter has discussed key 
elements that influence the effectiveness of natural resource rule enforcement. The elements 
discussed are: adequate resources; attention to local power brokers and local politics; 
blending management science with good governance principles; social capital and 
networks; issues around the design of the institution; demand side of enforcement and 
making deviation or non-compliance expensive. 
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The chapter has also discussed informal institutions and conceptualised them in three main 
ways with an argument that they could provide both positive and negative consequences for 
natural resources. The chapter argues that when we forge a link between formal and informal 
institutions and counter the excesses which tend towards abuse, institutions produce positive 
behavioural outcomes and consequences for the social-economic lives of people without 
significantly compromising natural resource efficiency and sustainability. This review 
concludes that both formal and informal institutions serve as catalysts to reinforce natural 
resource efficiency; however, the two can also combine to form a clandestine network to 
facilitate unethical resource exploitation.  
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Chapter Seven 
Institutional Trajectory of Collaborative Wildlife Governance in Boabeng-Fiema 
Monkey Sanctuary8 
 
 
Abstract  
Natural resource governance is underpinned by institutions which evolve “circumstantially” 
over time. An attempt at understanding the contemporary institutions and governance 
structure of a resource requires an in-depth ethnographic enquiry. Adapting a four-phase 
institutional analysis framework, this study discusses the evolution and adaptation of wildlife 
governance structures and institutions using the unique experience of Boabeng-Fiema 
Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana. The study adopted a transdisciplinary research approach which 
was participatory and consultative. The key observations are that: wildlife institutions have 
gone through three main evolutionary phases: a pre-collaborative phase, which was 
exclusively underpinned by informal institutions; a critical juncture stage, where contextual 
challenges led to an adaptive response; and a contemporary phase, a collaborative 
governance regime, where the erstwhile informal institutions have been complemented by 
formal state structures and institutions to synergistically enhance viability of the wildlife 
species. In spite of the problems posed to community members by the monkeys (wildlife), 
the study still observes a cordial human-wildlife relationship. Based on the study outcomes, 
we derive four key conclusions which have implications for institutionalism and natural 
resource governance. 
Keywords: institutions, collaborative governance, wildlife, natural resource, adaptive 
capacity 
 
                                                          
8 This chapter is an adapted version of a peer-reviewed article published as Yeboah-Assiamah, E., 
Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2017) ‘Complex crisis’ and the rise of collaborative natural resource 
governance: institutional trajectory of a wildlife governance experience in Ghana. Environment, 
Development and Sustainability, 1-20. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Natural resource governance is a convoluted enterprise because it mostly involves trade-offs 
between the competing imperatives of balancing the requirements of ecological protection, 
on the one hand, and people’s socio-economic wellbeing, on the other hand (Sayer et al., 
2013; Hirsch et al., 2011). There are various empirical studies that highlight the recent 
destruction of natural resources resulting in colossal loss of biodiversity even inside 
protected areas (Muboko et al., 2016; Brennan & Kalsi, 2015; Sharma et al., 2014). In other 
words, most natural resources are in danger of near extinction at an accelerated rate and 
anthropogenic factors have been fingered as a major cause (Hansen et al., 2010; Leakey & 
Lewin, 1997; Johnston et al., 2006). Addressing this problem calls for an institutional 
arrangement that draws on the strengths of ‘hierarchies’ and ‘community-based 
management’ towards establishing a co-management regime underpinned by collective 
choice rules (institutional design) to avoid being caught in the tragedy of the commons 
syndrome (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008; Tang & Gavin, 2015). In this study co-management 
and collaborative natural resource governance are used interchangeably to refer broadly to a 
new governance system that emphasises collaboration between different stakeholders 
(forging alliances between state and non-state actors) to govern natural resources prudently 
and methodically (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016; Carlsson & Sandström, 2008). 
 
Classic and recent studies of collaborative natural resource governance have sought to 
evaluate the efficacy of institutions in ecological resilience (Dietz et al., 2003; Ostrom, 
2009). According to Dietz et al. (2003), locally evolved institutional mechanisms governed 
by stable communities and reinforced by outside forces have successfully underpinned 
resources management over the years, even though these mechanisms often have to adapt to 
embrace renaissance in periods of disturbance in the social-ecological equilibrium.  Each 
disturbance influencing the dynamics in the social ecological system calls for consequent 
learning and adjustment in the institutional and governance underpinnings. Sayer et al. 
(2013:8351) put it succinctly: “each surprise is an opportunity for learning, leading to the 
development of new understandings as a basis for revised strategies”. Such critical 
circumstances provide windows of opportunity which permit the emergence of 
collaborations and facilitate new forms of governance to deal with ecological threats (Olsson 
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et al., 2006; Folke et al., 2005). In that regard, scholars (Ison & Watson, 2007) contend that 
there is a need to examine the historical and relevant contexts within which institutions 
develop and evolve. For instance, Petty et al. (2015:8) apply historical ecology to assess two 
management regimes and conclude that “alongside history, community, perceptions of place 
and being must be considered critical datasets for interpreting the viability and sustainability 
of an SES (social ecological system)”.  
 
This study examines the experience of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) in 
Ghana, where institutions in wildlife management have been compelled to adapt and evolve 
over time into a collaborative governance regime. This study makes a contribution to the 
literature on how socio-ecological systems bounce back when faced with threats (Abel et al., 
2006). BFMS provides an empirical case of ecological viability and adaptive capacity in that 
it once experienced a ‘critical juncture’ or ‘branching point’ (referred to as ‘complex crisis’) 
which dramatically shaped the underpinning institutional design, management system and 
the ensuing human-wildlife interactions. In the next sub-section the chapter discusses the 
complexities associated with wildlife management and contextualises the study.  
 
7.1.1 Complexities of wildlife management 
Whilst natural resources management in general appears complex (Game et al., 2014), even 
more complicated is the management of wildlife resources, which not only deprives people 
of large territories (to be preserved as reserves or sanctuaries) of their agricultural space, but 
the animal species migrate to buffer zones and encroach onto agricultural lands, causing 
havoc for farmers (Apollonio et al., 2010; White & Ward, 2011; Horsley et al., 2003). 
Consequently, wildlife protection remains a ‘wicked problem’, because there is no definite 
formulation of the problem, and the information required to understand the problem depends 
upon one’s idea for solving it (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The interlocking of wildlife and 
people is not a recent occurrence (Lamarque et al., 2009) and mostly creates a conflictual 
relationship between wildlife and farmers, where the former are usually placed on the 
‘wanted list’ of the latter (Distefano, 2005).  
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Whilst this unsavoury relationship is a global phenomenon, in Europe (Schley & Roper, 
2003), America (Warren, 1997), Australia (Jones & Thomas, 1999) and Asia (Madhusudan, 
2003) it is exacerbated where the majority of people depend directly on natural resources 
and agriculture for their socio-economic wellbeing, as is especially the case in Africa 
(Okech, 2010; Weladji & Tchamba, 2003). Wild animals have been regarded in some 
contexts as pests or vermin (Gandiwa, 2011), which made people during the colonial period 
adopt a strategy of destroying them nearly to the point of extinction in Zimbabwe, for 
example (Mhlanga, 2001). 
 
In spite of the growing threats to wildlife sustainability, there are cases that have 
demonstrated resilience through time, despite some critical periods. It is usually argued that 
the ability of human institutions to remain flexible and adaptable over long-term trajectories 
is a sine qua non for both social and ecological resilience (Folke et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009). 
Understanding the prevailing institutional designs underpinning natural resources and their 
sustainability calls for a historical perspective (Petty et al., 2015). This study (i) examines 
the institutional and governance design that underpins the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary and its adaptations over time; and (ii) discusses how adapted collaborative 
governance shapes people’s behaviour (human-wildlife interactions). 
 
 
7.2 Formal vs informal institutions 
Imperial (1999) discusses formal institutions as including laws, policies, regulations (rules 
and prescriptions), along with the expected outcomes and sanctions associated with 
deviation. According to the institutionalist school of thought, formal institutions are closely 
linked to the state, its agencies, officials and state-sanctioned activities, including 
decentralised state agencies and local governments (Boussard, 2000; Tsai, 2002). Informal 
institutions in this context are conceptualised to mean traditional governance arrangements, 
including chieftaincy and priesthood systems as well as cultural belief systems (Yeboah-
Assiamah et al., 2017). This is mostly evident in the developing world, where traditional 
systems continue to wield influence in resource governance (Shackleton et al., 2002). It has 
been noted that natural resources in the African context have been valued not only for the 
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products and ecological benefits derived from them, but resources such as trees, animals, 
water bodies and aquatic creatures, and mountains have been the linchpin of people’s 
religious and cultural beliefs and were to be preserved from anthropogenic destruction 
(ibid.).  
 
7.2.1 Theoretical overview 
7.2.1.1 The theory of adaptive governance 
The study is underpinned by the theory of adaptive governance. According to Dietz et al. 
(2003), the theory suggests the ability of natural resource governance systems to select 
feedback originating from both human and biophysical elements, including combined 
elements of the system, to address any prevalent or perceived threat to social-ecological 
systems. In refutation of Hardin’s (1968) argument about human limits and a common 
dilemma, Dietz et al. (2003) contend that social groups have struggled successfully against 
threats of resource depletion by initiating and revising self-governing institutions, and that 
successful governance of the commons requires that rules evolve in tandem with changing 
circumstances. On their part, Koontz et al. (2015:148) define adaptive governance as “the 
ability of actors to change institutions in order to maintain or improve to a desirable state”. 
This definition suggests that adapting to changing socio-ecological dynamics in most cases 
involves evolution or a deliberate adjustment of institutions. Adaptive capacity requires the 
need to (i) promote the active involvement of groups and stakeholders, (ii) encourage 
continuous environmental scanning and learning, and adjust accordingly, and (iii) marshal 
leadership capabilities as well as the resources for enforcement (Gupta et al., 2010). 
Leadership in critical crisis periods emerges to play crucial roles in the transition towards 
adaptive governance of social-ecological systems; these roles include, inter alia, trust-
building, initiation of partnerships by connecting key actors, managing conflict, and 
mobilisation of broad support for change (Westley 1995 cited in Game et al., 2014) 
 
Although the roles of community-based resource management and institutions have 
demonstrated capacity to effectively manage natural resources, they may not prove fully 
adequate to address major conflicts and challenges (Brosius et al., 2005). Key constraints to 
community-based resource institutions and governance structures include lack of governing 
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authority, legitimacy, funding, adequate flow of knowledge and resources, and sustained 
leadership (Brosius et al., 2005). In that regard, when the resources are faced with major 
threats or disruption, adaptive governance is implemented to bridge locally oriented resource 
management initiatives with government interests for the development of improved 
environmental governance policies (Scholz & Stiffel, 2005 cited in Chaffin et al., 2014). 
Some scholars have discussed adaptive governance in the context of complementarity and 
synergistic arrangements between the state (its agencies and actors) and community-based 
institutional arrangements (local governance structures) in a more dynamic and adaptive mix 
towards finding a solution to the complexities in natural resource governance (Nelson et al., 
2008).  The idea of adaptive governance connotes a shift from the archetypical typology of 
institutions as static, rule-based and rigid towards one that accepts dynamism, continuous 
learning, adjustment and readjustment to deal effectively with changing patterns of 
ecological threats (Olsson et al., 2006).  
 
7.2.1.2 A conceptual framework 
Since the study discusses the institutional trajectory of BFMS, it adapts a four-level 
institutional analytical framework from Williamson (2000). This is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1:  Phases of institutional evolution and adaptation 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (2000) 
 
Williamson (2000) discusses four key phases that are relevant to institutional evolution and 
adaptation. The first phase he terms “embeddedness”; it involves informal institutions 
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(taboos, indigenous norms, customary traditions) that restrict people’s behaviour in relation 
to the resource. In most cases the origins of such informal institutions are unstructured and 
communicated through the oral tradition which the society embraces. A second phase 
involves devising well-designed sets of formal institutions (agencies, local constitutions, 
access and tenure rights systems) to complement the embedded informal arrangements to a 
large extent. 
 
A third phase involves the actors actively engaging one another in the natural resource 
governance process. It addresses the interaction between those involved in governance and 
the relationship between various stakeholders, including the way they apply the mechanisms 
for resolving conflicts that may arise. The final phase involves enhancement and 
consolidation of the economic benefits of stakeholders. In effect, actors and stakeholders are 
provided with incentives or a benefit system which compensates them for their participation 
in the particular resource governance process.  
 
This framework has been adapted to help explain how wildlife institutions have evolved in 
the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary. More importantly, the study discusses the 
precursors underpinning each of the transitions or phases as well as how each phase operates 
vis-à-vis the preceding phase. It should be noted that the evolution is not straightforward or 
neatly linear, but interlinks with the previous phase to become more robust. This is illustrated 
by the bi-directional nature of the arrows linking the phases (Figure 7.1). 
 
 
7.3  Methods 
7.3.1 Study context 
This chapter uses the unique case of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) in 
Ghana, West Africa. Boabeng-Fiema comprises two neighbouring communities, Boabeng 
and Fiema, which have similar beliefs and practices, hence the term ‘twin community’ for 
them. This twin community is located 20 km north of Nkoranza District of the Brong Ahafo 
Region (a transitional zone in Ghana), which is about 230 km from Accra, the capital of 
Ghana. BFMS is a unique site in Africa, where the two different species of monkeys (the 
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black-and-white colobus monkey (Colobus vellerosus) and the mona monkey 
(Cercopithecus campbelli)) continue to flourish in large numbers and, interestingly, co-exist 
harmoniously with humans in the Boabeng and Fiema villages, as they have since the 1830s. 
The monkeys are protected and revered as “offspring of the gods” daworo (the female 
goddess of Boabeng village) and abodwo (the male god of Fiema village). Legend has it that 
a great warrior entered the forest with his gun and discovered a shrine (which remains in 
Boabeng forest as daworo) which was guarded by two special monkeys; the monkeys 
performed some mysterious acts, which made him consult a seer, who explained that the 
monkeys are ‘children’ of the shrine or the daworo god and should never be killed or harmed. 
Spiritually, the god of Fiema abodwo is the husband of daworo, who said to the man that if 
you want to marry me, help me take care of my children; and this is the reason why both 
gods became the caretakers of monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema.  
 
The BFMS case presents distinct complexities, because the Boabeng-Fiema communities 
are surrounded by the Boabeng Forest, which is inhabited by the mona and colobus monkeys. 
The forest is demarcated into a core zone, which is not available for farming activities (main 
economic activity) but to accommodate the monkeys, and a buffer region, which indicates 
the boundaries allowable for farming activities. Despite the core forest area reserved for the 
monkeys, they nonetheless trespass on people’s farms to destroy crops and they also troop 
to people’s homes to ‘steal’ food and cause damage to backyard crops. Although the 
monkeys originally used to be confined to the Boabeng and Fiema communities, they have 
extended their range to seven neighbouring communities, which has increased the 
complexities. Finally, the protection and sustainability of the monkeys have been 
underpinned by an interplay of government and traditional institutional forces with their 
respective governance structures. Figure 7.2 provides a pictorial view of Ghana in the 
context of Africa whilst figure 7.3 depicts the study area (BFMS) in the context of Ghana. 
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Figure 7.2: Map of Africa illustrating location of Ghana (highlighted green) 
Source: http://webs.bcp.org/sites/spinkston/Ghana/Africa%20Ghana%20Map.html 
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Figure 7.3: Location of BFMS in Ghana 
Source:  Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2017) 
 
7.3.2 Research Approach  
Owing to the complexity and fuzzy nature of environmental threats, which come as ‘wicked 
problems’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973), the institutional and governance regimes as well as the 
associated research require a participatory and integrated approach. The growing consensus 
on the complexity of environmental issues has made the transdisciplinary (TD) approach an 
emerging design that underpins contemporary research (Lang et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 
2013; Mattor et al., 2014; Ignatieva et al., 2015). TD entails more collaborative research 
with interested groups (stakeholders), who are actively incorporated in all relevant phases of 
the research process (Mollinga, 2010). 
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Wildlife governance and dynamics presents many complexities (see section 7.1.1); in the 
case of BFMS therefore the research process involved actors, knowledge and expertise 
drawn from diverse academic disciplines and practices as well as the active participation of 
the communities being researched (Mobjörk, 2010; Game et al., 2014; Sayer et al., 2013). 
Utilising knowledge and ideas from diverse fields and value systems helps to broaden our 
depth of understanding and range of options to address societal challenges (Pascual et al., 
2017). The TD study approach enables researchers to produce three main forms of 
knowledge (i): systems knowledge, which provides answers on the origins of societal 
problems as well as the possible development of a problem; in that regard, this study 
discusses how disruptions in the social-ecological system of BFMS occurred in the past, 
which is part of the study’s first objective; (ii) target knowledge, which provides answers 
related to a determination and explanation of the need for change and desired goals; in this 
respect, the study details the idealised situation the Boabeng-Fiema community sought to 
achieve with regards to protection of the monkeys when faced with such a complex crisis, 
as demonstrated by the contemporary or prevalent human-wildlife interactions; and (iii) 
transformation knowledge, which answers questions related to the socio-technical, legal, 
cultural and other mechanisms that enabled BFMS to respond and transform into a more 
resilient system. In this regard, the study details the approach or mechanisms adopted by 
BFMS to navigate the ‘complex crisis’ to reach the idealised or target situation of 
appreciable human-wildlife interaction. The transformation process also reflects institutional 
and governance development over time in response to a changing SES as illustrated in Figure 
7.1. 
 
Principally, we resorted to the use of both primary and documented data relevant to the study. 
The knowledge synthesis process during the course of this study ranged from active 
consultation to direct participation involving 33 participants drawn from the traditional 
governance structures of Boabeng-Fiema communities, fetish priesthood structures, unit 
committees, youth groups, and the game and wildlife agency at Boabeng-Fiema. The 
principal researchers also possessed and drew on diverse knowledge systems (policy 
implementation, environmental governance, institutional analysis, neo-institutionalism) 
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along with active consultation with other faculty members from ecology and conservation 
backgrounds (Game et al., 2014).  
 
Primary data were gathered through brainstorming sessions with participants, in-depth 
interviews, informal discussions, focus group discussions (FGDs) and direct observation in 
the researched community between February and July 2016. The purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques enabled the study to involve all relevant actors. These techniques 
involved deliberate and non-random choice of participants based on the qualities they 
possess, as well as identifying and selecting participants who were deemed knowledgeable, 
experienced or well informed on the phenomenon under study (Bernard, 2002; Patton, 
2002).  The iterative and flexible ontology and epistemology of the TD approach enhanced 
the study through a ‘forward and backward loop’ process when a stakeholder was 
recommended or identified. All interviews and FGDs transcripts were sorted, and the 
similarities and differences were assessed and grouped under broader themes and sub-
themes. Such thematic analysis has been employed in the discussion and relevant narratives 
have been used to buttress the discussions by way of emphasising the arguments expressed. 
 
 
7.4 Results and discussion 
7.4.1 Evolution of institutional design underpinning governance of the BFMS 
A first objective of the study was to assess the evolutionary trajectory of contemporary 
wildlife institutions and the governance regime of the BFMS. The contemporary institutional 
design of BFMS presents a typical case where informal (taboo and chieftaincy) and formal 
(state laws and agents) institutions collaborate in the governance of wildlife. Document 
analysis and field data reveal that the governance of the wildlife has experienced a wide 
array of institutional arrangements, and historical circumstances have accounted 
substantially for its evolution and adaptation. The BFMS has gone through evolutionary 
governance regimes starting as a purely traditional system, where the governance of wildlife 
was underpinned solely by informal institutions (local taboos), through a period of a 
community-initiated collaborative governance structure to a benefit-sharing regime. This is 
also reflective of Figure 7.1 which conceptualises institutional adaptation as evolving from 
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embeddedness, through institutional development towards a new governance era to one that 
promotes incentives and benefit-sharing schemes. 
 
7.4.1.1 Pre-collaboration: embedded traditional governance 
In BFMS two monkey species (mona and colobus) are believed to be totems and ‘offspring’ 
of the gods. As explained in section 3.1, the mythology of BFMS has it that ‘no one should 
harm or kill the monkeys for they are the emblem or offspring of the gods’. Consequently, 
from the 1830s, when monkeys were first identified, they were viewed as sacred species, 
never harmed and they consequently reproduced to multiply in their natural habitat, a forest 
surrounding the two communities. These traditional institutions in the forms of restrictions 
and bans kept the monkeys and their habitat secure. This is what Williamson (2000) terms 
embeddedness (Figure 7.1). During that time the two species were preserved purely for 
traditional reasons and not necessarily for underpinning biological value or ecotourism. 
There was an exclusive informal institutionalism that underpinned the wildlife management 
with a high compliance rate, keeping the monkeys well protected. Anyone who accidentally 
or deliberately harmed any of the species was to be sanctioned by the gods, chiefs and fetish 
priests. A traditional priest explained:  
So before the wildlife (officials) came into the community it was the ancestors and 
the gods that were protecting the animals. … because of how the gods of the 
community were handling people who disturbed the monkeys, it protected the 
animals from people who harboured such similar intentions.  
 
Any monkey found dead was buried in a specialised monkey cemetery (Figure 7.4) to send 
a signal to people about the significance attached to the monkey species. In a discussion with 
a priest in charge of monkeys, he explained:  
... it was not always the case that you would notice the animals (carcass) when they 
died in the forest. But if we noticed any of them dead, we had the ritual to perform 
and we still do…  
 
... but anyone who killed the animal (accidentally or intentionally) must appease the 
gods by bringing sheep and eggs for the rituals. So people ensured they don’t get 
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into such trouble of buying these and a coffin to carry on the head. The offender 
would organise a funeral for the animal and everyone within the community would 
know that he/she killed the animal. 
 
The point was corroborated by another key participant:  
The tradition has established it that … when one of the monkeys die we don’t just 
throw it away, we would bury it like a human being. We will have to bury it in a 
coffin. So we have the monkey cemetery. 
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Figure 7.4:  Monkey Cemetery  
Source: Photograph taken by Field Assistant (Insert, candidate) 
 
Additionally, there used to be a funeral conducted for the dead monkeys. In Ghanaian 
tradition funerals are organised only for adult human beings; therefore the practice of 
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mourning dead monkeys signified the animate attachment and their relevance as children of 
the gods.  
 
To ensure that the monkeys do not face any form of predation, there has been a traditional 
taboo that bans people from keeping dogs as pets in the Boabeng-Fiema communities. The 
participants explained:  
So we agreed at some point in time on the elimination of dogs... the gods indicated 
that dogs used to disturb him each time he paid visit to his wife…; but we also know 
that dogs could harm the monkeys so that was why we eliminated all the dogs. 
 
For a long time the embedded tradition or purely community-based governance approach 
seemed perfect until the realities of social-ecological dynamics shook it to its foundation.  
 
7.4.1.2 Critical juncture, pitfalls and branching point 
The myth surrounding the monkeys’ protection as ‘children of the gods’ was almost 
undermined with the emergence of a Christian sect. This was in the 1970s, when the Saviour 
Church made converts and established itself closer to the two communities harbouring these 
‘sacred monkeys’. Members of this religious group hunted the monkeys to eat and also 
encouraged others to do so in an attempt to prove the powerlessness of the gods, and perhaps 
the powerfulness and omnipotence of the Christian God. They did not just hunt to establish 
their non-traditional stance, but for their subsistence and economic wellbeing (Sayer et al., 
2013 on diverse values and interests), since the species are bushmeat and a local delicacy 
(Ntiamoa-Baidu, 1998). Participants in our study told a story of one of the believers who had 
hunted monkeys and tied them in a sack behind his bicycle to go and sell in a nearby town – 
that had been his business – only to be arrested by three soldiers. In our discussion with the 
fetish priest in charge of monkeys, he explained:  
Yes, things have really changed. Christianity was destroying a lot of things. They 
saw the practices as witchcraft. We told them what not to do, but they did not listen 
… (even though) they are from this community and they know the tradition of the 
land. 
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The findings corroborate similar observations elsewhere in the Awka-South area of Nigeria, 
where local people’s adherence to local taboos that helped to conserve their forests and 
streams became eroded with the advent of Christianity (Anoliefo et al., 2003). It is therefore 
not surprising that the literature reports links between neglect of long-held traditional beliefs 
upon the exposure of African people to Western technology, the influence of foreign 
religions and beliefs, and problems of migration and resettlement (Ntiamoa-Baidu, 1995). 
 
The ‘complex crisis’ (indiscriminate hunting of monkeys) amidst the ‘short-term’ perceived 
silence of the gods in BFMS provided a window of opportunity to trigger the emergence of 
a new governance regime and institutional collaborations (Olsson et al., 2006).  
 
 
7.4.1.3 Adaptive response: a drive towards collaborative natural resource governance 
Greene (2002) reports several instances of particular animals or objects that used to be 
regarded as taboo or sacred in Ghana becoming poorly protected or extinct in contemporary 
times because of the myths associated with them have been adulterated. Therefore, the 
monkey species in the BFMS were more likely to suffer the same fate as the mythology 
became more adulterated.   
 
In order to become viable and minimise the threat to the species, the system responded by 
initiating a new governance regime supported by an adaptive institutional underpinning. The 
role of ‘crisis’ leadership (Westley, 1995) was imperative in this process. A Mr Daniel 
Akowuah, a native of the Boabeng community (a retired policeman and head teacher), 
championed the process, with some form of support from community elders, by writing a 
series of proposals to the former Game and Wildlife Department in Accra to salvage the 
situation. This appeal yielded results and in May 1975 a by-law was passed that summarily 
put a ban on hunting monkeys in the BFMS areas (Fargey, 1991). Consequently, governance 
of BFMS was to be complemented with formal institutional underpinnings (see phase 2 of 
conceptual framework).  
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This situation was described by a past officer from the Game and Wildlife Division: 
So when the people began to kill the animals, the community reported to the 
government, so they brought officials from the head office (Game and Wildlife) to 
this place. This also led to the establishment of some by-laws, So they tried to 
maintain the core forest. … they indicated that when you kill an animal or destroy 
the habitat, the Wildlife and Forest laws will deal with you accordingly. Previously 
when you did such, the elders would call you; but now it is the Ghana wildlife and 
government issue too. 
 
The intervention by the Game and Wildlife Department (currently Wildlife Division) 
enabled the habitat to be declared a formal sanctuary to provide a safe haven for the 
conservation of the monkeys. Since the two villages are surrounded by the forest – the habitat 
of the monkeys – there is an identified buffer zone which demarcates the areas where people 
can carry out their farming activities. However, in the core forest zone people are not allowed 
to farm, nor are they allowed to fell trees, but they are allowed to gather herbs. In this core 
zone hunting for any other meat is also not allowed and no gunshots should be heard in the 
forest. There is a resident wildlife officer and his team, including game guards locally 
employed, who patrol the forest and also guide tourists. In contemporary times the 
established governance system involving government and the traditional authority makes it 
largely impossible for people to embark on the kinds of hunting and habitat destruction 
activities which had prevailed before the new order. 
 
A priest in charge of the monkeys acknowledged the relevance of involving the state (formal 
institutions) to salvage the situation. He explained: 
Well, there was some fear in people which had kept the monkeys safe and secure. But 
the fear began to erode because people did not see or receive immediate sanction 
each time they killed the monkeys. So out of this situation, the wildlife people 
(wildlife commission) were asked to come in. 
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This point was given support by a participant from the traditional governance system, who 
remarked:  
The advent of wildlife (officials) and government has been very effective because 
there are few recalcitrant individuals … I believe without the wildlife (officials), 
these few would have engaged in this act, because they have a mindset of ‘do and 
die’ and they seem not to fear anything. 
 
7.4.1.4 The new governance regime: collaborative natural resource governance 
Indiscriminate hunting of monkeys and destruction of their natural habitat without any 
immediate punishment from the gods provided a window of opportunity to necessitate a 
well-designed set of formal institutions to complement the embedded mythology to adapt to 
the ‘complex crisis’. What makes this drive unique is that it emanated from the desires of 
the local communities themselves, unlike many other collaborative arrangements that are 
state-initiated (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008). Upon reaching a critical juncture, the local 
communities felt helpless, which made them call for external help in the form of 
collaboration with the state and its agencies – a process championed by Mr Akowuah, a 
native of Boabeng village, with support from community elders. Consequently, collaborative 
governance; the new governance system which entails forging an alliance between state and 
non-state actors to prudently and methodically govern natural resources (Yeboah-Assiamah 
et al., 2016; Carlsson & Sandström, 2008) became the adapted management regime.  
 
A former management committee chairman remarked: 
… it’s managed by both the community and the government. The government does 
so through the district assembly and wildlife agency … wildlife (officials) are 
expected to protect the forest (habitat of the monkeys) when there is any infringement 
or anything illegal. They are representing the government and can make arrests. 
Their role is (also) to supervise. 
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This point was forcefully brought home by an officer from the Wildlife Division in a 
submission: 
So we (Forestry Commission) apply the wildlife and forestry laws to protect the 
monkeys. If you cut timber, we will apply the forestry laws, and when you kill an 
animal we will apply the wildlife laws and also Nananom (chiefs and priests) will 
also apply their traditional rules. There is a management committee. We have the 
wildlife officers in place, we are more or less like advisors ... But the traditional 
council is the overall boss. 
 
As the collaborative form of governance emerged, the institutions of the time underpinning 
wildlife conservation also evolved to include formal institutions that would be reinforced by 
the new partner (the state). This finding buttresses an observation by Gunderson et al. 
(2016:359) that adaptive institutions and collaboration governance become imperative when 
there is a shift in societal values and norms; adaptive institutions provide institutional 
diversity for addressing complex challenges that could have otherwise affected natural 
resources. Consequently, the underlying institution comprises a traditional institution 
(chieftaincy and fetish structures) to deal with breaking of taboos; national legislation and 
legal sanctions to be enforced by state actors; the involvement of and intervention by 
communities of interest including international organisations; and research communities 
working towards wildlife conservation and eco-tourism (reflective of phase 3 in the 
conceptual framework).  
 
The main actors in the new governance regime include traditional governance structures 
(chiefs and fetish priests of Boabeng and Fiema), a five-member management committee, a 
well-composed management board, the district assembly, the game and wildlife division of 
the Forestry Commission, and the general population. Each of these actors has their 
distinctive roles in the governance process, but the day-to-day administration process has 
been ceded to the management committee, which reports to the various actors and 
stakeholders. The governance process is structured by a local Constitution, which stipulates 
the various boards and their composition and duration; other key actors, and their 
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responsibilities and roles; and benefit systems. The idea of blending local knowledge and 
practices with formal regulatory systems, especially state intervention, reinforces the 
conservation value of the governance system (Hens, 2006). The collaborative governance 
process is explained in Table 7.1. 
 
 
Table 7.1:  The collaborative governance process 
The management committee works with two chiefs and two unit committees, one each 
from Boabeng and Fiema, as well as with the game and wildlife outfit. The role of wildlife 
officials is to ensure that no one disturbs the natural habitat of the monkeys; that nobody 
fires a gun in the forest; that no one harms the animals; and if it comes to any arrest or 
sending to the police station, they do this. The actual power lies with the chiefs; the chiefs 
have delegated their powers to a five-member committee which reports to them and a 
management board which is comprised of 3 members from Fiema and Boabeng – one 
appointed by chiefs and elders, one unit committee member and one elected by the 
community; the assembly member9 for the Boabeng-Fiema electoral area is a board 
member; a senior wildlife officer of BFMS, one representative from each of seven 
neighbouring communities whose territories have been invaded by the monkeys because 
of the migratory nature of wildlife.  
 
Explaining how the collaborative governance operates, a wildlife officer who had been 
instrumental in the process intimated: 
 
… there is the general management board and the 2 traditional bodies. There are 
representatives from each of the communities but it is when there is a major issue 
that all the chiefs come for the meetings. 
 
The study also observed a workable and cordial relationship between the game and 
wildlife agency [formal] and the traditional chiefs and priests [informal] entities, which 
                                                          
9 Assembly member is an individual appointed by central government or popularly elected 
by members of a local electoral area to represent them in the local government. See Yeboah-
Assiamah, E. (2014). Power to the people! How far has the power gone to the people? A 
qualitative assessment of decentralization practice in Ghana. Journal of Asian and African 
studies, 51(6), 683-699. 
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means the kind of tension and acrimony widely reported in the literature is largely non-
existent in the BFMS. These partners collaborate with each other in the performance of 
their duties, and there is mutual respect for one another. In an interactive session with the 
acting chairman of the management committee, he explained:  
 
There is a cordial working relationship between the traditional governance system 
and the wildlife officers … this is because both are geared towards a similar 
outcome, tradition says do not kill monkeys and wildlife people say do not destroy 
the forest [monkey habitat].. so they are both in the same direction… here there is 
no conflict between the state agencies and traditional institutions. 
 
If any individual offends, traditionally you have to pay some money and sheep to 
appease the gods and maybe the wildlife officers will process you for arrest and 
prosecution. Even if you get arrested, you will have to perform such tradition to 
appease the gods after being discharged. 
 
The partnership and mutual respect for both offices was corroborated by a former officer 
who explained: 
 
… when someone does something, the traditional leaders do fine them, …. Though 
they will ensure that the right things are done, because the community members are 
their own people, they [traditional leaders] will most often plead with us [wildlife 
officials] on behalf of the accused not to pursue legal case. But without the 
collaboration and cooperation the forest and monkeys will not have existed”  
 
7.4.2 Structuring people-wildlife interaction: institutions and benefit systems 
In natural resource governance it is essential to structure the system in such a way that all 
relevant stakeholders get access to benefits accruing from the common pool resource in 
question. This is quite relevant, because “given a desire to conserve species and ecosystems, 
it is increasingly important to think through and make explicit trade-offs among different 
conservation goals and between conservation and other social goals,… [and] economic 
development. Nevertheless, ignoring or obscuring trade-offs can contribute to profound 
disappointment” (Hirsch et al., 2011:263). This also reflects phase four of the conceptual 
model, which argues for heeding the socio-economic needs and incentive mechanisms for 
actors and stakeholders.  
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In order not to compromise the socio-economic livelihoods of people, the BFMS institutions 
have incorporated measures that enable people carry out their farming activities in areas 
outside the core forest zone, which have been clearly delineated through a buffer region or 
zone. Besides, there are other benefits that individuals derive from the forest such as herbs, 
mushrooms, snails and other minor food supplements. The influx of eco-tourists who visit 
BFMS on routine basis provide a large share of the market for most of the traders in the 
Boabeng-Fiema communities; and in periods of serious social needs, especially, with regards 
to school children, the BFMS management committee has been helpful in helping needy 
students with school fees (Attuquayefio & Gyampoh, 2010). At the community and 
governance level in BFMS, there are benefit-sharing criteria which recognise the various 
actors, structures and communities that have a stake in the governance of the resource.  
 
 
Figure 7.5:  Benefit-sharing system in BFMS      
Source: Adapted from Eshun et al (2014) 
 
The revenues accruing from the BFMS through ecotourism are shared based on the criteria 
in Figure. 7.5 in such a way that all relevant governance entities get their due. Firstly, the 
total revenue is divided into 40% and 60%. The 40% share is now converted into 100%; 
10% is given to the Chief of Boabeng and fetish priest, another 10% is given to the Chief of 
Fiema and the fetish priest; 35% each is given to both the Boabeng and Fiema communities, 
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and the remaining 10% is given to the clans or families in Boabeng whose lands are covered 
by the forest (natural habitat) of the monkeys. 
 
The other 60% is shared among key actors and institutions. The wildlife division and the 
district assembly take 20% each, 5% is given to the Nkoranza traditional council (the 
traditional council which contains both Boabeng and Fiema communities), another 5% is 
given to the other seven satellite communities closer to both Boabeng and Fiema10 whilst 
10% is deposited into a BFMS development fund. The process of benefit sharing is in line 
with Ghana’s Community Resource Management Areas (CREMA) approach, which has 
been advanced by the Collaborative Unit of Ghana Wildlife Division with a philosophy that 
“if natural resources are given ‘value’ and communities are given the ‘authority’ to 
‘manage’, then they (community actors) will have the ‘incentive’ to sustainably manage and 
conserve natural resources”.  
A key informant explained the community benefits: 
…the presence of these monkeys has brought many good things to us; without them, 
who would have even heard of us? ... the community water projects here, the 
maintenance of our bore hole, the building of a befitting accommodation for our 
traditional priests have all been the result of these monkeys, directly or indirectly. 
 
The argument is that natural resource conservation involves trade-offs (Hirsch et al., 2011). 
People manage wildlife and other resources when they are given sufficient incentives to do 
so (Lu et al., 2005). People who live with and are responsible for the management of natural 
resources must be the primary beneficiaries of that management effort (Forestry 
Commission of Ghana, 2004). The study has so far argued that it is not as if the people just 
love monkeys, or do not want meat, or do not know the economic value of bushmeat; but 
they are constrained from depleting the resource because of the institutions and controls, 
precedents and perceived benefits. The desire for the meat was evident in a study by 
                                                          
10 The monkeys were initially only in Boabeng and Fiema communities but over time do troop to 
other seven nearby communities.  
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Fargey11, where 75% of the people explained that they would have hunted the monkeys for 
bushmeat had it not been for the traditional institution (taboo) prohibiting their killing. This 
suggests that the informal institution has a greater influence on the protection and 
conservation of the natural resources (Strauch et al., 2016; Alonso et al., 2016). The 
remaining individuals (a minority) who might have otherwise defied the informal institutions 
are now constrained by the formal legal ban by the state and the local by-laws. The 
collaborative governance process has therefore structured a cordial human-wildlife 
interaction through a hunting ban which is enforced naturally and supernaturally by the 
formal state apparatus and informal traditional belief system respectively. It is within such a 
context that Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2017:10) maintain that “the interplay of formal and 
informal institutions that are effectively enforced [has] a far-reaching consequence on 
natural resource governance” (see also Carlsson & Sandström, 2008). 
 
Free movement of monkey species 
The kind of protection the monkeys receive is evident in their free movement and ease with 
which they intermingle with people without any fear. In BFMS wildlife behaves like 
domestic animals or pets. The researchers personally observed how mona monkeys live with 
the rural population on a daily basis, especially in the mornings and evenings, when they 
wander in and around homes to scavenge for food from people as this meets the largest 
percentage of their dietary needs. This they do without any fear of harm, or of being 
poisoned, trapped or killed. The white colobus do not usually visit homes, but sometimes 
one can see troops of white colobus meander across the village along the road and on trees 
in nearby homes to demonstrate their coexistence with humans.  
 
Undisturbed by nearby gunshots 
The kind of protection enjoyed by the monkeys in the BFMS leaves them unperturbed, even 
when they see someone walking with a gun or even hear gunshots nearby. These same 
                                                          
11 Fargey P. J. Assessment of the Conservation Status of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary. Report to the Flora and Fauna Preservation Society 
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monkey species elsewhere would generally run off when they see someone approaching and 
would do so even more quickly if the person was carrying a gun, and would disappear in a 
flash if they heard gunshots (Remis et al., 2012). In spite of the havoc monkeys’ cause to 
farmers by raiding their crops in the permissible farming zones and buffer areas and even in 
backyard farms, the monkeys in BFMS seem composed, calm and untroubled, even when 
they hear gunshots from the buffer areas where hunting for other species is allowed (Saj et 
al., 2005). A queen mother explained: 
…today they (monkeys) do not fear guns; if they see you with a gun, they won’t be 
moved but if they see you with a catapult (people use these only to scare them 
especially when they are causing trouble), they will run. 
 
It was possible to reach this stage because of the adaptive capacity of the erstwhile 
governance regime to incorporate formal institutions to at least structure the behaviour of 
the few people whose actions could have had a cumulative effect to sway the majority to 
join the activity of hunting monkeys. The timely collaborative intervention has even 
reinforced the previous existing order of effectively protecting wildlife in BFMS. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
Firstly, from our case analysis it was observed that in the 1970s the wildlife species had 
reached a critical juncture when hunting for monkeys in the Boabeng-Fiema community 
reached its peak. At that critical juncture the potency of the traditional institutions (taboos) 
appeared less efficacious and enforcement appeared less effective, at least in short run, and 
compelled the existing institutional arrangements to evolve into a more collaborative regime, 
which demonstrated a synergistic relationship between informal and formal institutions. This 
drive or evolution did not occur naturally but circumstantially. Our finding adds to the 
existing body of theoretical assumptions and empirical findings that in periods of critical 
threats, systems must demonstrate adaptive capacity to remain viable or they will perish. 
This adds an empirical dimension to a study by Daye and Healey (2015:356) who, after 
observing the threats faced by sacred forests in the Gamo Highlands of Ethiopia, stated that 
“it will be important for the governance of sacred forests by their traditional custodians to 
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be supported and not undermined by the national legal framework and by governmental and 
non-governmental organisations”.  
 
The adapted collaborative governance of BFMS and its ability to keep wildlife largely 
protected over time is a test case. We contend that any contemporary institutional 
arrangement and governance regime of a natural resource has ‘untold stories’ which could 
only be unravelled by going into the intricacies of unique cases. Our empirical findings 
provide adequate evidence that the ability of a natural resource governance system to adjust 
or readjust its institutional underpinnings and governance regime in the face of threat, of 
whatever form or intensity, contributes immensely to the viability of the particular 
ecosystem. Institutions must necessarily evolve to adapt when there is sufficient evidence 
that the existing regime has become weakened in the face of the changing internal and 
external conditions of social ecological systems.  
 
Furthermore, whilst collaboration on natural resources mostly tends to evoke suspicion and 
mistrust from local people (Lachapelle et al., 2003; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Yaffee, 
1997), our study demonstrates that the emergence of intense threats and the reaching of 
critical junctures can have the effect of opening up the window of opportunity for 
collaboration to emerge or flourish with less resistance. This conclusion throws empirical 
light on a proposition that a feeling of fear of an impending threat could drive communities 
to collaborate, and that facilitating collaboration requires, inter alia, highlighting and 
capitalising on shared fears (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000:68).  
 
Moreover, collaborative natural resource governance is not always about the devolution of 
powers from a central government to lower-tier bodies, nor does it necessarily get kick-
started by the state, but could also emanate from alliances between a lower-tier body and 
state agencies or other non-state bodies. In other words, collaboration towards adapting to a 
changing social-ecological system does not necessarily have to emanate from the top 
(government); individual actors could initiate processes that foster state-community 
collaboration towards establishing an adaptive and more resilient governance regime. We 
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conclude that a call for collaboration may flow through the traditional top-down or a bottom-
up approach.  
 
Finally, although informal institutions are formidable in enhancing natural resource 
protection largely through voluntary compliance, reinforcing effective enforcement systems 
requires a more collaborative regime where formal institutions provide some form of legal 
basis and legitimacy to complement the role of the informal systems. Institutional 
development becomes crucial as society becomes more heterogeneous, with the associated 
social dynamics, which might render the erstwhile voluntary compliance largely restricted 
to perhaps fewer members of society.  
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Chapter Eight 
Synergy between Formal and Informal Institutions in Natural Resource 
Governance12 
 
 
Abstract 
There has been a call to forge a synergistic relationship between local ecological knowledge 
(local taboos, indigenous governance structures and belief systems) and formal institutions 
in the governance of natural resources. How exactly do informal institutions complement 
the efforts of formal state regulation of natural resources? What are the key enforcing 
mechanisms underpinning formal and informal institutions? Adapting the institutional and 
development framework, this ethnographic study sought to assess the role of informal 
institutions in the enforcement of formal natural resource institutions using the case of 
Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana, West Africa. The study observed that 
traditional governance structures and local belief systems promote “softer grounds”, which 
promote robust wildlife protection. The study argues that by infusing dynamism into 
informal institutions, they become more formidable to engender compliance rates that make 
formal game and wildlife officers operate without facing the kinds of difficulties prevalent 
elsewhere.  
Keywords: Natural resources, wildlife governance, informal institutions, enforcement, 
Africa 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 This is an adapted version of an article in review as Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, 
K. A. (2018). Two sides of the same coin: Synergy between formal and informal institutions in 
natural resource governance,  
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8.1 Introduction 
Promoting ecological protection has been a global concern, with efforts taken at varying 
policy levels to get nation states and non-governmental actors committed to this course 
(Chapin et al., 2009). That notwithstanding, many wildlife species have become threatened 
(IUCN, 2008), which has made wildlife governance issues a global concern (Manfredo, 
2015; Redpath et al., 2013). Consequently, many governments have established institutions 
to structure the way people interact with wildlife resources (Ostrom, 1990). In spite of the 
various policy interventions and formal institutions, the level of protection that wildlife 
species receive even in protected areas leaves much to be desired (Steinmetz et al., 2014). 
Laxities in the enforcement of wildlife regulations have a negative impact on species 
protection. According to Woodroffe et al. (2005), enforcement laxities could pose varying 
degrees of threat to wildlife including, inter alia, population decline and extinction of 
particular wildlife species. Generally, the enforcement of wildlife institutions is quite 
problematic; this is because such species exhibit widespread and unpredictable movement 
patterns across the landscape without any particular attention to demarcated borders or 
territorial limits (Kreuter et al., 2010). On the other hand, some groups of persons tend to 
contravene wildlife rules to demonstrate their resistance to the regulations which were 
perhaps imposed on them by external actors (Jacoby, 2001; Duffy, 1999).  
 
Evidence suggests that human threats to wildlife occur in different contexts, including in the 
advanced countries (Gavitt, 1989; Tobias, 1998; Warchol et al., 2003). Even when regarded 
as protected species in formally recognised habitats, wildlife species in many cases remain 
threatened (Warchol et al., 2003). This raises the issue of natural resource governance; the 
nature of institutions and their enforcement mechanisms have been discussed as a major 
determinant of natural resource governance successes or debacles (Gibson et al., 2005; 
Agrawal, 2003). Institutions entail “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction ... [consisting] of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)” (North, 1991:97). Though institutions are useful, their relevance is more 
determined by the extent to which they interact to elicit preferred patterns of behaviour from 
members of society (Ostermeier, 1999). In this study we examine the specific context of a 
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rural African community (under Ghana’s Community Resource Management Area, CREMA 
scheme) where enforcement of wildlife rules remains formidable as a result of the interplay 
of formal and informal institutional mechanisms. It illustrates an empirical case where 
enforcement of wildlife institutions incorporates the ‘visible’ (formal rules and actors) and 
‘invisible’ (gods, fetish priests, chiefs and local taboos) as well as other contextual practices. 
The study proffers answers to the following key research questions: To what extent do 
informal institutions soften the grounds for effective enforcement of formal wildlife 
regulations? How does this interplay foster appreciable human-wildlife interaction? 
 
 
8.2 Conceptual framework 
The study adapted the institutional and development (IAD) framework to discuss 
institutionalism and human-wildlife interaction in BFMS. The framework (Figure 8.1) 
entails five key elements and an action arena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.1: Adapted IAD framework 
Source: Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2017) with ideas from Ostermeier (1999); Ostrom 
(2005) 
 
The framework (Figure 8.1) explains that institutional analysis involves a biophysical 
element (in this study, monkey species) that interacts with a process and institutional element 
(together with enforcement mechanisms). The interplay between the biophysical element, 
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institutions and enforcement determines the behaviour of stakeholders or actors towards the 
natural resource. The nexus between formal and informal arrangements, as well as their 
enforcement, together with particular benefit systems, largely determines the way 
community members regard the resource in question and, for that matter, resource outcomes. 
Informal institutions connote customary rights or pre-existing rules – mostly not codified 
into law – passed down from generation to generation to protect, maintain and sustain natural 
resources within a particular context (Otsuka & Place, 2002). In this study context they 
involve the traditional governance arrangements including chieftaincy, priesthood systems 
and cultural belief systems. Formal institutions, on the other hand, involve the prescriptions, 
instruments and instructions that are largely codified, having the status of constitutional 
clauses and laws that are guaranteed and sanctioned at multiple levels largely by public 
agencies (Lauth, 2000). The elements in the framework have been used to discuss the study 
observations in section 8.4. Consequently, the section (8.4) is organized into these broad 
themes: process/institutional elements, enforcement mechanisms, behavioural choice and 
outcome elements 
 
 
8.3 Methods 
8.3.1 Study context 
Providing an empirical case of complementarity between informal and formal governance 
structures, we adopt the unique case of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) in 
Ghana. BFMS is a unique place in Africa where the two different species of monkeys (black 
and white colobus and mona monkeys) have lived in large numbers and co-exist 
harmoniously with humans in the Boabeng and Fiema villages since the 1830s. The monkeys 
are protected and revered as “children of the gods” by traditional taboos and historical 
cultural beliefs. BFMS presents one of the successful stories of Ghana’s Community 
Resource Management Areas (CREMA) scheme adopted by the Wildlife Division of 
Forestry Commission in Ghana. CREMA presents a community-wide natural resource 
management where local structures are encouraged to anchor the management of off-reserve 
lands which remain ungazetted. In this arrangement local communities are tasked to manage 
the natural resource prudently for the sake of community-wide benefits. Officially emanating 
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from Ghana’s 1994 Forest Policy, CREMA is a model through which the Wildlife Division 
transfers authority and management responsibilities for wildlife to local communities. It 
involves helping communities to self-organise local structures to be able take responsibility 
for wildlife management. What makes Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary unique is that the 
community already had in place the contextual governance structures and informal 
institutions before the scheme, and such collaboration between local structures (informal) 
and wildlife structures (formal structures) provides a robust case, which is discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
8.3.2 Research design  
The chapter adopted an ethnographic design. Ethnography is an indigenous approach where 
researchers task themselves to undertake a systematic investigation of the beliefs, processes, 
social interactions and behaviours, as well as distinctive phenomena, of sizeable societies; 
the process is largely interspersed with participation and observation over a period of time 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Reeves et al., 2008). The overarching goal of this design is an 
exploration, description and explanation of other cultures and contextual phenomena rather 
than to test a quantitative hypothesis (Barbour, 2007; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). 
Throughout the study the researchers positioned themselves within a prevailing 
epistemology by recognising the information and knowledge base of participants. A key 
asset that enabled the research was the use of social relationships and intermediaries to gain 
unhindered access to key participants. According to Wilson (2008:129), ethnographic design 
requires “the proper protocol for building of healthy relationships … the use of 
intermediaries has practical uses in establishing rapport with research participants and 
placing the researcher within a circle of relations”. Consequently, two indigenous members 
proved very useful throughout the study period as they led the researchers to participants 
including the chiefs, traditional priests and other relevant actors, and consent was easily 
acquired.  
 
Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify 33 key informants who 
were deemed to have the requisite information on institutional enforcement in the Boabeng-
Fiema Monkey Sanctuary. Participants in the study involved chiefs and fetish priests of the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
202 
 
Boabeng-Fiema communities, past and present wildlife officials of the Sanctuary, unit 
committee members, key actors of the BFMS Management Board, tour guides, local 
government actors, farmers and selected community members.  The main instruments of 
primary data gathering involved informal and focus group discussions, in-depth interviews 
and narrative enquiries. Each of these interactions lasted for an average of 45 to 60 minutes. 
All proceedings with participants were later transcribed and sorted into appropriate themes 
that were used in the discussions. Data were analysed using inductive thematic analysis 
based on issues that emerged from the observations and data gathered as is common in 
ethnographic studies (Reeves et al., 2008). Direct narratives were used to support the themes 
discussed. A major strength of this design is that through observations and immersion in the 
society, the researchers were able to identity and gather novel empirical insights that may 
have eluded previous studies. More importantly, the comprehensive nature of the approach 
helped researchers to explore and link social phenomena and related narratives which may 
appear prima facie to have no connection (Reeves et al., 2008). A limitation of ethnography 
is that since it is confined to a particular context, the outcomes or conclusions cannot easily 
lead to generalizations, the findings however could be adapted to suit different contexts. 
 
 
8.4 Results  
In this section the study uses elements of the adapted institutional and development (IAD) 
framework (process/institutional elements, enforcement mechanisms, behavioural choice 
and outcome elements) to present the study results.  
 
8.4.1 Process/Institutional elements 
8.4.1.1 Governance structure and arrangements 
The governance structure of BFMS has evolved from a hitherto archetypical traditional 
(community-centric) system towards a more collaborative approach embracing the concept 
of “collaborative natural resource governance”. In the BFMS, formal institutions have 
reinforced the level of protection given to the wildlife species. This is because informal 
institutions had exclusively underpinned the wildlife conservation in the past, and have since 
the mid-1970s been reinforced by formal institutions which have brought on board many 
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different actors/stakeholders and interests in the wildlife governance. This arrangement 
depicts the values of collaborative natural resource governance conceptualized to mean the 
new governance system that emphasizes on different stakeholders to prudently and 
methodically govern natural resources (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). The main actors in 
the contemporary governance regime of BFMS comprise Wildlife Division of the Forestry 
Commission, local government, a management committee, the police, international 
organizations and scientific community and more importantly the traditional structures 
including chiefs and traditional priests of both Boabeng and Fiema communities. The actors 
and institutions are illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
 
Formal Institutions   Informal Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Governance and Institutional Enforcement model of BFMS 
Source: Author’s construct from field study 
 
The first element with solid outline captioned ‘formal institutions’ illustrates the formal laws 
and regulations relevant to wildlife governance of BFMS. These include legislative 
instrument and regulations such as Wildlife Conservation Regulation of 1971 which lists the 
colobus and mona monkeys as wholly and partially protected respectively; 1994 Forest & 
Wildlife Policy; and 2012 revised Forest & Wildlife Policy. They also involve local by-laws 
including those on hunting ban, no farming in the core forest sanctioned by the by the local 
government (the then Nkoranza District, now Nkoranza North District) where the BFMS is 
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located. For example, the BFMS Constitution which is enforced by the Management 
Committee forbids hunting, cutting of trees and bush burning within the core forest. This is 
also legitimated by a 1975 local by-law which among other things seeks to offer protection 
to trees within the core forest. However, same cannot be said of forest and trees that fall 
outside the 1.92 km2 area core forest. Whilst monkeys within and outside the core forest 
receive maximum protection, the forest itself does not. It suggests that formal regulations 
and restrictions alone do not guarantee effective resource protection in BFMS. On the other 
hand, the taboos and informal governance institutions alone could not have provided a 
formidable system for sustainable monkey conservation in BFMS (Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 
2017a). The inherent challenges associated with informal institutions necessitated a synergy 
with formal institutions.  
 
The second element also with solid outline illustrates the various state agencies and actors 
who help to enforce the formal rules. The practice of the formal rules and actors/agencies is 
to ensure a cordial human-wildlife interaction and sustainability of the resource species 
including their natural habitat. However, the realization of this overarching goal is reinforced 
by robust traditional governance and belief system captioned ‘informal institutions’ which 
are illustrated with broken lines. The taboos and local belief systems as well as traditional 
actors and governance arrangements provide significant catalytic role in the sustainability of 
the monkey species. This is illustrated in table 8.1 
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Table 8.1:  Formal and informal institutional complementarity 
Joint management and complementarity 
The management committee works with two chiefs and two unit committees, one each from Boabeng and 
Fiema, as well as with the wildlife officers. The role of formal wildlife officials is to ensure that no one 
disturbs the natural habitat of the monkeys; that nobody fires a gun in the forest and that no one harms the 
animals. When it comes to any arrest or sending an offender to the police station, they do this. The actual 
power lies with the chiefs who have delegated their powers to a five-member management committee which 
reports to the former and the management board. The board comprises three members from Fiema and 
Boabeng – one appointed by chiefs and elders, one unit committee member and one elected by the 
community and a local government member. It also involves a senior wildlife officer of BFMS, one 
representative from each of seven neighbouring communities whose territories have been invaded by the 
monkeys because of the migratory nature of wildlife.  
 
Explaining how the collaborative governance operates, a wildlife officer who had been instrumental in the 
process intimated: 
… there is the general management board and the two traditional bodies. There are representatives 
from each of the communities but it is when there is a major issue that all the chiefs come for the 
meetings. 
 
Joint implementation and monitoring 
There is a cordial relationship between the wildlife agency and the traditional chiefs and priests. The kind 
of acrimony widely reported in the literature is largely non-existent in the BFMS. These partners collaborate 
with one another in the performance of their duties, and there is mutual respect for one another.  The acting 
chairman of the management committee explained:  
  
There is a cordial working relationship between the traditional governance system and the wildlife 
officers … this is because both are geared towards a similar outcome, tradition says do not kill 
monkeys and wildlife officers say do not destroy the monkey habitat.. so they are both in the same 
direction… here there is no conflict between the state agencies and traditional institutions. 
 
If any individual offends, traditionally you have to pay some money and sheep to appease the gods 
and maybe the wildlife officers will process you for arrest and prosecution. Even if you get arrested, 
you will have to perform such tradition to appease the gods after being discharged. 
 
 A wildlife officer explained: 
          …... But without the collaboration and cooperation the forest and monkeys will not have existed”  
 
The essence of a synergy between formal and informal institutions is to help bridge people 
of different orientations (whether native or migrant) into a common overarching goal of 
effective resource protection. This reflects a narrative by a traditional priest who explained: 
 in the past the gods were really active in the protection of the animals but currently 
it is the government that is reinforcing this role.  But the community members know 
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that it is either for the gods or the government. People will not like to harm them in 
order to avoid the wrath of either the gods or government 
 
The narrative above demonstrates the strength associated with a synergy between local 
taboos and formal institutions in BFMS.  
 
8.4.2 Enforcement mechanisms (enforcing formal and informal institutions in BFMS) 
8.4.2.1 Key Actors and enforcement of formal institutions 
With reference to the governance model in Figure 8.2, this section discusses how each actor 
contributes to the enforcement process towards maintaining effective human-wildlife 
interaction and species protection. 
 
a. Wildlife officials 
The contemporary governance regime makes provision for a local resident Wildlife officer 
and other supporting officers in the BFMS community. Their mere presence serves as a 
check on community members who may want to disturb the species, more especially their 
habitat, which is the protected forest. Without the external check, people may flout the 
regulations on monkey and habitat protection. This is against a backdrop that there are 
relatively homogenous relations among community members with a set of family ties. It may 
therefore appear quite difficult to impose real punishment when someone offends the rules 
and regulations – for instance, if the culprit is a member of the royal family or an elder. This 
point was well explained by a traditional priest: 
But as a result of the relational and brotherliness which exists in the community,  If 
someone conducts any harm against the monkeys, people will come and beg, 
claiming the person is either my son, or grandfather of other relative. So with this, 
you will just perform some ritual or else a lot of negative consequences will occur. 
 
The presence of the Wildlife Division has been an effective external check on hunting and 
timber extraction, which would have been difficult to regulate if left to the traditional 
governance structures alone. In the traditional communities it is mostly difficult for people 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
to blow the whistle or report law-breakers to authorities because of family and community 
ties. This was explained by one of the study participants: 
As for the wildlife officials, they derive their powers from government and are mostly 
external to the community, they have no such worries which some of us may 
encounter… They are expected to protect the monkey habitat when there is any 
infringement or anything illegal. They are the ones representing the government and 
can make arrest so that is their role. Their role is to supervise and not to succumb. 
 
This point was corroborated by another key participant who submitted that: 
this they do without recourse to much sentiments from community members since the 
latter know it is officer’s responsibility (as mandated by government) and not borne 
out of bad faith or callousness. 
 
b. Local government 
The governance and institutional structure of BFMS has been consolidated by local by-laws 
legitimated by the local government, which makes their enforcement considerably easier. 
Although in practice the local government has no direct role in the governance process of 
BFMS, it has helped provide the enabling legal and regulatory framework. This has made 
the institutions enforceable in the law courts and offenders could be prosecuted. The local 
assembly is also a partner in the development of the BFMS area in terms of infrastructure, 
which will promote eco-tourism. The assembly is consulted on other issues concerning the 
BFMS, but does not play any direct managerial role in the governance process.  
 
c. Local management board and committee 
The overall governance of the BFMS is entrusted to the local management board, whose 
membership cuts across the traditional actors, state agencies, the two communities (Boabeng 
and Fiema) as well as seven other allied communities whose territories have been encroached 
upon by wildlife from BFMS. The board is tasked to promote unity among all the nine 
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resource communities13 and work together towards the sustainable governance of wildlife 
species. It also operates to sensitise community members to the relevance of conserving 
natural resources as well as the need to prevent wildlife habitat degradation. The day-to-day 
governance of BFMS is conducted by a five-member management committee, whose 
membership is comprised of representatives from both Boabeng and Fiema and the 
Assembly member appointed for a four-year term. A traditional chief explained: 
 
What happened was, ‘nananom’ [chiefs and elders] couldn’t directly handle …. So 
nananom have appointed a management board …  Boabeng and Fiema chiefs 
nominate one member each; the fetish priest or community nominates one member 
each; and the assembly member of both communities is a member. 
 
This committee powers the governance process and helps to derive socio-economic benefits 
from the sanctuary and helps to reinforce its eco-tourism prospects. As has already been 
established, the ownership and management of the sanctuary are essentially vested in the 
chiefs; they have subsequently delegated the management role to a five-member 
Management Committee, which is in charge of the day-to-day activities that go on at the 
Sanctuary, and appropriates moneys derived from eco-tourism and rents from the Sanctuary 
guesthouse. A chairman of a unit committee explained:  
The role of management is to safeguard the monetary aspect of the sanctuary; if any 
guests come; if there is any problem, it’s the management. 
 
In our interaction with the former chairman of the Management Committee he explained: 
The essence of the Management Committee was to open up the governance system 
and to make it more community-centric and as open as possible; the local BFMS 
Constitution makes everything streamlined 
 
                                                          
13 The uniqueness of wildlife resources is that they are migratory in nature over time; 
monkeys have spread to seven other surrounding communities. The people in these 
communities are aware that the monkey species are sacred and there is a taboo against 
harming them; they consequently deal with them as such 
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8.4.2.2 Actors and enforcement of informal institutions 
Role of the chiefs 
The traditional governance system headed by chiefs plays a crucial role in the protection of 
wildlife in Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS). Each of the two communities 
(Boabeng and Fiema) has a robust chieftaincy system headed by a chief with his council of 
elders (traditional cabinet), who help to enforce community by-laws and regulations geared 
towards the protection and conservation of monkeys. In each community the chief remains 
the main enforcer of local taboos or the traditional ban on killing of monkeys. Any other 
governance arrangement (including local management committee and board) reports to the 
local chief, who wields final responsibility and authority. 
This was explained by a unit committee head: 
The actual power is with the chiefs, even if the monkeys belong to the gods, the land 
is for the chiefs and more importantly the monkeys are largely inhabited on the land 
of Boabeng community. 
 
Anyone who contravenes any of the regulations on the monkeys is hauled before the chief, 
who makes a pronouncement on the appropriate punishment to impose. In most cases, the 
accused person is asked to buy items including a sheep to slaughter to appease the gods. One 
of the traditional priests explained: 
…so the person who kills the animal must appease to the gods by bringing sheep and 
eggs for the rituals … anyone who even accidentally kills the animal will buy a coffin 
and carry it. You will organize a funeral for the animal and everyone within the 
community will know that you killed the animal.   
 
Traditional priesthood system 
The chiefs execute their traditional roles in tandem with their spiritual advisors, who are the 
traditional priests in charge of the monkeys. Both Boabeng and Fiema communities have 
their own traditional priest in charge of the monkeys and these priests take divine instructions 
from the gods and advise the chiefs accordingly. One of the priests explained: 
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We listen to the gods. Whatever someone does, the gods communicate to us. So 
anything you do, we will know… and if the animal dies, we have the ritual we 
perform. 
 
Traditionally, the priest (in collaboration with the chief) is responsible for the enforcement 
of the taboos in the two communities. He is able to interpret the gods’ wishes, which he 
conveys to the community. Traditionally, the monkeys are seen as offspring of the gods and 
the two fetish priests of the Boabeng and Fiema communities carry out traditional rites to 
appease the gods whenever there is an unfortunate incident of a monkey found dead or killed. 
This includes burial rites for the monkeys and, in the past, initiating an appropriate funeral 
ritual for a dead monkey. In some situations these priests receive a revelation from the gods 
on some specific thing to be done with respect to the monkeys and at times are given prior 
knowledge of what is yet to happen. At other times the priests may contact a relatively 
powerful priest to get additional insight into what is to be done for interpretation of an 
observed phenomenon.  
 
Role of the gods 
Throughout Ghana and most African society’s people associate the lesser gods with elements 
of nature, such as rivers, lakes, rocks, trees, mountains and animals that are believed to 
possess spirits and powers. In the context of BFMS, both Boabeng and Fiema possess a 
lesser god, daworo and abodwo, respectively. These two river gods – daworo (female) and 
abodwo (male) – are the parents of the monkeys who provide supernatural protection for the 
monkeys. One of the respondents explained the parental role of the two gods: 
So we agreed at some point in time on the elimination of dogs at the instruction of 
the gods… The history of the monkeys revolves around two shrines, one in Fiema 
and other in Boabeng… And the history is that at night when the god (abodwo god 
of Fiema) visited his wife (daworo god of Boabeng) the dogs used to bark at him. But 
the main reason is that the gods indicated that the dogs used to disturb him en route 
to his wife.  
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Additionally, the gods reveal ‘what is hidden’ to the priests and spiritually offer protection 
to the monkeys. In that regard, even in the absence of any human, people fear causing harm 
to the monkey species. Those individuals who appeared recalcitrant in the past received 
divine sanctions from the gods, which in contemporary times serves as test cases and 
narratives. For instance, respondents variously narrated: 
There was a woman in Fiema who pounded hot pepper and mixed it with food so that 
the monkeys would eat in her home (ostensibly to punish monkeys and to scare them 
from her house), after eating with their forelimbs and using same to scratch their 
face and eye, it itched them bitterly… today the woman has also gone blind at Fiema. 
In the study respondents narrated and shared experiences where individuals and groups who 
defiled the sanctity of the informal restrictions were subject to mysterious sanctions from 
the gods. See Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2:  Sanctioning misbehaviour: Efficacy of informal institutions 
Designation  Offence  Divine punishment 
A foreign 
woman 
Pretended to carry out a project 
in the sanctuary but had a latent 
motive to test the potency of the 
spirits and gods  
Mysteriously got bitten by one of the 
monkeys and died 
A Christian 
sect 
Took the traditional leadership 
to court for some decisions 
made 
The wife of the church leader mysteriously 
suffered stroke and died 
Savior church 
members in the 
1970s 
Had no belief in the tradition 
and hunted monkeys 
A man would have strange occurrences such 
as protruded stomach; sometimes women 
gave birth to strangely deformed babies 
A migrant 
Northerner 
Used his cutlass to hit the 
forelimb of one monkey 
 He mysteriously got one of his arms sprained 
(similar to what he did to the monkey) whilst 
dancing at a funeral few days after. He 
became paralyzed for the rest of his life and 
died years after. 
Some sect at 
Jema-Nkwanta 
(nearby town) 
One of the colobus monkeys 
got killed and eaten by a group 
of people 
They experienced fire outbreak in their homes 
which originated from one of them whose 
house gutted fire whilst the wife was cooking. 
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The fire mysteriously trespassed and targeted 
only houses of those who partook in the diet.  
Source:  Author (fieldwork) 2016 
 
8.4.3 Behavioural choice and outcome elements: people-wildlife interaction 
Unlike what appears to be generally rancorous interactions between humans and wildlife 
(Beisner et al., 2015; Manfredo, 2015), the situation in BFMS is fairly unique as there is an 
appreciative relationship between humans and wildlife. Put differently, people do not hunt, 
taunt or harm monkeys. This theme remained dominant throughout the data-gathering 
process and all participants answered in the affirmative. For instance, a retired wildlife 
officer explained: 
I have served in over five national parks in the country, elsewhere; there is nothing 
to scare them [community members and poachers].  The wildlife system is different 
elsewhere, but here it is collaborative and the local systems in place reduce the task 
and burden of the wildlife officer.  
 
Largely troublesome, yet highly protected: A paradox? 
Apart from being friendly to humans, monkeys in BFMS nonetheless largely troublesome 
and usually causes havoc in homes and on farms of people. Some participants explained the 
extent to which monkeys cause troubles in the communities. A queen mother explained: 
They [monkeys] are good but very bad, stealing and destruction. Just take a look at 
the building with red marks [pointing to some dirty marks soiled on her wall by 
monkeys] … I have changed my roofing sheets for about 4 times [monkeys jump on 
them and leave tiny holes]… if food is even on fire, bread, kenkey [local food made 
of maize dough] they will take and just eat in front of you when they sit on the roofing 
sheet or mango tree to spite you.  
 
The study argues here that the nature of the problems that wildlife (monkeys) pose to 
community members in BFMS ideally would have warranted the kind of harsh retaliation 
and decreasing species population that occurs elsewhere. In table 8.3 below, one rather 
observes an increasing monkey population which suggests that despite inconvenience 
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monkeys pose, the institutional robustness helps contributes to their protection which also 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the co-management process. 
 
 
Table 8.3: Increasing BFMS monkey population 
Census Year Number of individual population Number of groups 
1990 128 8 
1996 163 10 
2000 200 14 
2003 220 15 
Source: Saj et al, 2006 
 
In all focus group interactions with community members, people (whether native or migrant) 
were unanimous that they do not harm the monkeys, although their reasons differed. For 
instance, one explained  
I don’t hail from this community, although I may have my doubts about these myths, 
I don’t want any government litigation so I obey the rules… even if officials are not 
around, the people themselves will report you should you trespass … government 
laws will deal with anyone who offends. 
 
This confirmed by a native participant: 
Monkeys are children of the gods, this is what our elders have told us and we cherish 
it, the development of Boabeng-Fiema is a result of eco-tourism income brought forth 
by monkeys… we value tradition and we don’t harm the monkeys and won’t allow 
anyone to do so. 
 
From interaction with the respondents, it became evident that formal and informal 
institutions are two sides of the same coin, whose overarching goal is to ensure protection of 
monkeys in the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary and the synergy between these two has 
proven to be formidable in eliciting compliance from community members as there were no 
reports of abuses. 
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8.4.4 Discussion 
From the BFMS case, lessons on institutional synergy and conditions supporting appropriate 
complementation of formal and informal institutions in natural resource governance are 
discussed in themes below: 
 
Strength in complementation of formal with informal institutions 
The BFMS governance arrangement depicts a typical model where the strengths of formal 
and informal institutions have been synchronized and enforced in a coordinated manner 
(table 8.1 and figure 8.2). Globally, governments have an overall responsibility for 
promoting sustainability of their environmental resources. In situations where there are local 
community governance provisions for reinforcing this role, government’s task of ultimate 
responsibility is only reduced but not fully ceded (Arts 2014; Vodouhê et al., 2010; Roe et 
al. 2000). As seen in Figure 8.2, the informal institutions including the traditional priesthood, 
chieftaincy structures and mythology surrounding monkeys work together to support 
effective monkey conservation. But for the informal institutions, the formal institutions 
would have a Herculian task and been taken place only at an increased cost. Elsewhere, 
Wilkie et al. (2000) bemoan how resource constraints affect exclusive formal management 
of wildlife which results in poor outcomes in what they referred to as ‘paper parks’ which 
fails to accomplish the overall objective of wildlife conservation. In the African context, 
studies contend that “at the institutional and legal level, most countries, especially African 
countries, have a satisfactory framework for protected areas,… however, despite an 
abundance of laws and institutions, the framework is often ineffective and less strictly 
enforced for management of protected areas” (Iritie, 2015:202). On the other hand, the 
informal institutions alone in BFMS would not have been able to stand the test of time due 
to contextual complexities in the 1970s. BFMS before the mid-1970s was  underpinned 
solely by informal institutions and taboos which nearly resulted in ‘complex crisis’ as 
religion and in-migration nearly threatened the use of taboos in monkeys protection.  
 
Institutional consolidation to avoid inter-institutional gap 
The case entreats local communities to liaise with the appropriate state agencies in order to 
legitimize their operations and decisions which could be enforceable. Whilst mythology 
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forbids causing harm to monkeys in BFMS, this is also consolidated by national and local 
by-laws which is reinforced by contextual community arrangements. Additionally, whilst 
the gods of Boabeng-Fiema forbids dogs as pets in the community, this instruction has been 
consolidated in the BFMS Constitution legitimated by a local by-law which bans people 
from keeping dogs as pets in BFMS community. Such complementarity of formal and 
informal institutions to safeguard monkeys in BFMS is phenomenal as dogs are known to 
be predators to wildlife (Lessa et al., 2016). In a related study in northern Ghana, Millar 
(2003) contends that the traditional informal institutions and belief systems possess major 
conservation value but only become more robust when interspersed with modern democratic 
elements.  
 
Reinforcing informal institutions for cordial human-wildlife interaction 
From the study, one observes that the role of the chiefs, traditional priests and gods cannot 
be underestimated in the enforcement of wildlife institutions in BFMS. Most community 
members still have belief in the potency of the ‘unseen’ and this in most cases inform their 
interaction with monkey species at BFMS. This has been underscored in a report by Fargey14 
where 75% of the people explained that they would have hunted the monkeys for bushmeat 
had it not been the traditional institution (taboo) prohibiting their killing (see also table 8.1; 
Attuquayefio & Gyampoh 2010). This suggests that the informal institutions offer a 
catalyzing influence in the protection and conservation of monkeys in BFMS (see also 
Hartberg et al., 2016 on supernatural monitoring and sanctioning in natural resource 
governance).  
 
Generally, cultural belief systems, local taboos and myths have proved useful in controlling 
and regulating people’s interaction with natural resources (Colding & Folke, 2001; Negi, 
2010). Our narratives demonstrate that communities gain more from these informal systems 
if linked up with formal arrangements as well as other incremental institutional 
developments. The interplay of formal and informal institutions and their enforcement 
                                                          
14 Fargey P. J. Assessment of the Conservation Status of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary. 
Report to the Flora and Fauna Preservation Society 
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together with the governance dynamism has made wildlife in BFMS largely protected as 
summed up by a traditional priest “…the people know that it is either for the gods or the 
government,  people will not like to hunt or harm them in order not to incur the wrath of 
either the gods or government” (see also Osei-Tutu et al., 2015). This theme also reflected 
in the various interviews and discussions with community members including the 
researchers’ observations on the field as monkeys were seen in the homes of people 
especially during the mornings and evenings which demonstrates a relatively cordial human-
monkey interaction. The findings from this case study provide empirical support to a similar 
observation in Lushoto, Tanzania by Mowo et al. (2016: 120) where “when … conventional 
and indigenous by-laws enforcement mechanisms (were) adopted, incidences of abuse of 
natural resources were reduced by as much as 50% in some of the study sites”. The foregoing 
demonstrates the efficacy of traditional governance structures and institutions which need to 
align appropriately with the formal institutions to arrive at an overarching goal of sustainable 
natural resource governance.  
 
Systems view of complementation 
The enforcement complementarities of both formal and informal institutions depicts a 
‘systems approach’ which unleashes a robust outcome that is more than the sum of both parts 
(see Maani & Cavana 2007). In other words, the product of the interaction between formal 
and informal institutions is far greater and provides effective protection for monkeys in 
Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary. The governance arrangement ensures there is no 
institutional vacuum as local arrangements through the management committee and BFMS 
Constitution help operationalize the formal and informal processes which are coordinated 
for a unified purpose of resource governance. In their Inter-Institutional Gap (IIG) 
framework, Rahman et al. (2017) highlight the relevance of mediation between formal and 
informal institutions to adopt rules at various levels and scales to pragmatically regulate the 
management of natural resources. Despite the numerous calls for synergistic relationships 
between formal and informal groups for sustainable natural resources outcomes, there are 
reports of a general conflict between actors operating under these two entities (quoted in 
Rahman et al. 2017: 845). This trend notwithstanding, the institutional arrangements in 
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BFMS are structured such that there is cordiality and cooperation between formal and 
informal actors as highlighted in table 8.1. Elsewhere, enforcement of formal rules is 
problematic and wildlife officials may even experience the wrath of community members 
(Vaughan & Long, 2007); in the extreme cases, they become exposed to intimidation and 
death threats from poachers (Messer, 2010). 
 
Dynamism in the institutional model 
Inclusivity and stakeholder involvement 
Notwithstanding the robust nature of formal and informal institutions, we still observe 
dynamism in the governance and institutional model of BFMS which continues to sustain 
monkeys and their habitat. Although there are formal laws and mythology that ban hunting 
of the monkey species and destruction of the core forest, the community governance 
structure and informal arrangement continues to grow in dynamism to meet exigencies of 
time. This is also because managing wildlife comes with an ecological, social and political 
complexities (Rastogi et al. 2012:336) which calls for a more eclectic approach that hinges 
on governance and social inclusion.  
 
The involvement of seven nearby communities in the management board and decision 
making processes of BFMS suggests governance dynamism to optimize protection of 
monkeys and forest. This development corroborates an observation by Horowitz (1998) in 
Sarawak, Malaysia where indigenous structures and institutions were further developed to 
liaise with state institutional arrangement amidst contextual innovations towards effective 
wildlife management. It is instructive for natural resource conveners to strive for ways of 
involving actors when the need arises, the argument is that people will manage wildlife and 
other resources when they are provided sufficient incentive to do so (see Lu et al., 2005). 
Rahman et al. (2017:845) explained that the need for collaborative institutional 
arrangements capable of promoting flexibility, participation and inclusivity remains 
essential for sustainable natural resource governance. 
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Benefit-sharing measures to incentivize 
Using a given sharing criteria, stakeholders are incentivized by providing them economic 
benefits from moneys accruing from monkey eco-tourism. Although protection of monkeys 
in BFMS is primarily intrinsic, as societal members become more complex and diverse such 
socio-economic developments that come with monkey protection help to consolidate and 
validate traditional values underpinning natural resources protection. In addition to their 
traditional belief in monkey protection, community members derive tangible benefits from 
projects funded by moneys directly or indirectly from monkey eco-tourism. More so, the 
other seven nearby communities who have been incorporated in the benefit-sharing scheme 
augment the enforcement of wildlife protection rules. People who live with and are 
responsible for management of natural resources must be the primary beneficiaries of that 
management effort. In other words, laws and regulations per se, may not necessarily protect 
wildlife resources, people do and their efforts need to be rewarded as such. In their wildlife 
tolerance model, Kansky et al. (2016) contend that costs incurred from harboring wildlife 
should not significantly outweigh the benefits people derive from them, to acknowledge this 
involves engaging with relevant stakeholders in the resource context.  
 
From the study observations, a dominant theme has been the effective enforcement of 
wildlife rules and the positive human attitude towards monkeys and wildlife officials in 
BFMS. This suggests that the interaction of formal and informal rules coupled with 
contextual dynamics promotes effective enforcement and human-wildlife relationships. This 
finding provides empirical support to an earlier call by Rahman et al. (2017) which maintains 
the need for collaborative arrangements for sustainable governance of natural resources. 
 
 
8.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
Firstly, the case study demonstrates that the synergy between formal and informal 
institutions which is adequately enforced by recognisable governance structures gives 
wildlife resources effective protection from members of all facets of society. The migrant or 
so-called ‘modern thinker’ who might have otherwise shown disregard for or disbelief in the 
tradition will be compelled by the existing state regulations, whilst the traditionalists who 
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otherwise might have ignored the state regulations are compelled to comply by informal 
institutions. The study argues that although informal institutions are critical to natural 
resource governance, their relevance becomes more robust when synergistically located 
within a formal institutional arena. In other words, the combined effect of both formal and 
informal institutions in enforcement of wildlife rules cannot be overemphasised, as the total 
impact derived from the interaction (product) of both is more than their individual parts. 
 
The study argues that community resource management needs to evolve into a more 
collaborative system to involve an interplay of actors to enhance the effectiveness of 
institutional enforcement. It highlights that a strict sense of community-based natural 
resource management (in simplistic sense) does not exist per se or at best may be less 
effective (see Stone & Nyaupane, 2014; Ojha et al., 2016). Rather, protection of natural 
resources requires a capable regulatory framework (with help from state or local 
government) and supportive state agencies (Gilmour, 2016) and, more importantly resource 
communities need to “forge closer ties with communities beyond” so that synergistic 
relationships are established towards effective resource governance.  
 
It is imperative to find the convergence points between formal and informal institutions by 
‘modernising’ the informal rules through the introduction of some democratic elements as 
well as enhancing transparency and accountability. More importantly, as society grows in 
sophistication, ensuring the effectiveness of the natural resource institutions calls for a 
holistic approach towards adaptive or collaborative governance, where other emergent actors 
or stakeholders are brought on board and also made part of the benefit-sharing arrangement. 
Through this, networks and actors evolve to reflect existing societal or communal patterns 
which are viewed as more inclusive. Finally, the study concludes that natural resources 
institutions should be viewed as dynamic or evolutionary in nature; as society and the 
resource grow in sophistication and dynamism, natural resource institutions correspondingly 
need to rise to the challenge.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
220 
 
References 
Agrawal, A. (2003). Sustainable governance of common-pool resources: Context, methods, 
and politics. Annual Review of Anthropology, 32, 243–262. 
Agrawal, A. & Gibson, C.C. (1999). Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of 
community in natural resource conservation. World Development, 27(4), 629-649. 
Atkinson, P. & Hammersley. M. (1994). “Ethnography and Participant Observation.” In 
Denzin , N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.). Handbook of Qualitative Research. (pp. 248-
260). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Attuquayefio, D. K. S., & Gyampoh, S. (2010). The Boabeng-Fiema Monkey sanctuary, 
Ghana: a case for blending traditional and introduced wildlife conservation systems. 
West African Journal of Applied Ecology, 17(1), 1-10 
Barbour, J. D. (2007). Leader paradoxes and critical ethnographies. Academic Exchange 
Quarterly, 11(2), 117-123. 
Beisner, B.A., Heagerty, A., Seil, S.K., Balasubramaniam, K.N., Atwill, E.R., Gupta, B.K. 
& McCowan, B. (2015). Human–wildlife conflict: proximate predictors of 
aggression between humans and rhesus macaques in India. American Journal of 
Physical Anthropology, 156(2), 286-294. 
Chapin, F.S., Kofinas, G.P. & Folke, C. (Eds.). (2009). Principles of ecosystem stewardship: 
resilience-based natural resource management in a changing world. New York: 
Springer. 
Colding, J. & Folke, C. (2001). Social taboos: “invisible” systems of local resource 
management and biological conservation. Ecological Applications, 11(2), 584-600. 
Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (2011). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. & Stern, P.C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 
302(5652), 1907-1912. 
Duffy, R. (1999). The role and limitations of state coercion: Anti‐poaching policies in 
Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 17(1), 97-121. 
Fargey P.J. (1991). Assessment of the conservation status of the Buabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary. Report to the Flora and Fauna Preservation Society. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
221 
 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P. & Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive governance of social 
ecological systems. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 30, 441-473. 
Gavitt, J.D. (1989). Unlawful commercialization of wildlife parts. Transactions of the North 
American Wildlife & Natural Resources Conference, 54, 314-323. 
Gibson, C.C., Williams, J.T. & Ostrom, E. (2005). Local enforcement and better forests. 
World Development, 33(2), 273-284. 
Gilmour, D. (2016). Forty years of community-based forestry: A review of its extent and 
effectiveness. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO). 
Hartberg, Y., Cox, M. & Villamayor-Tomas, S. (2016). Supernatural monitoring and 
sanctioning in community-based resource management. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 
6(2), 95-111. 
Horowitz, L.S. (1998). Integrating indigenous resource management with wildlife 
conservation: a case study of Batang Ai National Park, Sarawak, Malaysia. Human 
Ecology, 26(3), 371-403. 
Iritié, B.G.J.J. (2015). Economic growth and biodiversity: an overview: conservation 
policies in Africa. Journal of Sustainable Development 8 (2), 196-208. 
IUCN (2008). Mammals on the IUCN Red List Accessed from 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/mammals (Accessed on June 25, 2016). 
Jacoby, K. (2001). Crimes against nature: Squatters, poachers, thieves, and the hidden 
history of American conservation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kansky, R., Kidd, M. & Knight, A.T. (2016). A wildlife tolerance model and case study for 
understanding human wildlife conflicts. Biological Conservation, 201, 137-145. 
Kreuter, U., Peel, M. & Warner, E. (2010). Wildlife conservation and community-based 
natural resource management in Southern Africa’s private nature reserves. Society 
and Natural Resources, 23(6), 507-524. 
Lauth, H.J. (2000). Informal institutions and democracy. Democratization, 7(4), 21–50. 
Lemos, M.C. & Agrawal, A. (2006). Environmental governance. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 31(1), 297-325. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
222 
 
Lessa, I., Guimarães, T.C.S., de Godoy Bergallo, H., Cunha, A. & Vieira, E. (2016). 
Domestic dogs in protected areas: a threat to Brazilian mammals?. Natureza & 
Conservação, 14, 46-56. 
Lu, D.J., Chou, Y.F. & Yuan, H.W. (2005). Paradigm shift in the institutional arrangement 
of protected areas management in Taiwan—a case study of Wu-Wei-Kang 
Waterfowl Wildlife Refuge in Ilan, Taiwan. Environmental Science & Policy, 8(4), 
418-430. 
Manfredo, M.J. (2015). Essays on human–wildlife conflict 10 years after the Durban World 
Parks Congress: An Introduction. Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 20(4), 285-288. 
Maani K.E. & Cavana, R.Y. (2007). Systems thinking, system dynamics: Managing change 
and complexity. Auckland, NZ: Prentice Hall. 
Messer, K.D. (2010). Protecting endangered species: When are shoot-on-sight policies the 
only viable option to stop poaching? Ecological Economics, 69(12), 2334-2340. 
Millar, D. (2003). Blending systems of governance: towards food security. COMPAS 
Magazine 9, 17–19. 
Mowo, J., Masuki, K., Lyamchai, C., Tanui, J., Adimassu, Z. & Kamugisha, R. (2016). By- 
laws formulation and enforcement in natural resource management: lessons from the 
highlands of eastern Africa. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods, 25(2), 120-131. 
Naughton‐Treves, L. (2002). Wild animals in the garden: Conserving wildlife in Amazonian 
agroecosystems. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 92(3), 488-
506. 
Negi, C.S. (2010). The institution of taboo and the local resource management and 
conservation surrounding sacred natural sites in Uttarakhand, Central Himalaya. 
International Journal of Biodiversity and Conservation, 2(8), 186-195. 
Ojha, H.R., Ford, R., Keenan, R.J., Race, D., Vega, D.C., Baral, H. & Sapkota, P. (2016). 
Delocalizing communities: Changing forms of community engagement in natural 
resources governance. World Development, 87, 274-290 
Osei-Tutu, P., Pregernig, M. & Pokorny, B. (2015). Interactions between formal and 
informal institutions in community, private and state forest contexts in Ghana. Forest 
Policy and Economics, 54, 26-35. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
223 
 
Ostermeier, D.M. (1999). ‘The role of institutions in ecosystem management’. In Peine, J.D. 
(Ed.). Ecosystem Management for Sustainability: Principles and Practices by a 
Regional Biosphere Reserve Cooperative (pp. 457 472), USA: CRC Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective 
action. New York: Cambridge University Press 
Otsuka, K. & Place, F. (2002). Land tenure and natural resource management: A 
comparative study of Agrarian communities in Asia and Africa. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Redpath, S.M., Young, J., Evely, A., Adams, W.M., Sutherland, W.J., Whitehouse, A. & 
Gutiérrez, R.J. (2013). Understanding and managing conservation conflicts. Trends 
in Ecology & Evolution, 28(2), 100-109. 
Reeves, S., Kuper, A. & Hodges, B.D. (2008). Qualitative research methodologies: 
ethnography.BMJ: British Medical Journal, 337: 512-514 
Roe, D., Pathak, N. & Gutierrez, I. (2000). Evaluating Eden: exploring the myths and 
realities of community-based wildlife management. Series Overview (No. 8). IIED. 
Steinmetz, R., Srirattanaporn, S., Mor‐Tip, J. & Seuaturien, N. (2014). Can community 
outreach alleviate poaching pressure and recover wildlife in South‐East Asian 
protected areas?. Journal of Applied Ecology, 51(6), 1469-1478. 
Stone, M.T. & Nyaupane, G. (2014). Rethinking community in community-based natural 
resource management. Community Development, 45(1), 17-31. 
Tobias, M. (1998). Nature’s keepers: On the front lines of the fight to save wildlife in 
America. New York: John Wiley & Sons 
Vodouhê, F.G., Coulibaly, O., Adégbidi, A. & Sinsin, B. (2010). Community perception of 
biodiversity conservation within protected areas in Benin. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 12(7), 505-512. 
Warchol, G.L., Zupan, L.L. & Clack, W. (2003). Transnational criminality: An analysis of 
the illegal wildlife market in Southern Africa. International Criminal Justice Review, 
13(1), 1-27. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
224 
 
Wilkie, D.S., Carpenter, J.F. & Zhang, Q. (2001). The under-financing of protected areas in 
the Congo Basin: so many parks and so little willingness-to-pay. Biodiversity and 
Conservation, 10(5), 691-709. 
Wilson, S. (2008). Research is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods. Winnipeg: 
Fernwood. 
Woodroffe, R., Thirgood, S. & Rabinowitz, A. (2005). The impact of human-wildlife 
conflict on natural systems. Conservation Biology Series Cambridge-, 9, 1. 
Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K.A. (2017). Institutional assessment in 
natural resource governance: A conceptual overview. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 74, 1-12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
225 
 
Chapter Nine 
The Role of the ‘Champion’ in a Bottom-up Approach to Natural Resource 
Governance Collaboration15 
 
 
Abstract 
Natural resource endowments are largely freely supplied by nature to ‘lucky’ communities, 
yet the ability to transform such endowments into meaningful resources are context 
dependent. There are many communities endowed with specialised natural resources which 
have not yet been transformed into a sustainable developmental resource for society. 
Adopting an ethnographic approach using the case of “a hitherto threatened wildlife species 
transformed into major community resource”, this study discusses the role of ‘champions’ 
in the development of adaptive responses to sustainable natural resource governance. The 
study discusses how the actions and specific strategies of an individual (champion) helped 
to salvage a threatened wildlife species to revive and survive through an adaptive governance 
and institutional response. Consequently, the natural resource endowment has become a 
productive resource which anchors the socio-economic development of Ghana’s Boabeng-
Fiema community. Five key strategies adopted by the champion have been illustrated in a 
schematic diagram and discussed using narratives and visuals. 
Keywords: adaptive response; institutions; collaborative governance; wildlife; 
champion 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 This is an adapted version of an article published as Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, 
K. A. (2018). ‘Comparative Conservation Studies: A “Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative 
Governance’. In A. Farazamand (Ed.). Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy 
& Governance. New Delhi: Springer. 
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9.1 Introduction 
The complexity and high stakes associated with natural resources render them rather 
problematic and perhaps impossible to be governed by a single unit; this has led to an era of 
networks and collaborations in natural resources governance (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 
2017). In other words, effective management of environmental resources including, inter 
alia, watersheds and aquatic life, forests and wildlife, and protected areas requires the 
synergistic efforts of multiple actors and systems. The idea of collaboration has come to stay 
and has been well researched in the natural resource governance literature (Yeboah-
Assiamah et al., 2016).  
 
An emerging theme has been the focus on the determinants or drivers of governance 
collaborations (Sayles & Baggio; 2017); in other words, how do these governance networks 
and collaborations come about or get initiated? The role of a community’s social capital base 
and how communities deploy social capital most effectively greatly determines the extent to 
which resources become transformed into meaningful assets in a sustainable way. Scholars 
discuss the role of bridging organisations in catalysing such collaborations between various 
entities and stakeholders towards achieving a superordinate goal of resource governance and 
conservation (Kowalski & Jenkins, 2015). Even within bridging organisations there are still 
some ‘micro’ entities that mastermind or catalyse the success of a bridging organisation in 
bringing about collaboration for effective natural resource conservation purposes. For 
instance, Olsson et al. (2007) suggest the unique and ‘championing’ role played by a director 
of the Ecomuseum (bridging organisation) in establishing the collaborative governance 
arrangement of the Kristianstads Vattenrike Biosphere Reserve in Sweden. In Canada 
collaborative governance in the lobster fishery of Maine largely involved the role played an 
individual (the Marine Resource Commissioner) who used his position as editor of 
Commercial Fisheries News and networks within the fishing space to propel the 
collaboration.  
 
Although collaboration in the natural resource governance context has gained much 
prominence, the literature appears silent on the specific and championing roles played by 
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individuals (referred to as ‘champions’ here) in a particular natural resource collaboration or 
in achieving resource outcomes. ‘Champions of change’ are “innovative, charismatic 
individuals and can be found at any level of society, within local or national governments, 
NGOs, local communities, and among resource users” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 
2004:336). The literature contends that although leadership is critical to the emergence and 
effectiveness of shadow networks, it nonetheless does not necessarily lead to an improved 
governance of social-ecological systems (Olsson et al., 2006). The authors (Olsson et al., 
2006) pose critical questions including inter alia, ‘What characterises the particular type of 
leadership that can transform an SES (social-ecological systems) towards adaptive 
governance?  
 
This chapter contends that natural resource endowments are largely freely supplied by nature 
to ‘lucky’ communities, yet the ability to transform such endowments into meaningful 
resource outcomes are context dependent. There are many communities blessed with 
specialised natural resources that have not yet been transformed into a sustainable 
developmental resource for society, whilst in other communities the same resources have 
become either counter-productive or exploited into extinction. Nature supplies freely, yet 
the question is: Who, How and What determines When the natural resource becomes a 
sustainable developmental resource? This chapter makes an empirical contribution to the 
literature by discussing the distinctive role of ‘champions’ in forging collaborative wildlife 
governance and institutions for effective conservation as well as examining the roles and 
strategies in the transformation of a community endowment into a sustainable developmental 
resource. The term ‘champion’ is used in this chapter to mean an individual who through 
specialised organising skills and interests undertakes integrated actions through a rigorous 
approach and strategies to link differing bodies unto a coherent platform; to foster 
arrangements towards the effective governance of natural resources.  
 
The study presents a case study of Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS), where the 
actions of ‘a champion’ (the late Mr Akowuah) resulted in collaborative wildlife governance 
that has helped in the conservation of a hitherto threatened monkey species that was on the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
228 
 
verge of near extinction (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2017). The BFMS in Ghana has 
subsequently become a renowned wildlife area attractive to local and international tourists, 
development agencies and researchers, with the associated society-wide benefits of that.  
 
 
9.2 Conceptual overview 
9.2.1 Social capital and natural resource development 
If societies A, B and C are given same amount of natural resource endowment, the ability of 
A, B or C to optimally adopt prudent measures to transform it into a long-term blessing or 
asset greatly depends on the social capital that society possesses. The notion of social capital 
suggests that individuals, groups, one’s family, friends and associates constitute an important 
asset that can be called upon in times of critical need (Putnam, 1993). A great deal of the 
social capital literature has been informed by Putnam’s (1993:6) work on civic participation 
and institutional performance in which he conceptualised social capital to mean the “features 
of social organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit”. One could argue that Putnam’s (1993) study took its 
cue from Bourdieu (1986:248), who conceptualised social capital as “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”.  
 
Broadening the scope, Coleman (1990:598) discusses social capital by focusing on the 
relations among groups and not just individuals. Arguing on the basis of its functional role, 
Coleman defines social capital as “a variety of different entities [which] all consist of some 
aspect of social structure, and [which] facilitate certain actions of actors ... within the 
structure”. At the macro level, social capital is explained as a process of drawing on the 
social and political environment to shape the social structure which also enables norms to 
develop. Briefly, social capital connotes individuals as assets; their close relations; 
interactions among groups; and socio-political imperatives.  
 
Relating the above conceptualisation to this study, the individual who championed the 
purposive course of action to salvage the threatened wildlife species, including the steps to 
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make the wildlife human-friendly, constituted great social capital to the Boabeng-Fiema 
community. At the micro and meso levels, his immediate family and his former school pupils 
(the youth) supported his conservation efforts. At the macro level, he drew upon the relevant 
societal actors including opinion leaders, government officials and researchers from abroad, 
which contributed greatly to revitalising a hitherto threatened monkey species into a more 
human-friendly species that has become the community’s greatest asset in fostering socio-
economic development. In essence, effective conservation requires the ability to use social 
capital to foster the appropriate social-ecological system and resilience. The concept of 
resilience implies the ability of governance regimes to make use of social capital, or other 
relevant resources, to respond and adjust effectively to changing social-ecological systems, 
and thus be able to moderate or prevent the adverse effect that similar threats may pose to 
less adaptive and less resilient social-ecological systems.  
 
 
9.3. Methods  
The study adopted an ethnographic design. Ethnography is an interpretive approach where 
researchers undertake a systematic investigation of the beliefs, processes, social interactions 
and behaviours, as well as distinctive phenomena, of sizeable societies; the process largely 
entails participation and observation over a period of time (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Reeves 
et al., 2008). The overarching goal of this design is exploration, description and explanation 
of other cultures and contextual phenomena rather than to test a quantitative hypothesis 
(Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). The study was positioned within the prevailing 
epistemology by recognising the information and knowledge base of participants. A key 
asset that enabled the study was the social relationships and intermediaries to gain 
unreserved access to key participants. According to Wilson (2008:129), ethnographic design 
requires “the proper protocol for building of healthy relationships … the use of 
intermediaries has practical uses in establishing rapport with research participants and 
placing the researcher within a circle of relations”. Consequently, the two older sons of the 
late Mr Akowuah (one is a tour guide) were very useful throughout the study period as they 
led the researchers to participants, including the chiefs, traditional priests and other relevant 
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actors. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to identify 25 key informants 
who were deemed to have the requisite information. The main instruments of primary data 
gathering involved informal discussions, narrative enquiry, in-depth interviews, simulation 
exercises and direct observations. Key individuals in the governance structure of BFMS as 
well as those who used to be closer to the ‘champion’ when he was alive, including his wife, 
were engaged in a narrative inquiry, followed by in-depth interviews. By direct observation 
and simulation exercises, the authors tied bananas to a wooden structure where ‘the 
champion’ used to feed the monkeys, which came around to pick up the bananas in the 
presence of the authors, and photos were taken (see Figure. 9.3).  
 
The study also noted how researchers and tourists from both the local area and the 
international arena visited the BFMS (Figure 9.4). All the visuals in the study were taken 
during the course of this study between 2016 and 2017. In ethnographic descriptions and 
discussions, visuals are deemed to be critical in the data-analysis process. According to 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011), the use of visuals or images is relevant as they help to focus the 
readers’ attention; they are able to explicate an idea or phenomenon that may be quite 
complicated to describe in words. Prosser succinctly makes the point: “art can describe, 
reflect, and evoke emotion, which dry facts or figures and cool logic rarely do” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011:488). All proceedings with the participants have been transcribed and sorted 
into appropriate themes and utilised in the discussions. Data were analysed using inductive 
thematic analysis based on issues that emerged from the observations and data gathered, as 
is common to ethnographic studies (Reeves et al., 2008). Direct narratives and visuals have 
been used to support the themes discussed. A major strength of this design is that through 
the observations and immersion into the society, the researchers were able to identity and 
gather novel empirical insights which have eluded previous studies. More importantly, the 
comprehensive nature of the approach helped the researchers to explore and link social 
phenomena and related narratives which may appear prima facie to have no connection 
(Reeves et al., 2008). A limitation of ethnography is that since it is confined to a particular 
context, the outcomes or conclusions cannot easily lead to generalizations, the findings 
however could be adapted to suit different contexts. 
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9.3.1 Study context 
The chapter uses the unique case of Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS) in Ghana, 
West Africa to demonstrate empirically how a ‘champion of change’ could influence social-
ecological systems by preserving a monkey species on the brink of extinction. Boabeng-
Fiema comprises two neighbouring communities, Boabeng and Fiema, which have similar 
beliefs and practices, despite a level of subtle inter-community rancour). This community is 
located 22 km North of Nkoranza District of the Brong Ahafo Region (transitional zone of 
Ghana), which is about 230 km from Accra, the capital of Ghana. The area presents a 
distinctive case, because the monkeys in the community continue to receive significant 
protection, despite the challenges they pose to community members; the widely recorded 
human-wildlife conflict with monkeys, which are becoming a threatened species in 
contemporary times, is non-existent in BFMS. But there were periods where the monkey 
species were threatened, until the emergence of a ‘champion of change’ who brought about 
a rejuvenation through pragmatic strategies (details in section 9.4).   
 
 
9.4 Results and discussion 
In this section the study provides a brief overview of BFMS and how the role of a champion 
fostered a bottom-up governance collaboration towards effective wildlife conservation. 
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Table 9.1:  Overview of emergence of champion in BFMS  
Boabeng and Fiema are two neighboring communities that are surrounded by forest which 
harbours mona and colobus monkey species. Traditional belief system had declared 
Monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema communities as totems or the ‘offspring’ two gods ‘daworo’ 
and ‘abodwo’ in the Boabeng-Fiema respectively. People in these communities, therefore, 
lived with monkeys harmoniously without any form of human ‘crime’ against the 
monkeys since the 1830s. People had beliefs in the taboo and were made to believe that if 
they harmed the monkeys, disastrous consequence would befall them. However, upon 
encounter with Christianity, some sections of the community began hunting for monkeys 
including massive destruction of the forest that inhabits them. The nature of the hunting 
nearly reached a crisis point which made one Mr. Daniel AKowuah (late), a native of the 
community to rise up as “a champion of change”. But for his intervention and the unique 
strategies embarked upon, the monkeys and their habitat would have perhaps become 
extinct or perhaps the patchy remaining monkeys being very hostile to human beings as 
observed in other contexts. The late Akowuah was a retired police officer and a then 
headmaster of Fiema Primary School who upon recognising the potential in the monkeys 
and the rate of their depletion took varying steps to salvage the situation including 
lobbying and proposals writing; community sensitisation; afforestation and taming of 
monkeys; and personal commitment to direct monitoring. These inter-linked activities 
[figure 9.1] have today made BFMS a renowned centre of attraction to both researchers 
and tourists from across the world; a research hub for many local and international 
Universities which helps generate income for society’s developmental efforts.  
 
Figure 9.1 below indicates the key strategies adopted by the ‘champion of change’ 
underlying the governance and institutional rejuvenation enabling effective preservation of 
the hitherto threatened monkey species in Boabeng-Fiema. This section also discusses the 
strategies adopted by ‘the champion’ to make the monkeys more domesticated and human-
friendly, which in turn attracts tourists from all over the world.  
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Figure 9.1: Schematic view of measures taken by the champion 
Source: Designed from field results  
 
 
a) Proposal application for sanctuary status 
Although the people of Boabeng-Fiema had seen monkeys in their forests and farms, they 
did not envisage their economic and ecological value, apart from the fact that they were 
protecting them for their gods who had ordered them to do so. Largely a rural community, 
the people felt helpless when their fundamental beliefs were challenged as a result of being 
exposed to Christianity, which undermined the value of the gods’ commandment not  to kill 
the monkeys. The Saviour Church had converts in the community who decided to hunt and 
use monkeys for their subsistence. Then a retired policeman and headmaster of Fiema 
School, Mr Daniel Akowuah (whose house was very close to the forest, see Figure. 9.2) took 
it upon himself to draw the attention of national policy makers to ‘the beauty and potential 
of the monkeys’ in the Boabeng-Fiema communities. This was in the 1960s, when he wrote 
series of proposals to the then Department of Game and Wildlife. The efforts yielded results 
and the Department sent evaluators to assess the possibility of earmarking the area as a 
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national park. However, because the Boabeng-Fiema community is largely surrounded by 
the forest harbouring the monkeys, and because there were associated land size issues, it 
would have been difficult to resettle the people. However, in the early 1970s the areas was 
officially declared a sanctuary and the National Game and Wildlife agency was to provide 
resident officials to patrol the forest (habitat of monkeys) and also to ensure that wildlife 
laws were not violated.  
 
In effect, the governance of the sanctuary was to become a more collaborative enterprise 
between the community leaders (informal institutions) and the state agency (formal 
institutions). This is what the study refers to as a bottom-up approach to collaborative 
governance, as the initial process towards the collaboration and conservation was kick-
started by an individual and with local efforts. Consequently, wildlife became largely 
untouchable as a result of the dictates of the gods as well as national policies; the latter was 
largely the consequence of the efforts and role played by the ‘champion of change’. A 
traditional priest explained:  
 
Akowuah was fortunate to be highly educated to become a senior policeman, my 
uncle [the priest at the time] told him, Kwaku (Akowuah), you have been in 
government, how can we salvage the animals from such destruction? Akowuah wrote 
a series of letters to government which saw wildlife officials coming on board. 
 
b) Continuous lobbying at local level 
His efforts did not stop only at the national level. After achieving the target of sanctuary 
status and the government declaring BFMS monkeys a protected species, he later persuaded 
the local district council (then Nkoranza District Council) to pass a by-law in 1972 that 
sought to further provide localised regulations to protect monkeys and the habitat. 
Consequently, there is now a hunting and farming ban in the core forest. People can only 
farm at designated area clearly removed from the core forest and demarcated by a buffer 
region. Therefore, the colobus and mona monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema are protected by 
national regulations, local by-laws and traditional beliefs. A traditional ruler explained: 
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He [Akowuah] saw to it that the right institutions and regulations were passed to 
protect the monkeys, even the passage of the by-laws, I cannot take it away from him. 
He had a bit of education and knew the tourism potential that monkeys could provide. 
 
The champion’s initial action of getting the right institutions passed was a worthwhile course 
of action as championing natural resources governance and conservation cannot be achieved 
without the enabling or supporting rules, regulations and structures (institutional 
underpinnings) especially regarding protected areas (Hayes, 2006). For instance, through 
this effort, the Wildlife Conservation Regulation (1971) of Ghana lists the colobus and mona 
monkeys (found in Boabeng-Fiema) as wholly protected and partially protected respectively; 
these regulations have been strengthened by local by-laws such as those of 1972 proscribing 
the hunting of monkeys and farming in the core forest – these are localised instruments to 
enhance wildlife conservation. 
 
 
c) Anchoring collaboration towards effective wildlife governance 
The champion anchored or fostered a management approach that sought to bring on board 
relevant stakeholders to collectively plan and execute the governance system and the 
conservation of monkeys. In other words, Mr Akowuah created a platform for the district 
secretary, chiefs and elders in the resource community where proposals and resolutions to 
construct a firebreak around the sanctuary were finalised. He personally planted teak trees 
(sometimes with the help of his former school pupils and many of his associates) along the 
edges of the sanctuary which have today grown into bigger trees largely used by the monkeys 
for swinging. One elderly woman who lived closer to Akowuah’s house explained: 
It was this man who because of his education and ability to communicate wrote 
letters to government… he did not sleep afterwards; he also planted a lot of teak 
trees along the sanctuary with his school youths so that the animals can be jumping 
on them.  
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Scholars (Gray, 1989) argue that a convener or champion should be able to identify and 
bring all legitimate parties to the negotiation arena; such a ‘champion’ requires a convening 
power (the ability to lobby actors to get involved) that could be based on, inter alia, the 
person’s formal position in society, or the reputation of the convener. In this case, the 
educational status, social standing and reputation of the champion helped him a lot to be able 
to induce actors to undertake collective actions. 
 
d) Personal commitment  
His interest in and enthusiasm for the process of conservation and wildlife development led 
Akowuah to retire from the teaching profession in 1975 to take full control of the Boabeng-
Fiema Monkey Sanctuary as the first warden. According to a traditional chief: 
Akowuah started the sanctuary all by himself, although the monkeys were prevalent 
already [offspring of the gods], he took it upon himself to remake the monkeys more 
human-friendly and to make people develop interest in them too. It is through his 
initiative that the place became a recognised sanctuary.  
 
His tenure as the warden made BFMS attractive to the outside world as he helped expose the 
Sanctuary to international organisations and researchers who developed an interest in the 
flora and fauna of the community. For instance, in 1989 he invited a Canadian lecturer 
(Fargey) who came with his team of students to carry out research on the monkey species. 
It was this Canadian scholar who suggested to Mr Akowuah the need to establish a formal 
management committee to help manage the BFMS. Inviting Fargey to come and conduct 
research in the area opened up the BFMS to the international community and to wider 
exposure. Fargey has been one of the main scholars to have written extensively on BFMS, 
making the place well known the world over and enhancing its status as an attractive research 
hub for many universities, especially outside Africa, who use BFMS for their field work. 
One of the Fetish Priests explained: 
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History has it he discovered the animals. But what actually happened was some white 
men came and those days, people were afraid of the whites ... So the community 
agreed that Mr Akowuah joins the white men and he worked very hard.  
 
Whichever way one wants to put it, the champion of change was pivotal in the initiation, the 
process and subsequent development of the sanctuary. 
 
A respondent who was with Mr Akowuah stated: 
Akowuah adopted several strategies to draw the animals closer to home and to 
human beings. Because he had taught before, he commanded a lot of respect and 
had most of the youth behind him. These youths helped him a lot to even go on night 
patrols; each time he heard a gunshot in the forest, even if he were asleep, he would 
wake up and move with his team of volunteers in different directions. They caused 
the arrest of many people. 
 
From the foregoing accounts one could see that apart from his enthusiasm and personal 
commitment, social capital and networks played key role in the success of the champion. 
His acquaintances along with his family and the youth contributed immensely to the success 
of most of the strategies he adopted. Ostrom and Ahn (2009) confirm that social capital 
serves as a social relationship asset which has the potential to engender anticipatory or future 
benefits to a community or a process. In this regard, social capital contributed to the 
Boabeng-Fiema community as well as Mr Akowuah’s processes to prevent the hunting of 
the monkey species. 
 
e) Appropriate steps to domesticate the wildlife 
Largely because the monkeys had been threatened and hunted by some sections of the 
community, they had become very afraid of humans and wouldn’t come close to humans or 
their homes. However, Mr Akowuah used pragmatic steps to reorient the monkeys’ 
behavious and to tame them. Today, when tourists visit BFMS, a significant and wonderful 
phenomenon they observe is monkeys moving in and around the houses of people; this is 
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the result of some actions systematically and rationally orchestrated by the first warden (Mr 
Akowuah). A respondent very close to Akowuah who witnessed and participated in these 
initiatives explained: 
Akowuah would buy bananas [preferred food of monkeys] and place them along the 
routes of monkeys closer to the forest. The monkeys would come along to pick these 
bananas, next time he would place it a bit closer and closer till it got to a time the 
bananas were placed very close to the home. These monkeys through that action got 
closer to the home without fears. Because our house was close to the forest, it was 
quite easy to do this (see Figure 9.2). 
 
In the process, he was actively supported by his family (social capital), who helped in either 
conveying logs of wood to construct benches to accommodate people, or seedlings to plant 
along the sanctuary. Regarding the domestication of the monkeys, a close associate of 
Akowuah explained: 
One of my daughters would put bananas on her lap and the monkeys would jump and 
pick. He made one of our sons convey logs from nearby village to construct some 
structures purposely for feeding monkeys. It was because of the monkeys that he 
made this structure [pointing to a wooden frame linking the pillars of the house]. He 
tied a rope with bananas along the bar; when these bananas get ripened, monkeys 
would come, pluck and eat. By and large, they kept trooping to the house and other 
households in their numbers. (See Figure 9.3) 
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Figure 9.2:  Location of Mr Akowuah’s house in relation to the forest 
Source: Photograph taken by candidate 
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Figure 9.3:  The wooden structure designed by Mr Akowuah to hang up food for the 
monkeys 
Source: (Fieldowork, 2017; Photograph taken by candidate) 
 
The idea of social connections and networks was instrumental in the entire process as the 
champion tapped the strength, assistance and expertise of many experts and interested 
parties, who also helped in the wildlife governance, institutional development and general 
protection that would have been very difficult for him if he had acted exclusively on his own 
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(see also Yamaki (2016) on the role of social networks).  In our data-gathering process, a 
queen mother had this to say: 
There was a white researcher who set a machine and placed all kinds of foods behind 
Mr Akowuah’s house for some months... that sought to train them [the monkeys] … 
There was one Mrs Sackey who helped in the process… Today they do not fear guns; 
if they see you with a gun, they won’t be moved.  
 
By and large, the timely intervention and pragmatic undertakings by Mr Akowuah that 
garnered micro, meso and macro support helped develop Boabeng-Fiema Monkey 
Sanctuary into a sustainable developmental resource for the Boabeng-Fiema community. In 
the discussions a traditional chief suggested that nature could provide people or a community 
with an endowment, but it takes ‘champions’ to develop such natural endowment into a 
valuable resource or community-wide asset. Monkeys in BFMS are human-friendly and they 
attract researchers and tourists from across the globe, which exposes the community to many 
opportunities (see Figures 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6). He remarked: 
The monkeys were prevalent, you would see them swinging on the trees when going 
to the farm. He [Akowuah] saw to it that the right institutions and regulations were 
passed to protect the monkeys, even the passage of the by-laws, I cannot take it away 
from him. He had a bit of education and knew the tourism potential that monkeys 
could provide. 
 
f) Public education and sensitisation 
Mr Akowuah took it upon himself to educate the people on the need to accommodate and 
protect the monkeys, as this could have economic benefits for the community. This he did 
by moving from one church (the major threat to the monkeys at the time) to the other to have 
talks with the people. A key respondent explained 
To sensitise the church people, he himself converted to become a member of Saviour 
Church, but had intention to educate and make them to understand why they should 
not hunt or destroy the beauty of the wildlife. With time, he was able to convince 
them. Once that mission got accomplished he discontinued attending that church. 
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The role of social education to get people adopt an appropriate attitude towards 
environmental conservation cannot be overemphasised, even where there are formal and/or 
informal rules in place. In this case, the approach adopted by the ‘champion’ helped each of 
the partners (the champion and the Saviour Church) to understand each other’s perspectives 
and also to learn from different knowledge bases; through that he was able to explain to them 
the community-wide benefit that could be associated with the monkeys if they were 
conserved well. Wheatley (1992) explains that although such public sensitisation efforts 
might not completely resolve the problem, it can considerably reduce the threats to 
conservation efforts (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 9.4:  Human-friendly monkeys attract researchers to BFMS 
Source: (Fieldowork, 2017; Photograph taken by candidate) 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
243 
 
 
Figure 9.5:  Pastoral wives and international researchers in BFMS 
Source: (Fieldowork, 2017; Photograph taken by candidate) 
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Figure 9.6:  Friendly “domesticated monkeys” attract toursits 
Source: Photograph taken by Field Assistant 
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g) Championing conservation efforts: A challenging yet worthwhile activity 
Finally, it should be noted that a decision to champion a natural resource conservation 
process entails some form of confrontation or dealing with the adverse sentiments of people. 
However, it is essential for one to remain focused and stay committed to the course of action. 
The ‘champion’ in this case faced some challenges as most of the people appeared ignorant 
of what he was trying to achieve. This was explained by a traditional ruler: 
Even nananom [traditional rulers and elders] at the time appeared not to really 
understand or appreciate his actions and initiatives at the time. There was a time he 
was summoned before the paramount chief of Nkoranza, but nananom at the time did 
not really rally behind him. 
 
Another participant explained an ordeal the champion had to go through because he was 
promoting or facilitating the domestication of monkey.  
There was even one man whose kenkey [local food made of maize] was eaten by a 
monkey and he rushed to Mr Akowuah for money to replace the kenkey and his 
argument was that it was Mr Akowuah encouraging the animals to come home.  
 
In spite of the apparent challenges, the ‘champion’ remained steadfast in his commitment 
and today the monkeys in Boabeng-Fiema have received international exposure, attracting 
researchers and tourists from every part of Ghana and abroad, generating income for the 
community through a stipulated benefit-sharing system (Eshun et al., 2014). To that end, the 
conservation efforts of and strategies adopted by Mr Akowuah have helped to transform the 
community’s natural endowment into a community-wide sustainable and valuable asset, as 
well as a major source of income, development and prestige to the Boabeng-Fiema 
community (Figuress 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6; see also Eshun et al., 2014). It is in recognition of the 
champion’s efforts that the main trail that leads to the Sanctuary is named after him; it is the 
first trail any visitor catches sight of (Figure 9.2).  
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9.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
The case study provides evidence that human actions towards nature could engender the 
appropriate natural resource outcomes and preferred behavioural changes that would yield a 
benefit to society. The study has drawn the following key conclusions from the discussions. 
 
Firstly, the role of individuals and leadership remains a cornerstone in natural resource 
governance. Within the developed institutional and governance set up, the championing 
roles of unique individuals remain essential and the catalyst in such processes. Individuals 
such as students, researchers or community members could initiate a process that could lead 
to the transformation of a redundant or exploited natural endowment into a sustainable 
resource or asset. In other words, the interrelated set of actions and strategies could lead to 
a paradigm shift in the way that people conceptualise and relate to a particular resource as 
well as the kinds of benefits it would generate for community members.  
 
Secondly, transforming a community’s natural supply (such as river, wildlife, trees, 
mountains, waterfall) from just being a natural endowment to a developmental resource and 
community asset requires a championing role by individuals who garner the support of others 
to catalyse or call for external support to achieve this purpose. More specifically here, the 
study contends that a given natural resource endowment in one community could remain 
idle or even be destroyed, even though the same endowment could be utilised as a 
developmental resource in another society because of the contextual differences between 
them.  
 
Thirdly, the study observes that it does not necessarily require a legitimate authority or the 
state to kick-start conservation or collaborative arrangements towards effective natural 
resource governance. Concerned individuals and groups could adapt some of the strategies 
used by the champion in this case study to contextualise in their respective areas. The study 
contends that initiating and championing a particular course of action requires an inter-
related set of activities that need to be performed tactfully, including immersing oneself in 
the community’s social ways so as to win their trust (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). In the 
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case of Mr Akowuah (the champion), he had to attend the Saviour Church not because he 
wished to, but because he had the objective of using the platform to reorient the church 
members and stop then hunting and taunting monkeys.  
 
Finally, a major aim of this chapter is to reorient readers (researchers, students, advocates 
and policy makers) towards the point of view that the actions of an individual or group could 
champion a particular course that could provide future benefits with respect to the way a 
given community endowment could be converted into a developmental resource. The study 
argues that teaching should also reorient students or rural communities (targeting its 
influential members) on how best they could initiate some context-specific actions that could 
spark a debate on how a redundant or exploited resource endowment could be transformed 
into a sustainable asset.  It could be well conserved and so provide greater value to society, 
if powered by the appropriate governance structures and institutional underpinning. 
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Chapter Ten 
Synthesis and Conclusions 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The final chapter provides general conclusions to the entire dissertation. This is done chapter 
by chapter as each chapter has met a specific study objective. Key conclusions are drawn, 
and contributions to knowledge in collaborative natural resource governance are also 
highlighted. The chapter also provides some personal reflections as well as indicating the 
practical constraints faced by the researcher in carrying out the study. A final part highlights 
the scholarly achievement and general contribution towards advancing knowledge in the 
wider field of public and development management. This demonstrates the eclectic approach 
of the student, as a further career objective is to advance the frontiers of knowledge in the 
field of public and development management beyond this PhD project. 
 
 
10.2 Summary of study findings 
The study sought to explore the theory and practice of collaborative governance, specifically 
institutional assessment in natural resource governance. In doing so, it adopted an 
institutional analysis framework to examine the trajectory of institutional design as well as 
the interplay of formal and informal institutions in the collaborative natural resource 
governance of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS). The study set out to (a) 
contribute to the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of institutionalism and 
collaborative natural resource governance, which was later contextualised (b) using the 
case of BFMS to examine the triggers of collaborative governance.  
 
(a) To make a theoretical and conceptual contribution, this study was underscored by two 
preliminary objectives: (i) to design a framework to optimise the facilitation of collaboration 
between local resource users and state agencies in natural resource governance; and (ii) to 
design a framework for institutional analysis in natural resource governance. Through a 
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critical review of classical theories and recent empirical literature on the concepts, the 
dissertation accomplished these two objectives, culminating in the publication of two peer-
reviewed manuscripts.16  
 
(b) To contextualise the practice of institutionalism in collaborative natural resource 
governance, the study investigated the case of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in 
Ghana. This formed the empirical basis of the dissertation, which was also underpinned by 
three main research objectives: (i) to examine the institutional and governance evolution of 
Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary and its triggers; (ii) to empirically examine the interplay 
between formal and informal institutions in natural resource governance; (iii) to discuss the 
role of ‘a champion’ in a ‘bottom-up approach’ to natural resource collaboration. These 
research objectives culminated in three peer-reviewed research articles.17  
 
 
10.3 Synthesis  
Experiences of ‘fortress’ state management of natural resources, on the one hand, and 
exclusive community management, on the other hand, have proven to be problematic. This 
has led to the idea of collaborative natural resource governance that advances partnerships 
between multiple stakeholders essentially involving synergistic relationships between state 
and non-state actors. This study makes a contribution to the theory and practice of 
collaborative natural resource governance. To make a meaningful contribution to the 
literature, policy and practice, the study set out to find answers to five key research questions, 
as outlined below.   
                                                          
16 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2016). Rising to the challenge: A framework 
for optimising value in collaborative natural resource governance. Forest Policy and Economics, 67, 
20-29. 
Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2017). Institutional assessment in natural 
resource governance: A conceptual overview. Forest Policy and Economics, 74, 1–12. 
 
17 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2017) ‘Complex crisis’ and the rise of 
collaborative natural resource governance: institutional trajectory of a wildlife governance 
experience in Ghana. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 1-20. 
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Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). Two sides of the same coin: 
Synergy between formal and informal institutions in natural resource governance, (in 
review) 
Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). ‘Comparative Conservation 
Studies: A “Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance’. In A. Farazamand 
(Ed.). Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy & Governance. New: 
Springer. 
 
1. How can conveners optimise a collaboration process between local resource 
users and state agencies?  
Having experienced the structural weaknesses and challenges associated with exclusive state 
or community management of resources, the idea of collaboration in natural resource 
governance has been developed since the 1980s. This approach adopts a network governance 
approach; this entails a multi-actor regime that has become popular mainly because of the 
lessons derived from the failure of the former approach, which tended to be too bureaucratic, 
centralised, state monopolised and, worse of it all, regarded local communities as destroyers 
of the environment and resources. However, with the ‘age of networks’ that developed 
mostly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a paradigm shift towards an 
emphasis on a ‘people’, ‘stakeholders’ and ‘communities’, where policies regarding natural 
environmental resources are devised through a deliberative democratic process.  
 
This approach has become known as, inter alia, collaborative environmental governance or 
co-management, which has varying positive benefits for natural resource governance. 
However, given the human tendency to be sceptical, which mostly is the result of some 
negative collaborative experiences, prospective collaboration or co-management 
arrangements with communities or groups are likely to face initial challenges. A first 
objective of this study aimed at reviewing the literature on the concept of collaborative 
natural resource governance, including the benefits as well as common challenges facing the 
process. The study observes the process as largely social and technical in nature and 
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therefore develops a socio-technical framework to aid state agencies and conveners of 
natural resource collaboration. 
 
As a contribution to knowledge, the study (Chapter Five) designs a framework to guide 
individual researchers, practitioners and organisations who seek to foster collaboration 
between local communities and state agencies. This has been published as “Rising to the 
challenge: A framework for optimising value in collaborative natural resource governance”, 
published in Forest Policy and Economics Journal, 67, 2016. The chapter reflects on 
classical and recent experiences with natural resource collaboration to design an ‘ABC 
framework’ aimed at providing a signpost to agencies, governments and conveners of 
collaboration on how to execute this socio-technical process to maximise value. The ABC 
framework has three broad pillars: Adopting and advancing human skills, Building integrity 
and legitimacy, and Creating a sense of attachment to the resource in question. The published 
version of this chapter has already received attention, with over 100 reads on Researchgate 
alone with five citations. 
 
2. What framework could demonstrate how formal and formal institutions 
interact in natural resource governance? 
Owing to the complexities (the nexus between attainment of conservation, and delivery of 
local socioeconomic benefits) associated with natural resources and multiple stakeholders 
involved, ‘institutions’ are required to structure patterns of interaction. In other words, 
collaborative natural resource governance hinges on how the ‘rules of the game’ structure 
the powers, benefits and actors involved in the process. Collaborative natural resource 
governance is therefore structured by rules, norms and strategies, which make 
institutionalism fundamental in the natural resource governance discourse. 
 
By way of contributing to knowledge, the study has led to the publication of a paper 
“Institutional Assessment in Natural Resource Governance: A Conceptual Overview” in the 
Forest Policy and Economics 74 (2017), which discusses an analytical framework to 
illustrate how formal and informal institutions structure natural resource governance. The 
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paper (Chapter Six) informs readers and practitioners that it is not institutions per se but the 
‘nature of the interaction’ between formal and informal institutions together with the 
‘enforcement mechanisms’ that will to a large extent determine the kind of resource 
outcomes. These are two important conceptual and theoretical contributions that the 
dissertation has offered to natural resource practitioners, policy makers and literature.  
 
Besides the above conceptual contributions to the literature on collaborative natural resource 
governance and its implementation, the final three chapters of the dissertation discuss the 
rise and evolution of collaborative natural resource governance institutions using the 
experience of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary (BFMS).  
 
3. What were the triggers of institutional and governance evolution in the BFMS? 
Classic and recent studies of collaborative natural resource governance have sought to 
evaluate the efficacy and resilience of institutions in ecological management, especially over 
time. Locally evolved institutional mechanisms governed by stable communities and 
reinforced by outside forces have successfully underpinned resources management over the 
years, even though these mechanisms have often had to adapt to periods of disturbance in 
the social- ecological equilibrium (Dietz et al., 2003). Each disturbance in the dynamics in 
the social-ecological system prompts consequent learning and adjustment in the institutional 
and governance underpinnings; Sayer et al. (2013:8351) put this succinctly: “each surprise 
is an opportunity for learning, leading to the development of new understandings as a basis 
for revised strategies”. Using the BFMS case, this study makes a contribution to the literature 
on the triggers of collaborative governance and institutional evolution as well as how socio-
ecological systems bounce back when faced with threats.  
 
As a further contribution to knowledge, the third objective led to the publication in 2017 of 
a paper “Complex Crisis and the rise of Collaborative Natural Resource Governance: 
Institutional Trajectory of a Wildlife Governance Experience in Ghana” in the Environment, 
Development and Sustainability Journal. The study (Chapter Seven) observed a ‘critical 
juncture’ along the narratives of BFMS pathways, which compelled the prevailing 
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institutional arrangements to evolve into a more collaborative regime, demonstrating a 
synergistic relationship between informal and formal institutions. The study concludes that 
the drive or evolution towards collaboration does not occur naturally but circumstantially. 
The finding adds to the existing body of theoretical assumptions and empirical findings that 
in periods of critical threats, systems must demonstrate adaptive capacity to remain viable 
or they will perish. 
 
4. How does the interplay of formal and informal institutions engender effective 
natural resource protection in BFMS? 
There has been the call to forge a synergistic relationship between local ecological 
knowledge (local taboos, indigenous governance structures and belief systems) and formal 
institutions in the governance of natural resources in those communities endowed robust 
informal institutions and governance system. How exactly do informal institutions 
complement formal state regulation of natural resources? What are the key enforcing 
mechanisms underpinning formal and informal institutions? 
 
A fourth objective of the study sought to adapt the institutional and development framework 
to assess the role of informal institutions in the enforcement of formal natural resource 
institutions using the case of the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana, West Africa 
(Chapter Eight). Specifically, the chapter underscores the interplay of formal and informal 
institutions to engender effective natural resource protection in the BFMS. Realising this 
objective produced a manuscript “Two sides of the same coin: Synergy between formal and 
informal institutions in natural resource governance”, which is being considered for 
publication. The chapter concludes that by infusing dynamism into informal institutions, 
they become more successful in engendering compliance rates that facilitates the operations 
of formal game and wildlife officers. 
 
5. How does collaborative natural resource governance evolve from below? 
The final part of the dissertation (Chapter Nine) entailed examining the way that 
collaborative natural resource governance emanates from a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Using the 
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unique role played by ‘a champion’ in BFMS to inspire a bottom-up approach to natural 
resource collaboration, this research result has been published as “Comparative 
Conservation Studies: A Bottom-up Natural Resource Collaborative Governance”, a chapter 
in the Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration,  Public Policy and Governance, 2018. 
The study concludes that it does not necessarily require a legitimate authority or the state to 
kick-start conservation or collaborative arrangements towards effective natural resource 
governance. This study therefore makes a challenging contribution to the literature on 
collaborative governance, which is replete with top-down collaborative initiatives. The study 
demonstrates that concerned individuals and groups could adapt some of the strategies used 
by the champion in this case study to contextualise developing their natural endowment into 
a resource through collaborative approach. 
 
 
10.4 Insights  
Although this empirical study highlights the insights derived from a specific study (BFMS), 
these observations could nonetheless be utilised as general insights in the themes below, 
which are deemed important for influencing thoughts on the policies, theory and practice of 
collaborative natural resource governance. 
 
Natural resource institutions are not naturally evolving constructs 
Natural resource governance should not be viewed as a naturally evolving phenomenon, but 
as one whose institutional underpinning and philosophy evolves ‘circumstantially’ in 
response to unique triggers. Any contemporary institutional arrangement and governance 
regime of a natural resource has narratives that can be unravelled only by going into the 
intricacies of unique cases. This study postulates that the ability of a natural resource 
governance system to adjust or readjust its institutional underpinnings and governance 
regime in the face of threat, of whatever form or intensity, contributes enormously to the 
viability of the particular ecosystem. Institutions must necessarily evolve to adapt when there 
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is sufficient evidence that the existing regime has become weakened in the face of the 
changing internal and external conditions of social-ecological systems.18 
 
Threat or fear of threat is a window of opportunity for collaboration 
Although the literature on natural resource governance is replete with indications that natural 
resource collaboration tends to have to confront suspicion, fears, apprehension and mistrust 
from local people in the collaborative process, this study demonstrates that the emergence 
of intense threats and the reaching of critical junctures can open up the window of 
opportunity for collaboration to emerge or flourish with less resistance.16 
 
Local initiatives catalyse or trigger natural resource collaboration  
Observations and lessons from this study demonstrate that collaborative natural resource 
governance is not always about the devolution of powers from a central government to 
lower-tier bodies, or that it necessarily gets kick-started by the state and its agencies. The 
point is made that such governance could also emanate from alliances between a lower-tier 
body and state agencies or other non-state bodies. In other words, collaboration towards 
adapting to a changing social-ecological system does not necessarily have to emanate from 
the top (government); individual actors could initiate processes that foster state-community 
collaboration towards establishing an adaptive and more resilient governance regime. The 
role of local leadership, social capital, local organisations and groups, and community-based 
organisations are essential in this drive.19 
 
Informal institutions and mythology require institutional complementarity over time 
Community-based natural resource governance underpinned by mythology, myths and 
traditional institutions necessarily need to be sustained over time by complementing it with 
formal institutions. Although informal institutions are formidable in enhancing natural 
                                                          
18 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. ‘Complex crisis’ and the rise of collaborative 
natural resource governance: institutional trajectory of a wildlife governance experience in 
Ghana. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 1-20. 
19 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). ‘Comparative Conservation 
Studies: A “Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance’. In A. Farazamand (Ed.). 
Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy & Governance. New Delhi: Springer. 
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resource protection largely through voluntary compliance, reinforcing effective enforcement 
systems also requires a more collaborative regime where formal institutions provide some 
form of legal basis and legitimacy to complement the role of the informal systems. 
Institutional development becomes crucial as society becomes more heterogeneous, with the 
associated social dynamics that might render the erstwhile voluntary compliance largely 
restricted to perhaps fewer members of society. 
 
‘Modernising’ aspects of informal institutions essential for sustainable outcomes 
Although informal institutions are formidable in enhancing natural resource protection 
largely through voluntary compliance, with the passage of time it becomes more important 
to introduce some elements of transparency as well as participatory processes and 
‘relevance’. In spite of the myths around the resource, it should demonstrate some tangible 
socio-economic benefits to community members. In the study it was observed that BFMS 
has instituted a benefit-sharing scheme from income derived from wildlife eco-tourism, 
which is also enshrined in a modern BFMS Constitution. Although by tradition people are 
required to protect the monkeys, this traditional protection is consolidated, or in modern 
times also justified, by the economic value derived from preservation of the monkeys and 
their habitat. Natural resource institutions should be viewed as dynamic or evolutionary in 
nature; as society and the resource grow in sophistication and dynamism, natural resource 
institutions should correspondingly rise to the challenge of making the governance process 
participatory, involving varying actors and introducing benefit schemes to somewhat offset 
the apparent loss from protecting and harbouring the resource. 
 
The whole product of the synergy is greater than the sum of the parts of formal and 
informal institutions 
Synergy between formal and informal institutions, which are adequately enforced by 
recognisable governance structures, gives natural resources effective protection from all 
members of society. Migrants or so-called ‘modern thinkers’ who might otherwise show a 
disregard for or disbelief in the local traditions will be compelled to comply by state 
regulations (formal institutions), whilst the ‘traditional thinkers’ who otherwise might have 
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ignored the state regulations are compelled to comply by informal institutions. The study 
argues that although informal institutions are essential to natural resource governance, their 
relevance becomes more robust when synergistically engaged within a formal institutional 
arena.20 
 
Human skills are as important as technical skills in the drive to collaboration 
The drive to collaborative natural resource governance should be viewed as socio-technical 
in nature, an art and a science with its own socio-technical rules. This is because it requires 
key competencies, skills and procedures in bridging barriers among people and groups. 
Being oblivious to these ground rules and approaches may deepenor escalate conflicts and  
even create new ones, which may make the ‘promised values’ of collaboration seem 
increasingly elusive.21 Conveners and policy makers require adequate human skills; they 
need to adopt the power of effective communication required to adapt to a context and even 
immerse themselves in the context, and manage the apparent challenges without giving up.22  
 
Value in local self-help or community initiatives  
Transforming a community’s natural supply (such as a river, wildlife, trees, mountains, 
waterfall) from just being a natural endowment to a developmental resource and community 
asset requires a championing role of an individual who garners the support of others to 
catalyse or call for external support to achieve this purpose. The study explores the BFMS 
case where a champion helped in kick-starting natural resource collaboration, through local 
strategies and deployment of social capital; this changed the monkeys from being a 
threatened species to becoming a more “human-friendly” species, in the process becoming 
the community’s greatest asset in fostering socio-economic development. 
                                                          
20 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). Two sides of the same coin: Synergy 
between formal and informal institutions in natural resource governance (in review) 
21 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2016). Rising to the challenge: A framework 
for optimising value in collaborative natural resource governance. Forest Policy and Economics, 67, 
20-29. 
22 Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Muller, K., & Domfeh, K. A. (2018). ‘Comparative Conservation Studies: 
A “Bottom-up” Natural Resource Collaborative Governance’. In A. Farazamand (Ed.). Global 
Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy & Governance. Springer, New Delhi. 
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10.5 Experiences and reflections 
This dissertation has drawn on six publications which form the basis for the respective 
chapters of the work. The researcher’s key reflections, experiences and challenges in the 
course of the three-and-half year doctoral study are summarised below. 
 
Although a transdisciplinary approach is conceptually rich, convincing and deemed 
appropriate for natural resource governance study, adopting it for an individual PhD 
dissertation presents some key challenges which necessarily require the researcher to adapt 
the methodology. The literature is limited on how to carry out TD research as an individual 
researcher, especially for degree purposes. With its underpinning philosophy of disciplinary 
border crossing and the nature of engagements in all relevant phases of the research, one 
may wonder whether an ‘idealised participatory’ transdisciplinary individual PhD 
dissertation could be feasible. The researcher was eager to position this research within a 
transdisciplinary approach by first conceptualising and publishing a manuscript on the theme 
“Transdisciplinary Approach to Natural Resource Governance Research: A Conceptual 
Paper” (published in the Management of Environmental Quality Journal). Yet the practical 
requirements and constraints within the context of an individual PhD dissertation could not 
make for an idealised transdisciplinary research. This is because students have a limited time 
frame and deadlines for completion of the dissertation with strict funding arrangements. 
However, TD requires an iterative process and entails extensive time, higher locus, and 
resources backing for more varied stakeholder engagements, workshops and brainstorming 
sessions to co-develop a common research theme. Transdisciplinary work requires 
substantial financial resources, which will be difficult for individual PhD researchers not 
part of a bigger funded project team to access.  
 
In spite of the apparent constraints, the researcher adapted various means to ensure access to 
different stakeholders through a consultative approach (see Mobjörk, 2010). Although the 
approach might not be regarded as entirely transdisciplinary in the strict sense of the 
approach, the dissertation nonetheless demonstrates the relevance and appropriateness of 
transdisciplinary approach by positioning this research within the broader philosophy of TD. 
The conceptual paper which has already been published provides key insights and a practical 
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guide to conducting TD research, even though this would be more feasible when the research 
forms part of a bigger project with more than an individual carrying out doctoral research 
work. It also demonstrates that given the right context and adequate resources, the researcher 
could embark on an ideal transdisciplinary research. Observing the practical constraints 
associated with the TD approach, Max-Neef (2005:12) contends that “although 
transdisciplinary research and approaches are necessary, transdisciplinarity in itself is still 
an unfinished project, around which there is still much to be discovered and investigated. It 
should be clear that transdisciplinarity is, at this stage, both a tool and a project”; in this 
particular research project TD served only as a tool. 
 
 
10.6 Future direction 
This study has demonstrated the need for a more participatory approach in collaborative 
natural resource governance research. The findings and conclusions are clear-cut, with five 
peer-reviewed articles published. Given the experiences, conclusions and practical 
limitations encountered in the course of the research, the study offers important pointers for 
a future direction and research. 
 
1. Conclusions based on the way that collaboration could evolve through a bottom-up 
process (Chapter Nine) indicate that a further direction is to reorient researchers, 
students, advocates and policy makers towards the view that it could take the action 
of an individual or group to champion a particular course that could provide future 
benefits if a given community endowment is turned into a developmental resource. 
The study argues that the direction of pedagogy should also be to reorient students 
or rural communities (targeting influential members) on how best they could initiate 
some context-specific actions that could initiate a debate on how best a resource 
endowment could be transformed into a sustainable asset, well conserved while 
providing greater value to society, powered by appropriate governance structures and 
institutional underpinning. 
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2. Further research could ascertain the nature of the institutional evolution of 
collaborative natural resource governance in other contexts. This comparative 
approach is more important in the process of theory building. This study was more 
exploratory and adopted the use of indigenous approaches that were more 
participatory and qualitative by proceeding through narratives; hence developing 
generalisations was beyond the scope of this PhD thesis. The approach was able to 
elicit relevant insights from stakeholders’ point of view. Having brought out the 
pointers and key issues in the consequent publications, further research could adopt 
mixed methods including community-wide surveys in order to test for some key 
variables that could lead to valid generalisations. 
 
3. Further research on natural resource institutionalism could combine transdisciplinary 
approaches (Chapter Four) with quantitative techniques and other sophisticated 
methods (mixed methods), to determine which of the two institutions (either formal 
or informal) engenders greater compliance by disaggregating these through more 
quantitative techniques and testing. 
 
4. Further research and practice should consider the deployment of the ABC framework 
developed in this study (Chapter Five) to determine how socio-technical imperatives 
prepare the grounds for natural resource collaboration. This framework, including 
others produced in the course of this PhD project, could be deployed as the 
conceptual framework for further study and tested empirically to determine its 
relevance. 
 
5. Further studies on the role of mythology and customary beliefs in natural resource 
governance in contemporary times are to be encouraged, with a greater focus on the 
key sustaining elements and triggers of these elements. This will form an important 
niche in natural resource governance literature, which may well help in modernising 
many traditionally managed resources that may outlive their usefulness over time if 
the governance system is left unattended. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP 
 
The interview guide is a research instrument to facilitate a semi-structured interview to carry 
out a study on the topic “Theory and Practice of Governance Collaboration: Institutional 
Assessment in Collaborative Natural Resource Governance” in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Public Management and Development 
Planning. The data elicited from participants shall be used solely for academic purposes and 
respondents are assured of the strictest confidentiality. 
 
SECTION A: Background of Respondent 
a. Designation of respondent: …………………………………………………. 
b. Position of respondent: ……………………………………………………… 
c. How long in the position: …………………………………………................ 
d. Gender of respondent: ……………………………………………………… 
e. Age range: …………………………………………………………………… 
f. Educational background: …………………………………………………... 
 
SECTION B: COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENT   
(Specialty questions for practitioners) 
1. To what extent would you say this resource is managed by both the state agencies 
and the community? 
2. Who are the members of the community that are involved in the governance process 
of this environmental resource? What criteria did you use in determining these 
stakeholders? Has there ever been a review of membership? 
3. What is the regulatory framework or provision that sets up this arrangement or to 
what extent are these individuals recognised in the governance process?  
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4. What factors do you think necessitated each of the provisions mentioned? How have 
these rules changed over time? And perhaps why? 
5. How is power and responsibility shared among these actors and how often is this 
power relations revised? When was it set up? Has there been any review? Have new 
actors being incorporated? 
6. Do you envisage any further tighter collaboration between the government agencies, 
the traditional institutions and community in the short to medium term? 
 
SECTION C: FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
1. What are the main legislative instruments that underpin the management of this 
resource? 
2. Have there been reviews or amendments to any of these? If yes, why? 
3. To what extent do these legislative instruments recognise the traditional institutions 
or informal institutions here? Please explain your answer, cite empirically where 
applicable 
4. To what extent do you also know the informal institutions (including taboos, 
restrictions and cultural practices) of the people regarding this resource? To what 
extent do you think they facilitate or pervert your efforts? 
5. Do you have any local operational plan or activity that was developed based on the 
people’s belief system? 
6. Does your outfit or agency have any formal forum or interaction with the traditional 
authorities? Please explain your answer 
7. What is the relationship between the government agencies and the traditional 
institutions? 
8. How do the laws, rules and regulations of government and the by-laws of the district 
assembly operate vis-à-vis the traditional rules and taboo system in managing the 
resource?  
9. Do you see a nexus? Do they ever conflict? Do they partner each other? Please 
explain by giving specific ones and how they operate together or apart 
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10. How do you think the traditional knowledge of the people regarding resource 
management and preservation help in the management process? 
11. How does the traditional institution (chieftaincy) and “nananom” influence or 
contribute to the management and conservation process? 
12. Do you think there has been a collaboration or partnership between government 
laws/agencies and traditional institutions/taboos in protecting or conserving this 
resource? If yes, how? When did it begin? Did it emerge out of a crisis point or 
natural evolution? 
13. Do you think the government agencies and assembly help in maintaining, protecting 
or enforcing the cultural practices or restrictions?  
14. To what extent do community members contribute in the governance process or in 
general contribute or influence the decision making process? 
 
SECTION D: ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
1. How are the formal rules on restrictions and access effectively enforced? Who are 
the actors in the enforcement process? 
2. To what extent do you think the people comply with formal rules? At what cost to 
your agency? 
3. How do you also think the informal institutions (taboos and culture) structure 
people’s orientation towards the resource? 
4. How do you monitor the informal rules that underpin the conservation of the 
environmental resource? 
5. How do you think the cultural restrictions on this particular resource make the people 
protect it differently from other environmental resources in this community?  
6. What do you think propels the people comply with these cultural restrictions? 
7. To what extent do the chiefs collaborate with government agencies to monitor and 
enforce the taboos on the resource? Is there a better relationship between the two? 
8. What has been the dynamics in terms of the compliance levels? Has obedience to the 
restrictions or taboos increased or decreased over time? What accounts for the 
dynamics 
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9. How does changing society, Christianity and influx of migrants affect compliance 
levels? 
 
SECTION E: BOTTOM UP APPROACH TO COLLABORATION 
1. Can you provide a brief overview of how the state agencies intervened or got 
involved in the Boaben-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary? 
2. Who and how were the brains behind the initial stages of seeking external help from 
government? 
3. Could you explain some of the strategies adopted? 
4. What key challenges did the process encounter? 
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